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Abstract
This doctoral thesis reports the results of three studies that address the implications of
two bank characteristics - bank efficiency and bank earnings quality - for bank dividend
policy and specified capital market outcomes. Chapter 1 introduces the thesis.
The first study links the market reactions to dividend change announcements by banks
to changes in bank efficiency score, our new measure of bank overinvestment problem,
derived from a frontier analysis of bank input-output combinations. We find that im-
provement in bank overinvestment problem, defined as changes in bank efficiency, is
significantly and positively associated with market reactions following dividend increases.
However, consistent with the moderating role of bank regulation, we find no support for
the role of changes in bank efficiency in market reactions to dividend decreases.
The second study establishes a link between bank earnings quality and bank cost
of equity capital. Using various earnings quality measures, the study finds that banks
with better earnings quality experience lower cost of equity capital. Consistent with this
primary finding, our results also support the idea that banks with higher earnings quality
enjoy higher market valuation and higher price-earnings multiples compared to banks with
lower earnings quality. Overall, our results suggest that markets can differentiate between
“good” and “bad” earnings and seem to compensate banks with better earnings quality.
The third study contributes to the literature by first developing a country-specific index
of bank earnings quality. We further hypothesise that banks in countries characterised by
high earnings quality pay more dividends than banks in countries with lower earnings qual-
ity. Our data give support to this hypothesis. Finally, using modified partial adjustment
models that incorporate our index of earnings quality, we find that the dividend-earnings
relation is stronger for banks operating in countries with high earnings quality than for
banks operating in countries with low earnings quality.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Introduction and Motivation
The importance of the banking system has received recognition from economists for
centuries, in particular, from Smith (1776), who highlights the importance of banks
through their liquidity creation function in helping the commerce of Scotland. He notes,
‘that the trade and industry of Scotland, however, have increased very considerably during
this period, and that the banks have contributed a good deal to this increase, cannot
be doubted.’ Hamilton (1781) argues that ‘banks were the happiest engines that were
invented’ for encouraging economic growth and development. More recently, Corrigan
(1982) and Volcker (1983), suggest that banks, because of their influence in determining
the size and growth of the money supply, are important in the transmission mechanism of
monetary policy. In serving this transmission role, banks have been the special institutions
that link the central bank to the commercial sector of the economy, through the stock
of bank deposit and asset allocation decisions.1
However, the recurring banking crises and their reverberating impact on all facets of
economies around the world seem to support Adams’ (1819) alternative position that
‘banks harm morality, tranquillity and even wealth of nations.’2 Perhaps, ‘banks are
nothing more, nothing less than intermediaries’ (Bossone, 2001) except that governments,
through regulations have made them special (England, 1991), and neither is anything
special in the loans they offer (Black, 1975; Fama, 1980).
Evidence supporting the destabilising role of banks, as strongly expressed by Adams
abounds in recent literature. For example, Caprio and Klingebiel (1999) and Demirguc-
Kunt et al. (2006) report that as many as thirty-five countries experienced banking crises
between 1985 and 1995, the result of which their banking systems virtually stopped
functioning while the countries entered recessions. With regard to the US, in particular,
1Studies by Gerschenkron (1962), Hellwig (1991), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), and Levine et al.
(2000) also highlight the positive influence of banks on economic development of countries.
2Adams’ view later received support as during the Great Depression one-third of US banks (about
10000) failed between 1929-33 (Mishkin, 2009, 206) wiping out $140 billion of depositors’ funds.
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between 1985 and 1990, bank failures averaged 170 banks per year (England, 1991). In
addition, the fact that bank failures triggered the more recent economic crisis is not an
overstatement. Underlying the role of banks in the crisis is the fact that between October
2007 and July 2011, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) recorded 405
failed US banks, 94% of which occurred since August 2007, when the current economic
crisis started.3
These crises bring to the fore pervasive questions that have engaged theorists and
empiricists on the nature of banks and their role in the allocation of economic resources.
Why do banks exist especially if the externalities from their existence are incidences of
bank crises, which create regular taxpayer funded black hole in the banking industry? In
fact, in a world a´ la Arrow-Debreu with complete and symmetric information between
market participants, and where market frictions such as tax and agency cost are non-
existent, there is neither a need for money nor banks and other financial intermediaries
as investors and borrowers are able to achieve efficient risk allocation on their own.
As Freixas and Rochet (2008, 10) show, analogous to the Modigliani-Miller theorem,
if firms and households have unrestricted access to perfect financial market, then in a
competitive equilibrium, banks make zero profits and the size and composition of bank
balance sheets, and their decisions have no effect on other economic agents because
households are completely indifferent between deposits and securities. Similarly, firms are
completely indifferent as to bank credit (financial institutions) versus securities (financial
markets).4
The reality of market frictions provides plausible explanations for the existence of banks
and their importance in economic growth and development. By moving away from the
perfect and complete market paradigm to an imperfect and incomplete market paradigm,
intermediation theories provide formal justifications for the existence of financial interme-
diaries, especially banks. These theories, which also support the special nature of banks
as economic entities, argue along two lines: that economic agents come together to form
financial intermediaries in order to mitigate economic consequences of (1) transaction
costs and (2) information asymmetries, resulting from an imperfect market. Thus, banks
exist to provide specific services that benefit suppliers of funds, who otherwise prefer to
hold cash as they view direct investment in financial claims and markets as an unattract-
3This list includes only failed depository banks and excludes failed investment banks, such
as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, as the FDIC does not cover these and sim-
ilar banks. We retrieved these data on 23 July 2011 from the website of FDIC:
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html
4See, for example, Hagen (1976).
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ive proposition due to monitoring costs, liquidity costs, and price risks (Saunders and
Cornett, 2009, 13).
The transaction cost explanation (e.g. Gurley and Shaw, 1960) views financial inter-
mediaries as agents that exist primarily to transform securities issued by firms (shares
and bonds) to securities demanded by investors (deposits and loans). Financial interme-
diaries are important because they provide services of divisibility and risk transformation,
which borrowers cannot obtain on their own, under identical conditions due to transac-
tion costs and limits to diversification. In particular, the fixed cost of asset evaluation
implies that financial intermediaries have advantage over individuals because they allow
cost-sharing resulting in lower trading cost, which ensures that intermediaries are better
able to diversify their risk than individuals can (Allen and Santomero, 1997).
Modern theories based on information asymmetries suggest that financial intermediar-
ies, such as banks, are unique in the provision of liquidity insurance, payment services,
transformation of assets, management of risk, monitoring of borrowers, and production
of information (e.g. Gorton and Winton, 2003; Freixas and Rochet, 2008; Saunders and
Cornett, 2009).5 These banking roles provide explanations for the nature of bank balance
sheet and the fragility of their capital structure. For example, the provision of liquidity
insurance explains the liability side of a bank’s balance sheet, which serves as medium
of exchange and the monitoring role explains the assets side of its balance sheet. How-
ever, as with explanations based on the transaction cost theory, none of the explanations
based on the theory of information asymmetry stands alone as a satisfactory explanation
of intermediaries; rather they are complementary.
Freeman (1996) extends the role of banks in the payment system to that of providing
liquidity for the system. Banks provide liquidity to the system through the role played
by their liabilities as medium of exchange and payment. Following Diamond and Dybvig
(1983), Freixas and Rochet (2008, 16) describe banks as ‘pools of liquidity’ or ‘coali-
tions of depositors’ that provide households with insurance against idiosyncratic liquidity
shocks. Freixas and Rochet (2008, 23) show that in an economy in which agents are
individually subject to independent liquidity shocks, market allocation can be improved
by a deposit contract offered by a financial intermediary. It is the ability of banks to
satisfy the liquidity needs of suppliers of funds and borrowers, using different classes of
assets that define their role as asset transformers as they purchase illiquid financial claims
and finance these purchases by selling financial claims to householders and other funds
suppliers in the form of liquid and divisible deposits. Banks, compared to other financial
5Saunders and Cornett (2009, 378) give a more exhaustive list and discussion of these functions.
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institutions are efficient in financing illiquid assets with liquid liabilities because of their
ability to diversify and substantially reduce transaction costs.
Consistent with theoretical literature, a recent empirical study supports the importance
of banks, in particular, their ability to create liquidity. Berger and Bouwman (2009)
develop four innovative measures of bank-level liquidity creation. The authors report that
banks in the US created liquidity in excess of $2.8 trillion as of 2003, which represents
nearly double of the value in real terms for 1993. They note that “large banks” (about 2%
of the sample) created as much as 81% of the liquidity and that banks create only about
half of their liquidity on the balance sheet, highlighting the importance of off-balance
sheet liquidity creation. However, the provision of liquidity service by banks leaves them
exposed to systemic risk that justifies their regulation and explains the fragility of their
capital structure and their susceptibility to runs as banks operate with a balance sheet
characterised by greater value of liquid deposits relative to the liquidation value of assets.
(Diamond and Rajan, 2001).
Diamond and Rajan (2001) further suggest an explanation for the existence and unique-
ness of banks in an environment where both investors and borrowers care about liquidity.
They argue that investors demand liquidity because they are uncertain about the time at
which they may want to reduce their holding of financial assets, while borrowers demand
liquidity because they are uncertain about their ability to raise funds in the future. An
intermediary that accepts deposits and extends loans is valuable in that setting because
it enables depositors to have better access to their funds than they would if they invested
directly in firms. The intermediary also insures borrowers against the risk that funding
will cease without notice, were they to borrow from an investor. Banks meet the needs of
investors by offering deposits, payable at par on demand, and providing loans to borrower
according to their risk profile.
However, why is it optimal for a single entity to simultaneously provide both the liquidity
functions of deposit-taking and lending? Fama (1980, 1985) Calomiris and Kahn (1991)
Flannery (1994) and Kashyap et al. (2002) examine why banks finance long-term illiquid
investment with short-term liquid liabilities. According to these authors, lending and
deposit-taking are the two manifestations of provision of liquidity on demand and banks
enjoy synergies between the two activities to the extent that both require banks to hold
large balances of liquid assets. If deposit withdrawals and commitment takedowns are
imperfectly correlated, the two activities can share the costs of the liquid-asset stockpile
(see, also, Holmstrom and Tirole, 1998).
Diamond (1984) drawing on the banker-customer pedagogic put forward by Schum-
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peter (1939), the single-agent-single principal literature, as well as the literature on in-
formation asymmetry, develops a theory of financial intermediation based on the minimum
cost of production of information useful for resolving incentive problems. Diamond ar-
gues that, although monitoring is costly, banks have cost advantage in collecting and
producing information because available alternatives that involve individual lenders either
result in costly duplication of efforts or a free rider problem, in which no lender monit-
ors. Because of their competitive (net cost) advantage in the production of information,
banks are delegated the task of costly monitoring of loan contracts written with firms
who borrow from them. As with the explanation relating to liquidity insurance, the key
to the existence of banks in this set-up is an informational problem under which firms
have more information about their investment projects than investors do. Investors may
choose, however, to delegate monitoring to a bank through which they all provide funding
to the firm (see, also, Seward, 1990). This monitoring role and the long-term relation-
ship that develops from it prevent adverse selection and opportunistic behaviour of the
borrower, including moral hazard and costly state verification (Mayer, 1988).
The idea that banks serve as delegated monitors by granting loans to firms seems to
receive empirical support from Best and Zhang (1993), who investigate market reactions
to new loan announcements by firms. The authors report positive stock price reactions
to new loan announcements, consistent with the role of banks as delegated monitors and
their comparative advantage in evaluating risky lending opportunities, where new loan
announcements serve as “seal of approval” concerning a prospective borrower’s credit
worthiness. This result is also consistent with the role of banks as producers of valuable
information.
However, Campbell and Kracaw (1980), while contributing to the information produc-
tion role of intermediaries, argue against the implication that information production is
a sufficient and primary condition for the emergence of intermediaries in an otherwise
perfect capital market. Instead, they argue that intermediaries emerge as information
producers because the production of information, the protection of confidentiality, the
provision of transactions services, as well as other intermediary services are, naturally,
complementary activities.
Leland and Pyle (1977) justify the existence of financial intermediaries by considering
the benefits obtained by borrowers when they form coalitions, provided they can truth-
fully communicate the quality of their projects within the coalition. They hypothesise
that the informational asymmetry that characterises capital markets is the primary and
sufficient explanation for the existence of intermediaries, such as banks. They argue
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that the moral hazard resulting from asymmetry information between the lenders and
borrowers, in which the latter party has superior and private information, suggests that
market value must reflect the average project quality. However, because the capital mar-
ket places average value that is greater than average cost on low quality projects, under
information asymmetry poor quality projects swamp high quality projects. Furthermore,
because the verification of true characteristics by outside parties may be costly or im-
possible the resulting poor information transfer implies that markets may perform poorly
as the probability that the projects for which all information is known and which merit
financing cannot be undertaken because of the high cost of capital resulting from low
average project quality. Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that something is special about
intermediation, which mitigates the problems of moral hazard and appropriability that
affect the production of information.6 They suggest that an intermediary could resolve
both the moral hazard and appropriability problem by investing its wealth in assets about
which it claims to have produced valuable information.
However, what explains the coexistence of financial intermediaries and financial mar-
kets? According to Diamond (1984), the increasing returns in the monitoring technology
implied that a monopoly bank should emerge and replace financial markets. The study
by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) suggests that the existence of financial markets typic-
ally impairs the provision of liquidity insurance by deposit banks. A second generation
of models focuses on the coexistence of financial markets and financial intermediaries.
These models attempt to explain the financial choice of firms between issuing securities
in the financial markets (direct finance) and borrowing from a bank (monitored finance).
Different, but complementary, explanations of this choice have been analysed formally
in the literature. According to these models, firms with the best reputation (Diamond,
1991), the highest level of collateral (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997), the best techno-
logy (Boot and Thakor, 1997) or the best credit rating (Bolton and Freixas, 2000) are
more likely to choose direct finance thus supporting a role for banks and other financial
institutions even in the presence of financial markets.
The special nature and functions of banking that we discuss above introduce another
dimension to the discussion of banking literature. As banks deliver on their services to
individual suppliers of capital and the economy they face potential risk, which may affect
their ability to perform with the costly impact on suppliers and users of funds as well as
the economy. Because of this, banks operate in a highly regulated environment designed
6See Gorton and Winton (2003) for a description of these problems and their impact on information
production.
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to increase the information available to investors and ensure the soundness of the financial
system and safety and efficiency of the payment system. The existence of asymmetric
information in financial markets is associated with the dual problem of adverse selection
and moral hazard that may hinder the efficient operation of financial markets. This
asymmetric information is potentially inimical to the survival and soundness of financial
intermediaries. As depositors may not be able to assess whether a depository institution
is sound, a shadow of a doubt about the overall health of financial intermediaries may
lead to runs on both sound and unsound institutions. This bank panic further exacerbates
the adverse selection and moral hazard problems in credit markets, produces large losses
for the public and causes serious damage to the economy. It is for these reasons that
banks and other financial institutions are highly regulated. Although they might impose
private cost on individual financial institutions and their managers, bank regulations are
aimed at increasing the efficiency of financial markets by reducing the adverse selection
and moral hazard problems. Consequently, regulation is an attempt to enhance the social
welfare benefits and mitigate the risks in the provision of financial intermediation services
(Saunders and Cornett, 2009, 18).
In view of potential negative impact of bank failures on local, national, and international
economies, numerous proposals aimed at protecting banks from runs receive attention
in the banking literature. Perhaps, the most popular of these are the deposit insurance
schemes, a version of which was first introduced in the US in 1934 after the bank failures
of 1930-1933. These schemes aim to provide protection for depositors and an insurance
guarantee for banks against runs. However, at least two practical difficulties are associated
with these schemes. First, because deposit insurance protects depositors from loss, the
provider of deposit insurance assumes the potential risk of the depositors. This reduces
the motivation for depositors to monitor banks and to demand an appropriate interest
rate that matches the risk of the bank. In addition, deposit insurance is associated with
moral hazard problems when the deposit insurer charges all insured banks a flat rate
premium, as more risky banks do not fully reflect the additional risk in their cost of
capital and therefore have incentives to take on more risk.
Proposals to mitigate the moral hazard (risk-shifting incentive) associated with deposit
insurance have taken the form of charging banks risk-based insurance premium and the
regulation of banks capital structure. The latter became an internationally coordinated
measure starting with the introduction of Basle I in 1988 and culminating in Basle II
issued in 2004.
Notwithstanding the economic importance of banks, the special nature of banks and
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the implication of their high regulatory environment have influenced academic literature as
banks and other financial institutions receive little attention on important and interesting
issues that have implications for better understanding of firms. We appreciate that the
special nature of banks, in particular their regulatory environment, places constraints on
banks by limiting the scope of their investment, capital structure, and dividend decisions.
These constraints ensure that banks are substantially different from industrial firms in
terms of their operations, leverage, and accounting. However, we do not appreciate a
near complete exclusion of banks from important and interesting accounting and finance
issues.7 Perhaps, the neglect of banks from empirical literature is more in line with
widespread view that we can ignore financial intermediaries because they have no real
effect; they are a veil; they do not affect asset prices or the allocation of resources (Allen,
2001); and, in lieu of a less academic adjective often used, they are uninteresting and
unattractive. As evidence of this view, Allen (2001) points out that the millennium issue
of the Journal of Finance contained surveys on asset pricing, continuous time finance,
and corporate finance but did not survey financial intermediaries.
In view of this limitation, the importance of a better understanding of the factors
affecting bank performance, and the outcomes of bank corporate choices, the thesis fills
some gaps in the literature by investigating, using bank-level and country-level data as
appropriate, the capital market consequences of bank information quality and its relation
to bank corporate policy, in particular dividends. The thesis also provides exploratory
evidence on the link between firm efficiency and dividend policy, an issue that receives
little attention in studies relating to banking and non-banking firms.
The remainder of this introductory chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 1.2, we
review the literature relating to the subject areas of the research, while in Section 1.3 we
present a summary of findings relating to the three broad issues that we examine in the
thesis.
1.2 Thesis Areas Literature Review
While we provide further literature review in each chapter that relates to the issue that
we research, in this section, we provide a brief review of the literature to place the thesis
in context, right from the outset. Our research relates to three strands of literature:
the measurement and implications of bank efficiency (Chapter 2); the relation between
7As we experienced during the course of this research, the dearth of data, notwithstanding the creativity
of researchers, is also one practical reason while banks have receive little attention, at least, in
empirical studies.
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information and the cost of equity capital (Chapter 3); the determinants of dividend
policy (Chapter 2); and consequences of earnings quality (Chapter 3 & 4).
1.2.1 Information Risk and The Cost of Capital
Recently, research in accounting moved focus from issues relating to the determinants
or drivers of accounting policy choices and disclosure to capital market implications of
these choices. Whether disclosure policies and financial reporting affect firm cost of
capital has become one of the most interesting questions in the accounting and finance
literature (Beyer et al., 2010). Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and portfolio theory
suggest a clear distinction between risks that are diversifiable and those that are not
diversifiable. Specifically, the CAPM offers no role for information risk in establishing a
firm’s cost of capital as such risk is easily diversifiable. However, a number of theoretical
and empirical studies suggest direct and/or indirect link between the cost of equity capital
and the quantity/quality of accounting information. These studies have evolved along
two streams: transaction cost and estimation risk explanations.
The first stream of studies links high cost of capital to low information stock because
of the positive (negative) relation between bid-ask spreads (market liquidity) and inform-
ation asymmetry. Theories along this line argue that greater disclosure reduces investor
uncertainty and attracts greater long-term investment by investors: firms that disclose
greater information that deliver greater returns to investors are able to attract long-term
investors thus improving the marketability of their shares and lowering the cost of equity
capital. Verrecchia (1983) and Dye (1985) show that greater disclosure of information
increases the demand for stock of the disclosing firms leading to lower cost of capital.
Benston (1986) and Fishman and Hagerty (1989) argue that greater disclosure of ac-
counting information promotes better monitoring of managers, which improves market
perception of managers of such firms leading to an increase in investor base thereby
lowering the cost of capital.
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) provide the most prominent transaction cost based
theoretical link between information and the cost of capital. The authors argue that the
cost of equity capital is greater for securities with wider bid-ask spreads because investors
require a higher return to compensate for the additional transaction costs resulting from
information asymmetry. The release of additional information helps to reduce information
asymmetry and allows firms to reduce the adverse selection component of the bid-ask
spread and increase the liquidity of the shares, thereby reducing the cost of equity capital.
Therefore, for Amihud and Mendelson (1986), the link between information and the cost
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of capital exists because information reduces asymmetry information, resulting in the
reduction of transaction costs and improvement in stock liquidity (see, also, Diamond,
1985; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Lang and Lundholm, 1993).
The impact of differential information on equity betas and its implications on the
cost of equity is the focus of the second stream of studies. These theoretical studies
suggest that greater level of disclosure reduces the estimation risk associated with investor
assessments of the parameters of an asset’s return distributions. The argument goes that
because investors’ estimate of the parameters of a security’s return distributions depends
on publicly available information, investors perceive securities for which there is relatively
less information as relatively more risky because of the uncertainty surrounding their
returns parameters. Therefore, greater disclosure reduces the uncertainty and lowers the
estimation risk (error) thereby reducing the cost of equity capital.
Seminal studies by Barry and Brown (1985) and Coles et al. (1995) use a Bayesian
framework to compare two information environments with differential information struc-
ture. In one environment, information is available for all firms in the economy, whereas
in the other information environment there are more observations for one group of firms
than there are for another. The authors find that the traditional CAPM formula for
market beta does not reflect estimation risk resulting in estimates of betas of the high
information securities that are lower than they would be in the equal information case.
Barry and Brown (1985) suggest that estimation risk, which may not be observable in
returns data, is an additional element of risk that investors consider over and above
the observable measures of risk. They argue that the possible existence of unobservable
estimation risk might explain why small, less established low information firms seem to
have higher average rates of returns than the large and well established high information
firms as noted, for example, by Banz (1981) in the well-documented size effect.
However, Banz (1981) and Reinganum and Smith (1983) suggest that in well-diversified
economies with many securities, estimation risk should be largely diversifiable. According
to Reinganum and Smith (1983), estimation risk is inherently idiosyncratic and where
securities with low information are a small part of a market index, idiosyncratic com-
ponents have a correspondingly small influence on index variances and covariances. This
argument contradicts Handa and Linn (1993), who argue that systematic components of
estimation risk are potentially important, even in well-diversified economies. In view of
the controversy, Clarkson et al. (1996) analytically explore the diversifiability of inform-
ation effect. Using a Bayesian framework similar to that employed by Barry and Brown
(1985), they conclude that the differential information effect should not be fully diversi-
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fiable in most common settings but that its magnitude should vary considerably across
firms. They predict that firms with more idiosyncratic components should also initially
have higher beta risk and as a result, a greater rate of decline in beta as information
increases.
Lambert et al. (2007) show that the quality of accounting information has a potential
direct and indirect influence on the cost of capital. The direct effect, which is consistent
with “estimation risk” paradigm, occurs because higher quality disclosure affect market
participants’ assessments of the distribution of the future cash flows, without having a
direct impact on the cash flows per se. In addition, the quality of information exerts
an indirect effect on cost of capital by affecting a firm’s real decisions, which in turn
influence its expected value and covariance of firm cash flow. While the authors suggest
that accounting information may have a positive and negative relation with the cost of
equity capital, they show that the effect of information on the cost of capital is not
diversifiable and affects all firms. They conclude that higher information quality lowers
market risk in the traditional CAPM framework resulting in the reduction of the cost of
equity.
Relying on theoretical evidence that suggests a role for information in the determination
of firm’s cost of equity, however controversial, a number of empirical studies attempt to
investigate whether this role is supported by data. In line with this, Botosan (1997),
using a restrictive sample of 122 manufacturing firms, documents a negative association
between the cost of equity capital and voluntary disclosure level for firms with low analyst
following - firms with higher information asymmetry. However, she finds no association
between these variables for firms with a high analyst following and for the full sample
of firms. In view of limitations of the study by Botosan (1997), Botosan and Plumlee
(2002) re-examine the link between the cost of equity capital and disclosure level using
much larger sample. Contrary to expectation, they find that total disclosure is not
associated with a lower cost of equity capital. However, when they examine, individually,
the components of the total disclosure level they find that firms with a high analyst
following benefit from providing greater annual report disclosure. On the other hand, and
contrary to the prediction from theory, they find a strong positive and significant relation
between the cost of equity and the level of timely disclosures, such as the quarterly
report of shareholders. Finally, they find no association between the cost of capital
and “investors relations” - presentation of analysis, company-sponsored field trip, and
interviews. Botosan and Plumlee (2002) suggest that the positive relation between the
cost of equity and timely disclosure, while inconsistent with theory, is consistent with
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the concern of managers regarding the negative impact of timely disclosure (such as
quarterly reports) on the cost of equity as high frequency of disclosure increases stock
price volatility.
Poshakwale and Courtis (2005) extend the link between the cost of capital and disclos-
ure level to the banking sector using a sample of 135 banks from Europe, North America,
and Australia. The authors argue that higher level of voluntary disclosure lowers in-
vestor uncertainty and encourages investors to accept lower dividend payout. A lower
dividend stream reduces the cost of capital because of a lower risk premium expected by
investors. They argue that the lower cost of capital implies a lower cut-off rate that is
applied in appraising potential projects thereby improving a firm’s chances of accepting
a higher number of profitable projects. Consistent with their prediction, controlling for
cross-sectional variation in firm characteristics, they find a negative relation between their
disclosure score and the cost of equity, measured as price to book value multiples. Our
study provides a within-country investigation of the link between the cost of equity and
bank financial reporting. However, unlike Poshakwale and Courtis, who investigate the
role of disclosure level on the cost of equity, our study investigates the relation between
quality of information, as measured by earnings quality, and bank cost of equity. In ad-
dition, we extend the study to examine the role of earnings quality on bank value and
value relevance of bank earnings.
1.2.2 Dividend Policy: Theories and Evidence
Lintner (1956) pioneers modern academic empirical research on dividend policy. Lintner
interviewed financial and other corporate officers of 28 US companies on factors that
entered most actively into dividend decisions.8 He reports that the primary question
for many companies regarding their dividend decision was ‘should the existing dividend
be changed?’ He notes that the relationship between current earnings and the existing
dividend rate was the most important single factor determining the decision to change
dividends and the amount of any change in dividends. Lintner (1956) reports that firms
only increase their dividends when management believe there is a permanent increase in
earnings, suggesting that a dividend increase implies a sustainability of the new level of
dividends because of the sustainability and persistence of the current level of earnings.
In addition, Lintner (1956) reports that management exhibit an inherent resistance
to change the level of dividends (inertia), concern for substantially increasing dividends
(conservatism), and the belief that most stockholders prefer and put a premium on a
8See, also, Allen (1992) for evidence relating to the UK.
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reasonable stable rate of dividends. Managers are also extremely reluctant to decrease the
level of dividends, because they are concerned about sending negative information to the
market. Lintner (1956) captures his findings with the now well-known partial adjustment
model in which dividend change depends on current earnings, lagged dividends, and
an adjustment factor, which is a function of management’s conservatism and/or inertia
about dividend change. Fama and Babiak (1968) apply the Lintner model to a sample of
392 US industrial firms for the period between 1947 to 1964 and provide strong support
for many of the findings documented by Lintner (1956).9
Apart from the dividend smoothing behaviour uncovered by Lintner (1956), Allen and
Michaely (2003) note five additional empirical observations that are the focal points in the
discussion of dividend (payout) decisions. They show that large, established corporations
typically pay out a significant percentage of their earnings in the form of dividends and
repurchases and that dividends have been the predominant form of payout while share
repurchases are increasingly becoming important (e.g. Grullon and Michaely, 2002). In
addition, among firms traded on organized exchanges the proportion of dividend-paying
firms has been steadily declining (e.g. Fama and French, 2001; Ferris et al., 2006).10
Moreover, individuals in high tax brackets receive large amounts in cash dividend and pay
substantial amounts of tax on dividends (e.g. Peterson et al., 1985). Finally, they also
note that markets react positively to announcements of repurchase (e.g. Ikenberry et al.,
1995; Grullon and Michaely, 2004) and dividend increases, including initiation (e.g. Pettit,
1972; Charest, 1978; Aharony and Swary, 1980; Michaely et al., 1995), and negatively to
announcements of dividend decreases, including omission (e.g. Impson, 1997; Lie, 2005).
These stylised observations pointing to the importance of dividends are inconsistent
with the dividends irrelevance theory of Miller and Modigliani (1961). In their seminal pa-
per, Miller and Modigliani (1961) provide analytical arguments contradicting the hitherto
received knowledge that shareholders preferred dividends by some unspecified multiples of
earnings (e.g. Graham et al., 1961). According to this traditional position, all else equal,
the more generous the dividend policy the higher the shareholders’ wealth. Miller and
Modigliani (1961) ask whether ‘companies with generous distribution policies consistently
9Brittain (1964, 1966) and Brav et al. (2005) provide additional empirical support for the Lintner
(1956) model.
10However, Julio and Ikenberry (2004) report that this pattern seems to have reversed in more recent
years. In addition, DeAngelo et al. (2004) find no evidence indicating a reduction in dividends. They
report that while the number of payers has reduced there has been a significant increase in nominal
and real dividends because the increase in real dividends paid by firms at the top of the dividend
distribution more than compensate for the reduction resulting from dividend omission by many small
payers at the bottom of the distribution.
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sell at a premium above those with niggardly payouts’ and invoke the assumptions of the
perfect market with rational investors and perfect certainty to prove that firm value is
independent of dividend policy. This is so as a firm’s dividend policy neither affects its
cost of capital nor the total returns to its shareholders. They conclude that a firm’s value
is determined, only, by the quality of the firm’s investments, as typified by the sequence
of cash flows from operations, and not by the manner in which the net earnings are shared
between dividends and retentions.
Recently, however, in a sequence of three studies DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006, 2007,
2008) resuscitate the relevance-irrelevance debate by casting doubt on the current the-
oretical understanding of the irrelevance of dividend policy as advocated by Miller and
Modigliani (1961). In the first of these papers, they argue that ‘payout policy is not irrel-
evant and that investment policy is not the sole determinant of value, even in frictionless
markets.’ They provide analytical argument showing that the reason why payout policy
is irrelevant in the Miller and Modigliani’s framework is that the authors’ assumptions re-
duce the feasible set to optimal choices by requiring firms to pay 100 percent of their free
cash flow in every year, thus preventing niggardly distribution. DeAngelo and DeAngelo
(2006) argue that if Miller and Modigliani’s assumptions were modified to allow retention
with NPV of investment policy fixed, a firm can reduce its value by paying less than full
present value of free cash flows. They conclude that payout policy affects the wealth of
the shareholders and its value relevance is not limited to the influence of project choice
or to the effect of market imperfections, such as tax.11
In view of the influential theoretical paradigm suggesting no role for dividends in in-
fluencing firm value, and the tax disadvantage of dividends relative to capital gains in
most jurisdictions, it must be perplexing that firms, including banks, have a preference
to disgorge cash through dividends, while shareholders seem to respond favourably to an-
nouncements of dividend payments. Thus, the puzzle: why do companies pay dividends
and why do shareholders seem to prefer dividends?
A good theory of dividends therefore is one that is able to explain as many of the pat-
terns of dividends as possible. Financial economists have spent the greater part of the last
five decades attempting to provide explanations for the observed patterns of dividends.
The imperfections of the capital market are, expectedly, viable candidate explanations.
While capital markets are imperfect because of (differential) tax, asymmetric informa-
tion structure, agency problem, transaction cost, and regulations, the most influential
11However, see Handley (2008) for a criticism of the arguments and conclusions presented in the papers
by DeAngelo and DeAngelo.
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explanations for dividend payments relate mostly to the informational component.
The signalling explanation of dividends (Bhattacharya, 1979; John and Williams, 1985;
Miller and Rock, 1985) suggest that managers have private information about the future
cash flows of the firms and pay or increase (decrease) dividends in order to signal this
private information to investors. Managers have an incentive to signal the private inform-
ation when they believe that the company’s stocks are currently undervalued. Given that
payment of dividends is costly, dividends serve as a credible signal as other firms with
less favourable inside information cannot mimic the dividend decision of a high quality
dividend-paying firm without having to cut back on dividends in later years.12 Thus, one
implication of the dividend-signalling hypothesis is that stocks of firms that increase (de-
crease) dividends should experience positive (negative) price reaction as markets review
their expectations about the prospect of the dividend announcing firms.
Bhattacharya (1979) pioneers the signalling explanation for dividends and the market
reactions to dividends. He assumes that while markets are characterised by information
asymmetry, managers nonetheless act in the interest of shareholders. He proposes a two-
period model in which managers signal the quality of an investment project by committing
to a dividend policy at time zero. Simultaneously at time zero, managers invest in a
project about which they have private information relating to the project’s quality, as
measured by the expected profitability. The model assumes that if the payoffs from
the project are not sufficient to maintain the committed dividends, the firm will cover
any shortfall through outside financing and incur transaction costs in doing so. If the
firm does indeed have good quality projects, it will usually be able to pay the dividends
without resorting to outside finance and thus bears no transaction costs. Therefore,
the transaction costs associated with external financing prevents firms with low quality
projects from mimicking the dividend decision of firms with high quality projects. If
dividends are high enough, the extra costs of assessing the market will more than offset
the advantage from the higher share price received in time 1. As such, it would be
unprofitable for the firm with poor quality project to mimic the dividend policy of the
firm with good quality project.
Bhattacharya’s (1979) model is successful in providing some explanations to some of
the issues relating to the dividend conundrum. It explains the positive market reactions
to dividend increase suggesting that investors are able to decipher the signal in manage-
ment’s dividend choices. It is also consistent with the payment of dividends notwith-
12For example, Asquith and Mullins Jr (1983) contend that dividend announcements are effective signals
because they are "backed by hard, cold cash," or the lack of it.
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standing the dividend-tax disadvantage relative to capital gain; dividends are desirable
provided the dissipative (transaction) cost incurred in time zero is less than the benefit
from a higher market value at time 1. However, his model fails to provide an explanation
for management’s use of dividends as signals when there are other less costly and equally
effective alternatives, such as share repurchase (Vermaelen, 1981; Comment and Jarrell,
1991; Bartov, 1991) and debt (Ross, 1977). Thus, implicit in his model is the assumption
that dividends and share repurchase are perfect substitutes. In addition, Bhattacharya’s
model fails to address the observed dividend smoothing behaviour of management.
Miller and Rock (1985) avoid the critical but less defensible assumption that managers
commit to paying a known level of dividends that is the core of Bhattacharya’s (1979)
signalling model. The authors present a two-period model in which the private information
relates to the level of firm’s investments and the profitability of these investments. At
time zero, a firm invests in a project whose cash flows are unobservable by investors. At
time 1, the firm uses the cash flows generated by the project to finance dividend payments
and new investments, both of which are unobservable by investors. Thus, according to
Miller and Rock (1985), the opportunity cost of paying dividends is the lost investment
opportunity, rather than the transaction cost put forward by Bhattacharya (1979). As
the level of cash flows and investments are unobservable by the market, a bad firm may
mimic the dividend policy of good firms by paying dividends and cutting down on its
investments. However, a very high dividend level precludes such from happening without
having an adverse effect on cash flows, investment level, and future dividends of the
mimicking firms. Therefore, Miller and Rock’s (1985) model provides an explanation for
the large dividend payout observed in practice. It is also consistent with the positive
reaction to dividend increase. But like Bhattacharya’s (1979) model, their model fails to
provide a convincing argument on why managers prefer the use of more costly dividend
signal when other less costly signalling alternatives exist.
The premier implication of the dividend signalling models suggests a positive relation
between dividend changes and future earnings changes. Watts (1973) provides the first
empirical test of the relation between current dividends and future earnings. Using di-
vidends and earnings data relating to 310 firms for the years 1946-67, the author tests
the ability of current and past level of dividends and earnings to predict future earnings.
He finds only weak evidence supporting the information content of dividends. While tests
suggest that on average the relationship between future earnings changes and current un-
expected dividend changes is positive, these tests also suggest that the average absolute
size of the future earnings changes which is conveyed by unexpected dividend changes
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is trivial. This conclusion is consistent with Penman (1983) who finds that there is
not much information conveyed by dividend changes, after controlling for management’s
future earnings forecast (see, also, Gonedes, 1978).
However, Healy and Palepu (1988) report that firms that initiate dividend payments
have positive earnings changes in the year before (mean 4.3%), the dividend announce-
ment year (mean 5.5%), and two years after the dividend policy change (mean 2.2% and
3.5%, respectively) even after controlling for industry effect. For the dividend-omitting
firms, Healy and Palepu (1988) show that, similar to dividend initiation, dividend omission
follows significant changes in earnings. However, following dividend omission, omitting
firms experienced two years of significant positive earnings changes, contrary to the pre-
diction of the dividend signalling models. Benartzi et al. (1997) reinvestigate the issue
using a much larger number of firms covering the period 1979-91. Consistent with Healy
and Palepu (1988), they find a positive correlation between past and current earnings
changes and dividend increases. Again, contrary to the dividend signalling prediction,
they find no relation between future earnings changes and dividend changes. For dividend
decreases, however their results support to a negative and significant relation between
earnings changes and dividend changes in the two years following dividend cuts, consist-
ent with Healy and Palepu (1988) for dividend omissions but contrary to the dividend
signalling prediction.
Nissim and Ziv (2001) argue that earlier studies investigating the link between dividend
changes and earnings changes report weak results because the regression models that they
adopt are misspecified due to measurement error and omitted variable problems. After
correcting for these econometrics issues by controlling for the expected change in future
earnings, the authors find that dividend changes provide information about the level of
profitability in subsequent years, incremental to market and accounting data. In support
of the information content hypothesis, they also document a positive relation between
dividend changes and earnings changes in each of the two subsequent years following
dividend changes. However, their results are not symmetric for dividend increases and
decreases. For their full sample, dividend increases are associated with future profitabil-
ity for at least four years after the dividend changes whereas dividend decreases exhibit
no relation with future profitability after controlling for current and expected profitab-
ility. They suggest that the lack of association between dividend decreases and future
profitability is due to accounting conservatism.
Following the conflicting results presented by Benartzi et al. (1997) and Nissim and
Ziv (2001), Benartzi et al. (2001) re-examine the relation between dividend changes and
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earnings changes using the Fama and French (2000) modified partial adjustment model
which controls for non-linearity occasioned by the mean reversing nature of earnings.
They find no evidence that dividend changes contain information about future earnings
changes.
The idea of a positive relation between dividend changes and stock price changes
receives support in the literature. For example, Benartzi et al. (1997) show that a signi-
ficant price increase (decrease) follows announcement of dividend increases (decreases).
They find significant average abnormal returns of 0.81% (-2.5%) over a three-day event
window following dividend increases (decreases). Bessler and Nohel (1996) investigate
one of the implications of the dividend signalling models for banks. They hypothesise that
the announcement effect of dividend reductions should be more severe for banks than for
non-financial firms because bank customers may avoid financially weak institutions and
discontinue the relationship on the release of negative information. To test their hypo-
thesis, they investigate 81 dividend reductions for the period 1974-1991. Consistent with
the signalling theory, they find significant abnormal returns of -8.02% for the two-day
event window and -11.46% for a two-week period, correctly noting that these negative
valuation effects are stronger relative to those reported in studies of dividend reductions
by non-financial firms and other negative bank announcements. Their results underline
the need for a separate treatment of banks and other regulated firms in empirical studies.
While the dividend signalling models give no guidance on the possibility of an in-
formation transfer from one firm to the other, another body of research documents the
existence of intra-industry transfers of information where news about one firm is extrapol-
ated to other companies in the same industry. Firth (1996) links the dividend signalling
and the information transfer literatures. His result suggests that not only do dividends
signal information about the announcing firms but that these signals also reflect on the
stocks of similar firms within the same industry. Specifically, he reports significantly pos-
itive abnormal returns of 2.63% (0.37%) for dividend increasing (non-announcing) firms
and significantly negative abnormal returns of -4.29% (-0.6%) for dividend decreasing
(non-announcing) firms over a two-day event window. Bessler and Nohel (2000) extend
this strand of studies to the banking industry. They test the idea of a contagion effect
in bank stock returns stemming from announcements of dividend reductions by money-
center banks. They investigate the possibility that a reduction in bank dividends signals
information not only about the bank but also about other banks in the same industry.
The authors find that non-announcing money-center banks suffer negative abnormal re-
turns when rival money-center banks announce dividend cuts. They conclude that the
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abnormal returns of non-announcing banks are systematically related to risks common to
both announcing and non-announcing banks.
Allen and Michaely (2003) suggest that an ultimate test of the information content
of dividends is one that considers the relation between the dissipative cost suggested
by each of the dividend signalling models and the announcement effects of dividend
changes. The role of (changes in) taxes on dividend changes is an important issue in this
regard. Tax-based dividend signalling models suggest that managers use dividends to
signal information about the firm because dividends are credible signals given that they
are less tax efficient than share repurchases and are taxed higher than capital gains, in
most tax jurisdictions. In line with this, Bernheim and Wantz (1995) use the opportunity
provided by the change in dividend taxation in the US to investigate the effect of dividend
taxation on share price response per dollar of dividends (bang-for-the-bucks).
The taxed-based dividend signalling theory suggests that given the tax disadvantage
position of dividends, an increase in dividend taxation should increase the ‘bang-for-the-
bucks.’ On the other hand, the agency-based free cash flow hypothesis suggest that an
increase in dividend should decrease the bang-for-the-bucks since it is more expensive to
pay dividends and the benefit is not likely to change when the taxes on dividends are
relatively higher. Bernheim and Wantz (1995) present results that are consistent with
dividend signalling hypothesis: the “bang-for-the-bucks” rises with dividend tax rate.
However, other empirical studies do not seem to support this conclusion. For example,
Grullon and Michaely (2001) investigate the difference in market reactions to dividend
changes before and after the Tax Reform Act of 1986. They find that contrary to tax-
based dividend signalling models, the market responded much more positively to dividend
increases when dividend taxation was lower (see, also, Bernhardt et al., 2005).
The agency cost explanation for dividends has also received some limited theoretical
and empirical support in the literature. Agency costs arise from the conflict of interest
among corporate managers, shareholders, and bondholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976)
suggest that company managers could overinvest by allocating resources to activities that
benefit them even though such activities might not be in the best interest of sharehold-
ers. Grossman and Hart (1980), Easterbrook (1984), and Jensen (1986) suggest a partial
solution to the agency problem between managers and equity holders. For example, East-
erbrook (1984) provides two explanations for dividend payments that help to reduce the
agency cost associated with the separation of ownership and control. First, he argues that
for firms with dispersed ownership, individual investors have little incentives to monitor
managers because the cost of such monitoring is overbearing at individual level while the
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benefit is only marginal given the proportion of their holding in the firm. Payment of
dividends encourages external financing through the capital market and subjects the firm
to the monitoring devices and agents in the financial market, such as investment bankers,
lawyers and public accountants. Second, payment of dividends may force managers to
take value-enhancing actions they will normally avoid but which are in the interest of the
shareholders, such as increasing the leverage of the firm.
Jensen (1986) argues that because perfect monitoring of managers is impossible, man-
agers can choose actions that best serve their interests rather than the interests of the
shareholders. In addition, he notes that cash is the asset that managers can misuse most
easily. Managers with large free cash flows may use this cash in ways that are not in
shareholders’ best interest. Under these conditions, shareholders’ best interests are served
if free cash flows are disgorged rather than wasted on negative NPV projects. While in-
creasing leverage with the resulting increases in routine interest payments is a way of
reducing the amount of cash under management’s control, Jensen’s analysis implies that
dividends benefit shareholders by extracting surplus cash from management control.
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) provide evidence in support of the free cash flow hy-
pothesis. They show that the average return associated with announcements of large
dividend changes is significantly larger for overinvesting firms (those with Tobin’s Q less
than unity) than for other firms consistent with the idea that markets react positively
to dividend increases as such mitigate the overinvesting tendencies of managers. Thus,
dividend changes by overinvesting firms signal information about changes in investment
policies.
Consistent with the agency cost explanation of dividends, Born and Rimbey (1993)
using a sample of industrial firms, find that dividend initiating firms that have engaged
in some form of external financing during the previous twelve months generate larger
abnormal returns. However, Noronha et al. (1996) present evidence that the agency cost
rationale is context specific and that the agency cost explanation will not drive dividend
payments if other mechanisms exist for controlling agency problem. Building on this
argument, Filbeck and Mullineaux (1999) suggest that regulation of banks involves a
context specific case where agency cost may be less relevant. They hypothesize that
the presence of bank regulators as monitors may reduce agency cost to levels sufficiently
small that third party monitoring by capital market institutions yields minimal benefits.
Consistent with this hypothesis and in support of Noronha et al. (1996), they find no
relation between abnormal returns associated with dividend announcements and their
external financing activities. They conclude that monitoring activities of the capital
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markets are not a rationale for dividend payment in the presence of bank regulation.
They find support for an alternative explanation involving the signalling role of new
equity financing.
Born (1988), in his study of a sample of 192 dividend initiations, show that differences
in the magnitude of share price response to dividend initiations is explained by concen-
tration of insider ownership. In a similar vein, Filbeck and Chadwell (1993) investigate
the relation between concentration of insiders and the share price response to dividend
changes implemented by bank holding companies. They hypothesise that the presence of
regulatory monitors tempers the agency cost explanation to dividends, using the concen-
tration of insider ownership variable. In support of the signalling theory, they find markets
response significantly positively to dividend increases. However, their concentration of
shareholders variable fails to successfully explain the differences in market reactions to
dividend change announcements. They conclude that the degree of insider ownership
does not validate the accuracy of a signal for firms in regulated industries as it does for
those unregulated industries.
Collins et al. (2009) revisit the role of insiders on bank dividend policy. They examine
the relationship between insider holdings and dividend policy (and debt). Using a sample
of 65 banks in the US, they find that dividend payout is significantly and negatively
related to insider holdings at lower levels of insider holdings while insider holdings are
significantly and positively related to dividend payout at higher levels of insider holdings.
That is, at lower level of insider holding, as insider holding increases dividend payout
reduces, while at higher levels of insider holding, as insider holding increases dividend
payout increases. Their results support a non-linear relation between insider holding and
bank dividends.
Dickens et al. (2002) perform a horse race analysis of the factors explaining bank
dividends. They adapt Barclay et al.’s (1995) model to study the relation between bank
dividend policy and a set of seven factors: investment opportunities, capital adequacy,
size, signalling, ownership, dividend history, and risk. Consistent with similar results
for non-banking firms by Smith and Watts (1992), their empirical analysis suggests a
negative relationship between dividend yield and investment opportunities, signalling,
ownership, and risk and a positive relationship with size and dividend history. Theis
and Dutta (2009) examine the robustness of the model using different sample period,
sample firm, and data sources. They reexamine the Dickens et al. (2002) model of bank
holding company dividend policy using a cross-sectional sample made up of 99 US firms.
Their result shows that the original Dickens et al.’s (2002) model is robust, but not all
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variables keep their significance. Specifically, they find a negative and significant relation
for earnings volatility and size and a positive and significant relation for dividend history
and risk (equity-to-assets). They find no support for the role of insider holding, future
earnings, and investment opportunities. Furthermore, their results confirm the non-linear
relation between dividend yield and insider ownership.
Using the opportunity afforded by the Tax Reform Act (1986), the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, and the FDIC Improvement Act of
1991, Casey and Dickens (2000) examine the effect of tax and regulatory changes on
commercial bank dividend policy. They report a negative relation between tax rate and
dividend payout - the lower the tax rate the higher the payout. This result is contrary
to the dividend irrelevance conclusion. However, they are unable to establish a robust
impact of changes in capitalisation requirements on dividend policy. In addition, their
results show that bank dividend policy seems to be driven by factors other than those
reported in the literature for industrial firms. Bank dividends exhibit no relation with past
growth rates, beta, or an insider ownership variable that are important in such studies as
Rozeff (1982) for industrial firms.
Using call report data, Niswander and Swanson (2000) consider whether a bank’s
level of capital, earnings, and taxes affect the discretionary portion of four management
choices, including dividends. For discretionary dividends, they find no systematic relation
between capital level and dividends for below-threshold banks, possibly because most of
these banks pay little or no dividends. For banks above the capital threshold, however,
they find that as capital level increases, public banks increase dividend payout more
than private banks suggesting that private banks may be retaining funds to minimize the
personal tax payments of their owners and/or to increase bank capital. These results
underline the importance of regulations and regulatory capital in the choice management
of private and public banks make regarding dividend policy.
Mercado-Mendez and Willey (1995) examine the agency cost explanation of dividends
by analysing the effect of four variables that proxy for agency cost on three financial policy
variables, including dividend yield, for a sample of 104 largest US banks. Their proxies for
agency cost are earnings volatility, managers’ portfolio diversification losses, bank size,
and standard deviation of bank equity returns. They find evidence in support of bank size
and a measure of manager’s portfolio diversification opportunity set as factors affecting
bank dividends. Boldin and Leggett (1995) examine the relation between bank dividend
policy and bank quality rating. Using an ordered probit response model, their results
show a positive relationship between quality and dividends per share, In addition, they
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find an inverse relation between quality and dividend payout ratio. They conclude that
these results are consistent with management’s use of dividends to signal information
about bank quality in terms of its soundness or risk.
In summary, studies focusing on banking and non-banking firms attempt to test differ-
ent explanations for dividends without a consensus. While this thesis does not advance a
new explanation for the puzzling dividend phenomenon it, in part, re-examines the relation
between bank dividends and changes in bank overinvestment problem, using measures
derived from a frontier analysis of banks.
1.3 Summary of Thesis and Central Findings
This doctoral thesis addresses the implications of two bank characteristics - bank effi-
ciency and bank earnings quality - for bank dividend policy and specified capital market
consequences, including the cost of capital, bank valuation, and value relevance of earn-
ings. Using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), Essay 1 investigates the role of bank
efficiency in market assessment of dividend change announcements by banks. Essay 2
examines market implications of bank earnings quality. It relates bank earnings quality
to bank cost of capital, bank valuation, and value relevance of earnings. Finally, Essay
3 examines the results of a cross-country study of the role of bank earnings quality on
dividend policy of banks and the dividend-earnings relation.
1.3.1 Essay 1: Bank Efficiency and Market Reactions to Dividend
Change Announcements
Numerous studies attempt to explain the stylised significant market reactions to dividend
changes. However, to date, only a few of these studies examine this relation in the
context of the banking firm. In addition, while a limited number of studies link firm
efficiency to capital structure decisions, we are unaware of any study that establishes a
link between dividend policy and firm efficiency. In Essay 1 of this thesis, we explore
the potential relation between bank efficiency and abnormal returns following dividend
change announcements.
We estimate bank overinvestment problem using changes in bank efficiency derived
from a frontier analysis of bank input-output combinations. Drawing motivation from
both the dividend signalling and agency cost explanations of dividends, as well as ex-
tant empirical evidence linking firm efficiency to stock prices, we examine the possibility
that dividend changes signal changes in bank overinvestment problem, as measured by
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changes in bank efficiency. Consistent with extant literature, we find significantly posit-
ive abnormal returns following dividend change announcements suggesting that markets
seem to respond to the information content of bank dividends, whatever it is.
Using the efficiency scores derived from data envelopment analysis (DEA), consistent
with our hypothesis, we find that improvement in bank overinvestment problem is sig-
nificantly and positively associated with market reactions following dividend increases.
Markets seem to interpret an increase in dividends by inefficient banks as a signal of
an improvement the announcing bank overinvestment problem. This result supports the
idea that banks disgorge dividends to reduce excess inputs, consistent with the agency
explanation of dividends. However, consistent with the moderating role of bank regula-
tion, we find no support for the role of changes in bank efficiency in market reactions to
dividend decreases.
1.3.2 Essay 2: Market Rewards Associated with Bank Earnings Quality
In view of the prevalence of bank failures, investors, regulators, and academics have called
for better quality earnings from banks. Regulatory initiatives have aimed at reducing the
incidence of bank failure by improving the quality of earnings. However, these regulat-
ory requirements, such as those contained in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 and Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 are associated with predicted
and unintended costs. A number of studies, (for example, Altamuro and Beatty, 2010),
investigate whether introduction of regulations are followed by improvement in the fin-
ancial reporting quality of banks. However, one question that remains unanswered in the
literature is whether markets reward banks with better financial information. Essay 2 of
the thesis provides an answer to this question.
Specifically, Chapter 3 of this study investigates a number of economic consequences
of bank earnings quality. We draw motivation from the argument suggesting a role of
accounting information in capital markets. Theoretical studies on this issue suggest that
the quantity and quality of information affect the cost of capital. We investigate whether
higher earnings quality is associated with lower cost of equity as predicted by theory.
In addition, because stock value is a function of firm cost of capital, we argue that if
earnings quality matters and results in lower cost of equity for banks, its impact should
also reflect in bank valuation and market valuation of earnings. In line with this argument,
we investigate the relation between bank earnings quality and bank valuation as well as
market valuation of earnings.
Using various earnings quality measures, the study finds that banks with better earnings
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quality, as measured by an aggregate earnings quality variable, experience lower cost of
equity capital. Consistent with this primary finding, our results also support the idea that
banks with higher earnings quality enjoy higher market valuation and higher price-earnings
multiples compared to banks with lower earnings quality.
Overall, our results suggest that markets can differentiate between “good” and “bad”
earnings and seem to compensate banks with better earnings quality. Consistent with
this result, we argue that earnings quality, in addition to the levels of earnings, should be
an important ingredient in the governance of banks. However, we also caution that the
relation between the cost of equity and individual dimensions of our aggregate earnings
quality measure is not uni-directional as some earnings attributes exhibit significant and
positive relation with bank cost of equity.
1.3.3 Essay 3: Earnings Quality and Bank Dividends
While the surveys by Lintner (1956) and Brav et al. (2005) suggest that managers are
concerned about the sustainability of the level of earnings in setting the level of dividend
change, the importance of earnings quality in payout policy has received little attention
in empirical studies. Essay 3 of this thesis provides cross-country evidence on the link
between bank earnings quality and dividend payout.
We contribute to the literature by first constructing a country-specific index of bank
earnings quality that incorporates various dimensions of earnings quality. We show that
our index of earnings quality correlates strongly and in the expected direction with
country-specific measures of transparency and opacity. Using the index of bank earn-
ings quality, we investigate the relation between earnings and bank dividend payout.
We extend the study by examining whether the dividend-earnings relation depends on
earnings quality. Consistent with our first hypothesis, we find that banks in countries
with high earnings quality pay a greater proportion of their earnings, revenue, equity,
assets, and cash flows in dividends. This result is robust to a number of institutional and
bank-specific variables, and the potential endogeneity of earnings quality.
In addition, while banks around the world seem to follow the traditional dividend
smoothing policy, consistent with our second hypothesis, our results show that the
dividend-earnings link is stronger for banks in countries with high earnings quality. This
finding supports the idea that earnings of banks in these countries are more sustainable
and managers are quicker in incorporating them into dividends.
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2 Bank Efficiency and Market
Reactions to Dividend Change
Announcements
Abstract
We examine if there is a relation between market reactions to bank dividend changes
and changes in bank overinvestment problem, measured as the change in the level of bank
efficiency, derived from the frontier analysis of input-output correspondence of dividend
announcing and non-announcing banks. Consistent with the agency-based explanation of
dividends and empirical studies linking firm efficiency to (changes in) share price, our study
establishes a link between changes in share price around dividend announcements and
changes in bank efficiency. We find that improvement in bank overinvestment problem is
significantly and positively associated with market reactions following dividend increases.
The result suggests that banks announce a change in dividends to signal that they will
not waste their resources. In addition, our study fails to rule out the cash flow signalling
and dividend clientele explanations for market reactions to announcements of dividend
increases. Consistent with these theories, we find significantly positive relation between
market reactions to dividend increases and the magnitude of dividend change as well
as anticipated dividend yield. However, consistent with the moderating role of bank
regulation, we find no support for the role of changes in bank efficiency in market reactions
to dividend decreases.
2.1 Introduction
Why and when do firms pay dividends? Miller and Modigliani (1961) show that under
a perfect market, with rational investors and perfect certainty, dividend policy is irrel-
evant to market valuation of firms. However, anecdotal and empirical evidence show
that announcements of dividend changes affect firm value as markets respond favourably
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(unfavourably) to dividend increases (dividend decreases).1 Miller and Modigliani (1961)
suggest that this phenomenon is not inconsistent with the irrelevance of dividends but
consistent with the information content of dividends - the idea that investors react to the
information contained in the change in dividends rather than to the actual dividend pay-
ments. Two explanations for this observed phenomenon stand out among the competing
candidates: the cash flow signalling hypothesis and the free cash flow hypothesis.2
The cash flow signalling hypothesis builds on the theoretical evidence suggesting that
dividends or a change in dividends signal information about changes in the announcing
firm’s current and/or future earnings. Relying on the notion of asymmetric information
between managers and shareholders, Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), and
John and Williams (1985) suggest that dividend changes are explicit signals about current
and/or future earnings prospect. Dividends are attractive choice of signal because of their
dissipative costs, such as lost investment opportunities and taxes that make the payment
of (large) dividends less attractive to mimic by less valuable firms. For example, Miller
and Rock, using the sources and uses of funds identity, show that dividend decision could
reveal information about current earnings to the market.
However, the cash flow signalling hypothesis only receives a weak support from em-
pirical studies by Watts (1973) and Gonedes (1978), who find a tenuous link between
dividends and subsequent earnings. The authors show that dividends reflects no ad-
ditional information beyond that reflected in contemporaneous or past income signals.
While, Ofer and Thakor (1987) find that the knowledge of dividend announcements
improves the accuracy of the average analyst’s pre-announcement forecasts of future
earnings, more recent studies by Benartzi et al. (1997), Benartzi et al. (2001), Grullon
et al. (2002), and Grullon et al. (2005) show that the cash flow signalling theory (still)
plays little or no role in explaining market reactions to dividends.
The free cash flow explanation, which draws on the broader agency cost theory (Jensen,
1986), argues that firms with excess cash flow and poor investment opportunities face
agency cost and use dividends to distribute the excess cash to shareholders in order to
minimise wasteful investment and mitigate agency problems. Therefore, if managers are
overinvesting, an increase in dividends will reduce the overinvestment problem and ceteris
paribus, results in an increase the market value of the firm. Similarly, a dividend decrease
signals that managers will continue to invest in wasteful projects resulting in a loss in
shareholder value. The positive relation between market reactions and the sign of the
1See, for example, Pettit (1972), Aharony and Swary (1980), Bajaj and Vijh (1990), and Bessler and
Nohel (1996).
2The dividend clientele effect also enjoys some limited support in the literature.
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dividend change is consistent with the idea of efficient markets. Markets understand
the dividend signal and react positively (negatively) to dividend increasing (dividend
decreasing) firms with poor investment opportunities. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) find
support for the free cash hypothesis against the alternative cash flow signalling hypothesis.
However, Denis et al. (1994) re-examine the question and find no support that the free
cash flow hypothesis explains the market reactions to dividend change announcements.
This study examines whether bank dividend changes provide information about changes
in bank overinvestment problem by examining the relation between stock market reac-
tions to dividend changes and changes in bank efficiency, derived from frontier analysis
of bank input-output combinations. Specifically, our study provides evidence on the di-
vidend question by investigating whether change in stock prices following dividend change
announcements reflect changes in bank efficiency. While our study definitely speaks to
the age-old question on dividends and information content of dividends, we nonetheless
contribute to this strand of literature in many ways.
First, while dividend policy and, in particular, the information content of dividends of
industrial firms enjoy a considerable attention in the literature, there is little evidence on
bank dividend policy and bank signalling through dividends. For example, while Bessler
and Nohel (2000) provide evidence of significant market reactions following bank dividend
announcements, their sample is limited to only 49 money-center and regional banks. In
addition, their study examines the contagion effect of changes in the quality of bank
loan portfolios and does not investigate the validity of competing explanations of market
reactions to dividends. Even though the study period also differs from those covered in
other studies, the core of our contribution relates to the characterisation of bank quality,
in particular, the overinvestment problem. While studies such as Lang and Litzenberger
(1989) distinguish between overinvesting and optimising firms using Tobin’s Q ratio, our
study distinguishes between banks using efficiency scores derived from a frontier analysis
of bank technical and profit efficiencies. Therefore, we provide an innovative way to
look at the dividend problem and avoid one of the weaknesses of the Tobin’s Q measure
relating to the potential influences of non-performance related factors, such as market
misvaluation.
While frontier efficiency methods are widely used in economics literature and in studies
relating to the efficiency of banks and insurance companies, our study relates to studies
investigating the implications of firm efficiency. A common trend in these studies is the
conclusion that the stock prices reflect efficiency scores obtained from different frontier
models. This is not surprising given that the inputs and outputs data that enter the
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efficiency models are in public domain. However, the study by Berger and Bonaccorsi di
Patti (2006), who use a frontier approach to investigate the implication of agency cost
for bank capital structure, primarily motivates our study. Our study extends this relatively
new strand of research by investigating the relation between dividend changes and bank
efficiency, our measure of bank overinvestment problem. We restrict our investigation to
the demand side of the problem by investigating the relation between market reactions
to dividend changes and changes in bank efficiency.
Using the standard event study methodology, we first estimate the abnormal returns fol-
lowing announcements of dividend changes by our sample of US banking firms. Consistent
with evidence in the literature, we find strong support for a positive relation between the
sign of dividend changes and market reactions to dividends: we find significantly positive
(negative) abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns following dividend increases
(dividend decreases). However, the magnitude of market reactions is comparatively lower
than that reported for non-financial firms suggesting that the peculiar characteristics of
banking firms or perhaps their regulatory and supervisory environment temper the po-
tential role of dividends. Using data envelopment analysis, we obtain yearly measures of
technical and profit efficiencies from 1998–2007 for a panel of 310 US banking firms. We
then relate changes in bank agency problem, measured as the yearly changes in efficiency
to market reactions following dividend change announcements. After controlling for the
size of the dividend change, the anticipated dividend yield, and bank size, we find, as
hypothesised, a significant positive relation between changes in bank efficiency and share
price reactions to announcements of dividend increases. Thus, changes in bank dividends
seem to reflect changes in the quality of management investment policies. However,
our study finds no support for the role of bank efficiency in market valuation following
dividend decreases.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 presents and discusses
the main research hypothesis tested in the study. Section 2.3 discusses the methodology
of the study, including the event study methodology and the frontier analysis that the
study uses in characterising bank efficiency and overinvestment problem. Section 2.4
presents and discusses the empirical results and Section 2.5 concludes the chapter and
discusses the policy implications for banks.
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2.2 Conceptual Framework and Hypothesis Development
The agency based free cash flow hypothesis argues that firms with substantial free cash
flows are more likely to invest in negative net present value projects or waste them on
organisational inefficiencies rather than distribute them to shareholders (Jensen, 1986).
Jensen’s free cash flow hypothesis predicts a significant valuation effect for signals of
changes in wasteful investments for firms with poor investment opportunities or those
characterised by organisational inefficiencies. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) argue that
these firms are reluctant to subject negative net present value projects to the monitoring
associated with external financing. Therefore, announcements of dividend changes by
overinvesting firms reflect management’s chosen course of action regarding its future
investment policy. Specifically, an increase in dividends mitigates the overinvestment
problem and increases the market value of the firm as markets adjust their expectation
about the outcome of the overinvestment problem. Conversely, markets react negatively
to a reduction in dividends by overinvesting firms as this sends a signal that management
would continue in the path of overinvestment. While bank regulation, aimed at mitigating
the potential agency problem associated with banks, may suggest a weak monitoring role
for external financing and dividends, evidence and the recurring banking crisis also suggest
that regulation is not a perfect substitute for capital market monitoring. In fact, evidence
suggests that regulatory efforts, such as the deposit insurance schemes, are associated
with other unintended agency problems, suggesting a potential role for market monitoring
of banks.3
The agency cost theory is pervasive in finance and accounting, in particular, as an
explanation for firms’ capital structure and dividend decisions. However, Berger and
Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) note that the inconclusive evidence regarding the role of
agency cost in capital structure may be due to the problem of measurement. They argue
that the lack of convincing evidence on the direction of the relationship “could be partly
explained by the intrinsic difficulty in defining a measure of performance that is close
to the theoretical definition of agency costs.” In line with their argument, we conjecture
that the inability to find consistent empirical evidence in support of the role of agency
cost in explaining market reactions to dividends or further distinguishing this explanation
from the competing cash flow signalling explanation may also be due to the problem of
measurement. For example, Lang and Litzenberger (1989) adopt the Tobin’s Q ratio that
incorporates both accounting and market data in the investigation of cash flow signalling
3See Chapter one of this thesis for further discussion of this issue.
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and free cash flow hypotheses as explanations for market reactions to dividends. They
find support for the role of the latter but not the former. However, Denis et al. (1994) use
similar measure for their study of dividend change announcements for a sample of 6777
US firms and find no support for the free cash flow hypothesis. One potential problem
with the use of Tobin’s Q ratio is that it relies on stock prices and thus incorporates any
potential misvaluation of shares and exogenous variables, which are outside the control
of management and thus may not reliably reflect the agency problem faced by firms.
Recent empirical evidence also suggests that markets incorporate the level and changes
in firm efficiency in the assessment of market value of firms. For example, Nguyen and
Swanson (2009) develop a simple model that relates firm inefficiency to expected returns.
They argue that in an efficient market with rational expectation market prices and stock
returns should reflect firm efficiency, such as agency problem and financial distress. They
provide evidence that firm efficiency exhibits significant explanatory power for average
equity stock returns and further suggest that an (in)efficiency factor be incorporated in
asset pricing models.
Alam and Sickles (1998) investigate the relation between stock market returns and
changes in technical efficiency in the US airline industry and find a significantly positive
relation between these variables. Consistent with this result, Eisenbeis et al. (1999)
find that the stock returns of US bank holding companies are a decreasing function of
cost inefficiency. In addition, Kohers et al. (2000) find that abnormal returns for US
bank holding companies engaged in merger and acquisitions are positively related to (the
target’s) X-efficiency as well as the difference in bidder/target efficiencies relative to their
peer group (see, also, Wu and Ray, 2005; Cummins and Xie, 2009). Fiordelisi (2007)
shows that banks lose around one-third of potential shareholder value due to inefficiency.
Finally, the relation between firm efficiency and stock prices is not limited to the US.
For example Chu and Lim (1998) analyse six publicly traded Singaporean banks and find
that changes in stock prices are positively related to changes in profit efficiency but not
related to changes in cost efficiency (see, also, Kirkwood and Nahm, 2006).
Our bank efficiency score that we obtain from a data envelopment analysis of banks
provides a simple, yet direct, measure of management use of firm resources to generate
desired outputs, relative to the best firm(s) in the same industry. Stigler (1976) first sug-
gests the conceptual link between (productive) efficiency and agency cost. Later studies
show that firms that seem profitable relative to other firms in the same industry are
not necessarily efficient in applying resources to generate optimal outputs. For example,
Sherman and Zhu (2006) note that studies of benchmarking practices with frontier ana-
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lysis, such as DEA have identified resources inefficiencies in some of the most profitable
firms.
Frontier analysis evaluates how close a firm is to the best-practice firm facing similar
exogenous conditions and utilising similar inputs to produce similar outputs. We argue
that the performance of a best-practice firm under the same exogenous conditions is a
reasonable benchmark for the expected performance of the firm if agency costs were at
their minimum level. While agency problem would not fully explain the differences in
efficiency among firms and while all banks are likely to face some level of agency cost, we
argue that inefficient banks are more likely to exhibit higher overinvestment problem that
suggests a role for dividends. Managers of inefficient banks are more likely to engage in
excessive consumption of perquisites (expense preference behaviour) that increases the
inputs of the firm while at best producing the same level of outputs.
The effect of this preference behaviour is the reduction in the efficiency of the firm
relative to the value maximising bank. Management of inefficient banks may signal any
improvement in the level of efficiency or a desire for a change of course of action by
increasing the level of dividends. Similarly, a reduction in the level of dividends signifies
management’s desire to continue or exacerbate the agency problem. Either way, in an
efficient market, we expect a positive (negative) market reaction to the “efficiency news”
contained in the dividend increase (dividend decrease). Therefore, if resolution of the
agency problem motivates bank dividend payments, we would expect less efficient banks
that are characterised by high agency problem to increase their level of efficiency by
reducing their inputs, for example, by disgorging excess cash through higher dividends.
The above discussion suggests the main hypothesis tested in this study stated in its
alternative form:
H1: There is a positive (negative) relation between change in bank efficiency and
market response to dividend increases (decreases)
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Data and Sample Construction
We obtain financial data for the construction of our sample and research variables from
Compustat Bank database. While the choice of the banking industry is consistent with
the general focus of this thesis, restricting the sample to banks ensures the homogeneity
of the sample. In addition, the data envelopment analysis that we use in the measurement
42
of bank efficiency does not lend itself to cross-industry studies as it assumes that firms
included in the model use similar inputs and generate similar outputs. In view of the
fact that efficiency scores are, by definition, relative measures of efficiency, in the first
stage of sampling, we require that banks must have data to calculate efficiency score for
each year of the study. For this reason, we restrict our study to a ten-year period starting
1998 and ending 2007 for which the greatest number of banks are included in the frontier
analysis.4 This procedure produces 310 banks resulting in 3100 bank-year observations
on bank efficiency scores.5
To be included in the sample of dividend change announcements the dividend distri-
bution and the bank to which it relates must meet the following conditions:
1. The bank’s returns data needed to estimate abnormal returns are sufficiently avail-
able in CRSP. To mitigate the problem of nonsynchronous trading, we require that
price and returns data are available for a minimum of 70% in a 90-day estima-
tion window. In addition, the price and returns data in respect of the dividend
announcing bank must also be available for all days in the 21-day event window.
2. The distribution is a quarterly taxable cash dividend in US dollars. We identify
all dividend announcement dates and the dividend amounts from CRSP database
(CRSP code 1232). Following Watts (1973) and Nissim and Ziv (2001), we allocate
each dividend observation to a particular year if the current dividend was declared
in the second, third, or fourth fiscal quarter of the year, or in the first quarter
of the following year. This ensures that our accounting data are appropriately
matched with the dividend announcement and stock data. Unlike similar studies
on industrial firms, we do not set a cut-off rate for the dividend change included
in the sample. This is because, as Filbeck and Mullineaux (1993) argue, dividend
payment is a form of certification by regulatory authorities of the quality of earnings
4We were faced with the choice of increasing the sample size by reducing the number of input and
output variables that enter our efficiency models or reducing the sample size by using more ideal
models that incorporate more input and output variables. As the validity of our results, no matter
the sample size, depends on our ability to better differentiate among banks based on their efficiency
level, we decide to sacrifice larger sample size for more ideal models. In addition, going further
backward in time reduces the number of bank (and bank-years) in the sample for which multiple
input and output variables are available. Finally, we restrict the study to 2007 in order to circumvent
the impact of the recent bank-related economic crisis that may have an impact on otherwise efficient
banks.
5Normally, by assumption, the DEA methodology requires that the efficient frontier is generated using
all firms in a particular industry. Our study is limited in this regard because the Compustat Bank
database that we use is restricted to publicly listed banks. While we are aware of other bank
databases, they are not as adequate as Compustat Bank. In addition, combining databases was not
a feasible option.
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of the announcing bank such that even a small change in dividends could signal
information to the market.
3. The previous announcement dividend date occurs within a window of 90 trading
days prior to the current dividend announcement date. That is, we require that not
more than one dividend announcement event occurs in a single quarter and that a
previous dividend amount is available to calculate the change in dividends.
4. The dividend announcement is not in respect of dividend initiation or omission.
We exclude dividend omission because CRSP does not indicate the dividend omis-
sion announcement dates. In addition to the reason given in 3 above, we exclude
announcements of dividend initiation because evidence suggests that the price reac-
tions to these announcements are significantly larger than dividend increases (see,
for example, Healy and Palepu, 1988).
5. A major difficulty in assessing information content of dividends lies in the potential
contamination of the dividend announcement effect by other price relevant news.
To mitigate the impact of other news on stock prices, we exclude any dividend
announcement for which there are also confounding events, such as merger, stock
dividends, and earnings announcements, occurring within 3 trading days surround-
ing the dividend announcement dates. We obtain announcement dates for mergers,
stock dividends, and earnings from Reuters 3000 Xtra.
This procedure produces our initial sample of 1182 dividend change announcements for
the 10 year sample period. This consists of 995 dividend increases and 187 dividend
increases. The large percentage of dividend increases relative to dividend decreases in
the sample is consistent with the observed reluctance to cut dividends (e.g. Lintner,
1956) and other empirical studies (e.g. Li and Lie, 2006). We assume that dividends
follow a random walk and use dividend change as our proxy for the unexpected change
in dividends. We define dividend change (DIVCHG) as the (signed) change in the cash
dividends relative to the previous period dividends (i.e. quarter t−1).6
2.3.2 Event Study Methodology
We estimate the market valuation of dividend change announcements using event study
methodology (Fama et al., 1969). The usefulness of event studies arises from the fact
that the magnitude of abnormal returns at the time of an event provides a measure of the
6Yoon and Stark (1995) use similar measure of unexpected dividend change.
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unanticipated impact of the event on the wealth of the firm’s shareholders (Kothari and
Warner, 2007). We estimate wealth effect of dividend change announcement using the
residual analysis in which the abnormal returns around dividend change announcement
dates are obtained as the difference between observed stock returns (Rit) and expected
stock returns (E(Rit)). We assume that the market model adequately captures bank
returns generating process:7
Rit = αi+βiRmt + εit (2.3.1)
where Rit is the continuously compounded returns on stock i on day t;8 Rmt is the
value weighted returns on the market portfolio; 9 αi and βi are the parameter estimates
of the market model for stock ith, estimated over a 90-day window; εit is the residual for
stock i on day t and represents the unexpected returns for stock i.
Cowan (1992) argues that thin trading makes the violation of parametric tests more
likely. If securities are thinly traded, applying ordinary least squares (OLS) to the time
series returns data results in biased parameter estimates of the market model due to serial
correlation that is induced by thin trading. This bias occurs because returns are measured
with error that is correlated with the market index (Scholes and Williams, 1977; Fowler
et al., 1980; Dimson, 1979). Scholes and Williams (1977) show that the parameters of
the market model are unattractive under condition of nonsynchronous trading. To the
extent that the security is more (less) thinly traded than the market index, beta estimates
are biased downward (upward). To account for the potential bias of the OLS beta, we
use the Scholes and Williams (1977) beta in the estimations of abnormal returns.
We initially consider a full event window of 21 days defined as the 10 days before and 10
days after the announcement period centred on day 0, the announcement day identified
in the CRSP database. However, our regression model relates the 3-day announcement
period cumulative abnormal returns to change in efficiency and other control variables.
We include the one day before and one day after the announcement in the announcement
period because the abnormal returns on these days are, generally, significantly different
7Many authors argue for the inclusion of an interest rate variable based on the premise that bank
stock returns and cost are directly dependent on interest rate (e.g. Stone, 1974; Choi et al., 1992).
However, Lloyds and Shick (1977) report that the inclusion of bond index leads only to a marginal
increase in explanatory power over the market model (see, also, Bessler and Nohel, 1996, 2000).
8We use continuously compounded returns as Fama (1976, 17-20) argues that continuously compoun-
ded returns conform better to the normality assumption underlying regressions (see, also, Strong,
1992). However, Brown and Warner (1985) report similar results using simple and continuously
compounded returns.
9Using equally weighted returns produces similar results.
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from zero, suggesting that they contain valuable information. We estimate the abnormal
returns (arit) on event day t for stock i as the out-of-sample residual of the above market
model. That is:10
arit = Rit −E(Rit) (2.3.3)
all variables are as earlier defined.
Empirical evidence suggests that announcements of dividends induce variance increases
in the distribution of event period returns. Brown and Warner (1985) show that increases
in variances due to events cause standard parametric tests to report a price reaction
more often than expected leading to the frequent rejection of the null hypothesis of zero
abnormal returns. Harrington and Shrider (2009) argue that all events induce variance
and suggest tests of significance of abnormal returns that are robust to cross-sectional
variation. They advocate that the BMP - Boehmer et al.’s (1991) - approach, which
compensates for the potential event induced variance by incorporating a simple cross-
sectional variance adjustment, is robust to the impact of heteroscedasticity of returns.
This approach also ensures that tests are robust to the impact of calendar and industrial
clustering, as our sample includes a single industry with many banks that announce their
dividends almost at the same time (see, for example, Bessler and Nohel, 2000).
Accordingly, we calculate standardised abnormal returns (ARit) as the ratio of (un-
standardised) abnormal returns (arit) to the standardisation factor si, where si = sˆi[(1+
1/Ti+((Rme− R¯m)2/∑Ts=1(Rmt− R¯m)))]0.5 and sˆ is stock i′s estimated standard deviation
of abnormal returns from the estimation period (t ∈ [−100,−11], Rme is the market re-
turns during the estimation period, and T is the total number of days in the estimation
period (90 days).
Thus, the test statistic that we use to analyse the statistical significance of the stand-
ardised abnormal returns is given by:
(1/N)
N
∑
n=1
ARit/
[
(1/N(N−1))
N
∑
n=1
(ARit − (1/N)
N
∑
n=1
ARit)2
]0.5
where N is the total number of events (dividend increases or dividend decreases) in
the sample. In effect, the Boehmer et al.’s (1991) approach assumes that event-induced
variance is proportional for each firm.
10That is,
arit = Rit − (αˆi+ βˆiRmt) (2.3.2)
where αˆ and βˆ are the estimated parameters of the market model.
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Parametric tests of abnormal returns, including that presented above, rely on the
assumption of normality. However, Fama (1976, Ch. 1) notes that, compared to monthly
stock returns, daily stock returns deviate from the normality assumption (see, also, Brown
and Warner, 1985; Cowan, 1992). In addition, even though the parametric test that we
use mitigates the impact of variance increase, other factors, such as outliers, may result
in potential misspecification of our test. We provide a robustness check of our test of
the null hypothesis of zero (cumulative) abnormal returns using the generalised sign test
(GST) originally developed by Corrado (1989) and extended by Cowan (1992). The
generalised sign test examines whether the number of events with positive cumulative
abnormal returns exceeds the number expected in the absence of abnormal performance.
2.3.3 Estimation of Bank Efficiency
Frontier analysis, which comes in two variants, measures how close a decision making unit
(DMU) is to the ‘best practice.’ The parametric variant, such as the stochastic frontier
analysis, involves an econometric estimation of a pre-specified stochastic production, cost,
or profit function. We use a non-parametric frontier methodology - data envelopment
analysis (DEA). DEA generates a frontier line that designates the performance of the best
decision making units and measures the efficiency of other units by deviation from the
frontier. Compared to the traditional ratios used in the measurement of firm performance,
its appeals rest on its ability to combine many variables. Unlike alternative frontier
approaches, DEA also appeals to empirical studies as it produces efficiency estimates
without a priori functional restrictions on the underlying functional form. Hence, the
resulting efficiency measures do not suffer from the potential misspecification of the
functional form.11 At the heart of DEA lies the condition of Pareto optimality under
which a DMU is efficient if it is impossible to raise output without raising any of the
inputs and without lowering any other output. Similarly, a DMU is not efficient if it is
possible to lower an input without decreasing any of the outputs and without increasing
any other input.
DEA uses a linear programming technique for the estimation of efficient frontier and
measurements of efficiency scores relative to the resulting efficient frontier (Charnes et al.,
1978). The efficient frontier, which is made up of decision making units is constructed
through a piece-wise linear combination of input-output correspondence set that envelops
the input-output correspondence of all DMUs in the sample (Thanassoulis, 2001). A
11However, DEA is also criticised for assuming non-existence of measurement error and statistical noise
(see, for example, Das and Ghosh, 2006)
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production frontier indicates the minimum inputs required to produce any given level of
outputs for a firm operating with full efficiency. For example, consider N banks (DMUs)
each producing m different outputs using n different inputs. We measure the efficiency
of the DMUs as follows:12
Es =
s
∑
r=1
uryr
m
∑
i=1
vixi
(2.3.4)
where yr is the amount of output r produced by the sth DMU; ur is the weight assigned
to output r, xi is the amount of input i used by the mth DMU; vi is the weight assigned
to input i. While these weights may be fixed in advance, we derived them automatically
during the estimation of the DEA model.
The efficiency ratio (Es) in Equation 2.3.4 is then maximised subject to the following:
Es =
s
∑
r=1
uryr
m
∑
i=1
vixi
≤ 1, j = 1, ..., n (2.3.5)
ur,vi ≥ 0. ∀r, i (2.3.6)
The first inequality ensures that the efficiency ratio for the other DMUs is constrained
at a maximum of 1 while the second inequality ensures that the weights are positive.
Charnes et al. (1978) who are credited with pioneering the DEA provide a transform-
ation of the fractional linear program above into its standard form:
maximiseEs =
s
∑
r=1
uryr (2.3.7)
sub ject to
s
∑
r=1
uryr−
m
∑
i=1
vixi ≤ 0, j = 1, ...., n (2.3.8)
m
∑
i=1
vixi = 1 and ui, vi ≥ 0 (2.3.9)
12Specifically, in this study, we define DMU as a bank-year observation on corresponding inputs and
outputs measures. Therefore, we evaluate 310 DMUs for each year, resulting in 3100 DMUs over
the study period.
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The models outlined above assume constant returns to scale (CRS). Figure 2.1 shows
further graphical illustration of the models depicting the production frontier P for a bank
with one input and one output. Bank i is operating at point (xi, yi). This bank could
operate more efficiently by moving to the frontier by reducing its input usage. The
bank’s level of Farrell (1957) technical efficiency TE(x,y) is given by the ratio oaob . We
also estimate a model of bank profit efficiency that is similar to the model above except
in the definition of input and outputs (see Table 2.1). We solve the linear programming
problem using the Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (BCC, 1984) methodology available
through the DEASolver software by Saitech (Version 7a).13 Although our sample of
dividend announcements is much smaller than the efficiency sample, due to additional
sample requirements, we compute bank efficiency on the much larger possible set of banks
since the universe of firms in the same industry determines the best practice frontier. In
addition, requiring that banks have data for all years also ensures that the same set of
banks are evaluated throughout the study period, a condition required for the assessment
of the change in efficiency.
However, while our efficiency measure aims to mitigate some of the shortcomings in
the use of Tobin’s Q and other measures in characterising firm agency problem, we note
that it is, yet, not a perfect characterisation of this market imperfection specially given
that the resulting efficiency scores may reflect either pure managerial (in)ability or agency
problem or both.14
13While other software options are available, we use this software as it has received positive and credible
review by leading academics in frontier analysis (for example, see, Cooper et al., 2007). For further
details about the software see http://www.saitech-inc.com.
14Because bank in(efficiency) may be a function of factors other than agency problem we also obtained
a measure of agency problem as the error term of the regression of the measures of efficiency on
bank characteristics that have been linked to bank efficiency, including capital strength, loan quality,
bank size, and market share. We find similar results using either the “error term” measures or the
pure efficiency scores.
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Figure 2.1: Frontier Efficiency - Single Input and Single Output

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


2.3.3.1 Definition of Inputs and Outputs
A controversial issue in bank efficiency studies relates to the definition of inputs and out-
puts that are required in the estimation of DEA models. Three competing approaches,
namely intermediation approach, production approach, and operating approach, receive
attention in the literature. The intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977) as-
sumes that banks produce loans and deposit account services, using labour and capital
as inputs and the number and type of accounts as measures of outputs. This approach
views banks as intermediaries between agents with surplus funds (depositors) and agents
with deficit funds (borrowers). The production (value added) approach views banks as
financial intermediaries that collect purchased funds and transform them to loans and
other assets. Finally, the operating approach (or income-based approach) views finan-
cial institutions as business units with the objective of generating more revenues given
total costs incurred in running the business (Leightner and Lovell, 1998). This approach
defines bank outputs as total revenues (interest and non-interest) and their inputs as total
expenses (interest payments and operating expenses). Berger and Humphrey (1997) note
that neither the intermediation nor the value added approach is perfect as neither fully
captures the dual roles of financial institutions as providers of transaction/document
processing services and as financial intermediaries. They point out that the production
approach may be somewhat better for the evaluation of the efficiencies of branches of fin-
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ancial institutions and the intermediation approach more appropriate for evaluating entire
financial institutions. Consistent with most of the recent literature on bank efficiency, we
measure bank output using the intermediation approach and estimate the model that has
interest bearing liabilities, labour, and capital as inputs, and total loans and securities as
outputs. Table 2.1 presents the description of input and output variables that enter into
the three DEA models estimated to obtain the efficiency scores.
Table 2.1: Efficiency Estimation - Bank Inputs and Outputs
Model Description Inputs Outputs
1
(EEF1)
Bank Service
Efficiency
x1 : Deposits and Borrowed Funds:
Total Deposit (dptc) + Total
Borrowed Funds (tb)
x2: Labour: Personnel Expenses
(xstfws)
x3: Physical Capital: Fixed Assets
(ppent) - Depreciation (dp)
y1: Interest Bearing Asset (Loans):
Net Allowance for loan losses (lntal)
+ Net Charge Off (nco)
y2: Other Earnings Assets: Total
Investment Securities (ist)
+Trading /Dealing Account
Securities (tdst)
2
(EEF2)
Profit
Efficiency
x1 : Deposits and Borrowed Funds:
Total Deposit (dptc) + Total
Borrowed Funds (tb)
x2: Labour: Personnel Expenses
(xstfws)
x3: Physical Capital: Fixed Assets
(ppent) - Depreciation (dp)
y3: Profit Before Tax and
Extraordinary Items (ibcom)
3
(EEF3)
Profit
Efficiency
x4: Total Interest Expenses (xint)
x5: Total Non-interest Expenses
(xnitb)
y4: Gross Interest and Dividend
Income (idit+idiis)
y5: Total Non-interest Operating
Income (tnii)
The table above presents input and output variables used in the estimation of bank efficiency.
Variables in parenthesis are Compustat Bank data items.
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics for the input and output variables used in
the estimation of the efficiency scores. Panel A reports for all bank-years with available
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input and output data (the “efficiency sample”). The results in the table show that our
sample consists of relatively small and large banks. For example, the mean physical
capital of sampled bank is about US$0.34 billion while the maximum is about US$18.83
billion. In addition, Panels B and C of the table suggest that dividend-increasing banks
generally make use of larger amount of inputs and produce larger amount of outputs than
dividend decreasing banks. For example, while dividend increasing banks have deposits
of US$22.57 billion and generate output of about US$0.34 billion in profit on average,
dividend decreasing banks have deposits of US$12.16 billion and generate output of about
US$0.17 billion in profit on average. However, these absolute values say little about the
level of efficiency of dividend increasing banks relative to dividend decreasing banks.
Table 2.3 presents summary statistics for the raw bank efficiency scores derived from
the linear programming models using Equations 2.3.5 to 2.3.9, the changes in these
scores and other control variables used in the regression analysis. The efficiency scores
(EFF1) derived from Model 1 suggest that relative to the best practice banks, dividend
increasing US banks seem to exhibit high level of (relative) technical efficiency with the
mean (median) efficiency being about 65.32% (64.24%) percent over the period of the
study. However, these banks are less profit efficient relative to the best performing banks.
For example, the table reports a mean (median) efficiency score of 33.26% (28.82%) on
Model 2 (EFF2) for dividend increasing banks suggesting that these banks could achieve
the same level of output by reducing their inputs by about 63.3% on average. This
result suggests that if profits are the drivers of dividends, as expected, profitable banks
paying dividends are not necessarily efficient relative to their industrial peers. Counter-
intuitively, Panel B of Table 2.3 shows that the average technical (EFF1) and profit
efficiency (EFF1 and EFF2) of dividend decreasing banks are higher than their dividend
increasing counterparts. While this result is rather unexpected, it is possible that these
banks, even though relatively more profit efficient, fall short on one or more standard
criteria, such as capital ratios, used by regulatory authorities in the assessment of banks
and make up this shortfall by reducing their dividends.
As the relation between our regression variables and market reactions to dividends
differs for some variables depending on direction of dividend change, Panel C of Table 2.2
presents the Pearson correlations between the regression variables separately for dividend
increases (below diagonal) and dividend decreases (above). As expected, the market
reaction to dividend change (CAAR) is significantly positively correlated with magnitude
of dividend change (DIVCHG) for dividend increasing banks. However, even though
we report a positive correlation between market reactions and magnitude of dividend
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change for dividend decreasing banks, this correlation is not significant at the conventional
levels.15 In addition, as predicted, we find positive relation between changes in bank
efficiency and market reactions to dividend increases. However, this relation is only
significant for the Model 1 (technical efficiency) and Model 3 (profit efficiency). Again, for
the dividend decreasing banks, we find no significant relation between any of the measures
of change in bank efficiency. These results suggest that change in bank overinvestment
problem, as measured by change in bank efficiency, is an important factor influencing
market reactions to dividend increases but seems not to have a significant effect on the
market reactions following dividend decreases.
15The correlation coefficient between these variables is only significant at 12% and above.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics - Input and Output Variables
Panel A: All Banks Mean SD Min Max Q1 Q2 Q3
Deposits and borrowed funds 28.15 116.20 0.02 1574.31 0.52 1.27 4.94
Personnel expenses 0.42 1.64 0.00 19.16 0.01 0.02 0.07
Physical capital (Fixed Assets) 0.34 1.37 0.00 18.83 0.01 0.02 0.07
Total interest expenses 0.95 4.28 0.00 85.95 0.01 0.03 0.14
Total non-interest expenses 0.88 3.29 0.00 39.04 0.02 0.04 0.14
Interest bearing asset (Loans) 17.84 73.79 0.02 1230.75 0.37 0.90 3.49
Other earnings assets 4.68 20.45 0.00 338.46 0.10 0.30 1.31
Profit before tax 0.30 1.26 -1.36 21.11 0.00 0.01 0.06
Gross Interest and dividend income 1.83 7.15 0.00 98.87 0.04 0.09 0.35
Total non-interest operating
income
0.69 2.85 -0.04 42.70 0.00 0.01 0.06
Panel B: Dividend Increasers
Deposits and borrowed funds 22.57 84.42 0.24 1198.32 1.48 2.64 7.69
Personnel expenses 0.41 1.51 0.00 18.21 0.02 0.04 0.11
Physical capital (Fixed Assets) 0.31 0.97 0.00 9.26 0.02 0.04 0.12
Total interest expenses 0.60 2.51 0.00 43.99 0.04 0.07 0.21
Total non-interest expenses 0.84 3.01 0.01 35.60 0.04 0.08 0.23
Interest bearing asset (Loans) 14.66 51.12 0.16 680.15 1.05 2.06 5.56
Other earnings assets 4.44 15.50 0.01 221.60 0.33 0.66 2.19
Profit before tax 0.34 1.32 -0.03 21.11 0.02 0.03 0.10
Gross Interest and dividend income 1.58 6.00 0.02 90.24 0.10 0.18 0.56
Total non-interest operating income 0.63 2.48 -0.04 37.99 0.02 0.03 0.11
Panel C: Dividend Decreasers
Deposits and borrowed funds 12.16 41.65 0.16 410.22 1.24 2.53 5.87
Personnel expenses 0.22 0.93 0.00 9.89 0.02 0.04 0.07
Physical capital (Fixed Assets) 0.21 0.82 0.00 7.79 0.02 0.04 0.08
Total interest expenses 0.36 1.30 0.00 12.29 0.03 0.07 0.17
Total non-interest expenses 0.46 1.92 0.01 20.74 0.04 0.07 0.14
Interest bearing asset (Loans) 8.16 28.49 0.12 311.99 0.87 1.83 4.25
Other earnings assets 2.61 7.02 0.02 58.47 0.31 0.70 1.77
Profit before tax 0.17 0.70 -0.04 8.48 0.02 0.04 0.08
Gross Interest and dividend income 0.92 3.42 0.01 35.52 0.09 0.17 0.44
Total non-interest operating income 0.32 1.45 -0.04 15.74 0.01 0.03 0.07
The table above shows the descriptive statistics for the input and output variables for the models of data envel-
opment analysis. Values are reported in billions (US$). The number of observations in Panels A, B, and C is
3100, 995, and 187, respectively
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2.4.2 Market Reactions of Announcers
The necessary condition for information content of dividends suggests a positive relation
between dividend announcement effect and the sign of the dividend change: If dividends
signal private information to the markets one would, at least, expect significant market
reactions following announcements of dividend changes. We compute mean abnormal
returns and cumulative abnormal returns around dividend change announcements, un-
conditioned on the (change in) efficiency level, to examine the predicted positive relation
between market reactions and the direction of dividend change.
Figure 2.2 shows the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) plot depicting
the graphical evolution of cumulative average abnormal returns during the 21-day event
window. The figure shows sharper market reactions to dividend decrease announcements
than to dividend increase announcements. Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 show the mean
abnormal returns calculated for the 21-day event window centred on the announcement
day 0 and cumulative average abnormal returns over four separate event windows based
on different assumptions about market reactions to dividend change announcements.
The tables also show the Boehmer et al.’s (1991) Z-statistic for tests of significance
of the average and cumulative average abnormal returns relative to zero at a two-tailed
significant level.
First, consistent with the well-documented evidence of a positive relation between di-
vidend increase and abnormal returns, Table 2.4 reports a significantly positive abnormal
returns of 0.11% (Z-statistic= 3.08) on the announcement day for dividend increases (day
0). This result is consistent whether we use the parametric BMP test or non-parametric
GST test. In addition, the number of banks with positive returns confirms the picture
portrayed by the positive abnormal returns and suggests the results presented in the table
do not result from few announcements with large positive abnormal returns. Even though
the significantly positive market reactions to dividend increases seem to persist after the
announcement date, a larger percentage (52%) of the cumulative abnormal returns of
0.85% is attributable to our designated 3-day event window. Conversely, consistent with
the information content of dividends, the results presented in Table 2.5 regarding the
sample of dividend decreases show that markets react significantly negatively to dividend
decrease announcements. The result suggests a significant announcement day abnormal
returns of about -0.66% (Z-statistic=-1.97) on the announcement day for dividend de-
creases (day 0). However, only 23% (-1.4%) of the 21-day negative market reaction of
-6.15% is attributable to the market reaction during the 3-day announcement window.
Overall, the results presented so far are consistent with managerial signalling through
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dividends under which market reactions reflect investors’ reassessment of bank value
following the costly dividend signal. For example, Bajaj and Vijh (1990) report 3-day
cumulative abnormal returns around dividend increases (decreases) of 1.04 percent (-
1.77%). DeAngelo et al. (2008, 182) remark that on average, dividend increases and
initiations are met with a statistically significant share price increase in the neighbourhood
of 1% and 3% respectively, while dividend cuts and omissions are typically met with
significant share price decline of around 6-10%. However, the relatively larger magnitude
of market reactions to dividends in these studies is also due to the fact they are by
design restricted to large dividend changes that are usually between the range of 10%
(e.g. Lang and Litzenberger, 1989) and 25% (e.g. Grullon et al., 2002) in absolute terms.
In contrast, as earlier stated, our study does not place such restriction on the dividend
announcement sample.
Tables 2.6-2.8 show the univariate results of the market reactions to dividend announce-
ments conditioned on the variables that proxy for the three leading explanations market
reactions to dividend changes: dividend yield (dividend clientele effect), dividend change
(cash flow signalling), and bank efficiency (agency cost explanation). Also included in
each of these tables are the tests of difference between dividend increasers and dividend
decreasers (Columns 4 and 5) and the tests of differences on average abnormal returns
(and cumulative abnormal returns) for groups of dividend announcers on standardised
dividend change, dividend yield, and bank efficiency (last panel of each table). We use
the median of each variable as the cut-off in forming the groups. The results in Columns
4 and 5 of each table generally support the empirically stylised fact of a significantly larger
market reactions (in absolute term) following dividend decreases compared to dividend
increases (see, Aharony and Swary, 1980; Dielman and Oppenheimer, 1984; Yoon and
Starks, 1995; Firth, 1996). This result is consistent with the cash flow signalling model
of Bhattacharya (1979), which assumes that the cost of making a cash flow deficit is
more than the benefit of a cash flow surplus of this same size. It is also consistent with
the model by Kalay (1980), which argues that managers’ reluctance to cut dividends is
a necessary condition for dividend to convey information. Both papers explicitly suggest
that dividend decreases are more costly than dividend increases. In the section that fol-
lows, we investigate the relation between market reactions to dividends and changes in
bank efficiency within a regression framework.
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Figure 2.2: Development of Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns
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The figure shows the development of cumulative abnormal returns (CAAR) for the overall
sample of 995 and 187 dividend increase and dividend decrease announcements, respect-
ively, within the event window of 21 days. Day 0 is the event date, as reported in CRSP.
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Table 2.4: Announcement Period Excess Returns Dividend Increasers
Day AAR SCS CAAR SCS Nos of
Positive
GST
-10 -0.0004 -0.2035 -0.0004 -0.2035 476 -0.9555
-9 0.0001 0.0875 -0.0003 -0.0805 500 0.5664
-8 -0.0001 0.1916 -0.0004 0.0466 496 0.3127
-7 0.0012 2.9778*** 0.0008 1.5270 535 2.7857***
-6 0.0003 -0.0449 0.0011 1.3864 495 0.2493
-5 0.0011 1.3604 0.0022 1.7507* 505 0.8834
-4 0.0003 0.5032 0.0024 1.7866* 493 0.1225
-3 0.0002 0.0315 0.0027 1.8030* 470 -1.3359
-2 -0.0006 -1.2236 0.0021 1.3139 485 -0.3848
-1 0.0009 0.9284 0.0030 1.5576 517 1.6443
0 0.0011 3.0837*** 0.0040 2.4071** 522 1.9614**
1 0.0024 4.1983*** 0.0064 3.1315*** 532 2.5955***
2 0.0009 2.1254** 0.0073 3.9970*** 497 0.3761
3 0.0004 0.8941 0.0077 4.3572*** 494 0.1859
4 0.0020 2.8754*** 0.0097 4.8140*** 505 0.8834
5 0.0009 0.5815 0.0106 4.6181*** 496 0.3127
6 -0.0005 -0.9227 0.0101 4.5106*** 482 -0.5750
7 0.0000 -0.4795 0.0101 4.2758*** 474 -1.0823
8 0.0001 -0.3305 0.0102 3.8147*** 474 -1.0823
9 0.0005 0.2884 0.0106 4.0912*** 508 1.0736***
10 -0.0022 -4.1168*** 0.0085 3.3382*** 438 -3.3650***
(-1, 1) 0.0044 4.3509*** 557 4.1807***
(-10, 10) 0.0085 3.3382*** 540 3.1027***
(-10, -2) 0.0021 1.3139 513 1.3907
(2, 10) 0.0021 0.4798 491 -0.0043
Table shows the valuation effect at dividend increase announcements by US banks with data
to compute efficiency scores and stock returns for all years 1998-2007. Daily average abnormal
returns (AAR) are computed as the out-of-sample residual of the market model. The parameters
are estimated, using CRSP equally weighted market index, over -100 through -11, where day 0
is the date of the announcement as reported in CRSP. Stock returns are adjusted for dividend
payments and the market model parameters are adjusted using the Scholes-Williams method.
CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal returns. SCS denotes the standardised cross-sectional
test (Boehmer et al., 1991). “Nos of Positive” refers to the number of positive abnormal returns
on day t. GST denotes the generalised sign test (Corrado, 1989 and Cowan 1992). The number
of announcements included in the analysis is 995. *, **, *** indicate statistically significant at
1% 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 2.5: Announcement Period Excess Returns Dividend Decreasers
Day AAR SCS CAAR SCS Nos of
Positive
GST
-10 -0.0210 -2.3775** -0.0210 -2.3775** 97 -0.9090
-9 0.0019 0.8144 -0.0190 -12.1712*** 98 -0.7620
-8 -0.0167 -1.2991 -0.0358 -1.5411 99 -0.6149
-7 0.0011 -0.7370 -0.0346 -3.7881*** 110 1.0026
-6 -0.0030 -0.8704 -0.0377 -3.4212*** 102 -0.1738
-5 0.0042 -0.8145 -0.0335 -3.7123*** 112 1.2967
-4 -0.0023 -1.2153 -0.0358 -16.6727*** 92 -1.6442
-3 0.0033 -1.1317 -0.0325 -3.7884*** 111 1.1496
-2 -0.0041 -0.8528 -0.0366 -3.4048*** 97 -0.9090
-1 -0.0014 -1.2721 -0.0379 -2.4964*** 117 2.0319**
0 -0.0066 -1.9666** -0.0445 -3.7937*** 106 0.4144
1 -0.0064 -1.6301 -0.0509 -3.8442*** 96 -1.0561
2 -0.0008 0.0136 -0.0517 -22.9103*** 103 -0.0267
3 -0.0017 -1.4155 -0.0534 -9.6122*** 84 -2.8206***
4 -0.0006 -0.4994 -0.0540 -6.9832*** 110 1.0026
5 -0.0083 -1.7823* -0.0623 -3.7964*** 96 -1.0561
6 -0.0041 -1.3072 -0.0664 -12.8728*** 90 -1.9383*
7 0.0060 -0.0899 -0.0604 -17.8849*** 101 -0.3208
8 -0.0025 -1.0359 -0.0628 -6.7671*** 107 0.5614
9 -0.0016 -1.2536 -0.0644 -8.1949*** 97 -0.9090
10 0.0029 1.3146 -0.0615 -24.6198*** 98 -0.7620
(-1, 1) -0.0144 -2.9131*** 105 0.2674
(-10, 10) -0.0615 -24.6198*** 102 -0.1738
(-10, -2) -0.0366 -3.4048*** 103 -0.0267
(2, 10) -0.0106 -8.8576*** 105 0.2674
Table shows the valuation effect at dividend decrease announcements by US banks with data
to compute efficiency scores and stock returns for all years 1998-2007. Daily average abnormal
returns (AAR) are computed as the out-of-sample residual of the market model. The parameters
are estimated, using CRSP equally weighted market index, over -100 through -11, where day 0
is the date of the announcement as reported in CRSP. Stock returns are adjusted for dividend
payments and the market model parameters are adjusted using the Scholes-Williams method.
CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal returns. SCS denotes the standardised cross-sectional
test (Boehmer et al., 1991). “Nos of Positive” refers to the number of positive abnormal returns
on day t. GST denotes the generalised sign test (Corrado, 1989 and Cowan 1992). The number
of announcements included in the analysis is 187. *, **, *** indicate statistically significant at
1% 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 2.6: Market Reactions by Standardised Dividend Change
All Increasers Decreasers Difference t-statistic
Announcers in Absolute
Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: All Changes
Nos. of Observations 1182 995 187
AAR 0.0019 0.0011 -0.0066 0.0055 6.08 ∗∗∗
z-statistic 3.06∗∗∗ 3.08∗∗∗ -1.97∗∗
Nos. of Positive AAR 603 522 106
GST 1.64 1.96∗∗ 0.41
CAAR 0.0059 0.0043 -0.0144 0.0101 8.66∗∗∗
z-statistic 5.44∗∗∗ 4.35∗∗∗ -2.91∗∗∗
Nos. of Positive CAAR 639 557 105
GST 3.73∗∗∗ 4.18∗∗∗ 0.27
Panel B: CHNG<Median
Nos. of Observations 591 570 21
AAR -0.0002 0.0003 -0.0146 0.0143 3.76∗∗∗
z-statistic 0.99 1.16 -1.07
Nos. of Positive AAR 293 284 9
GST 0.11 0.25 -0.68
CAAR 0.0026 0.0028 -0.0036 0.0008 -0.00
z-statistic 2.53∗∗ 2.72∗∗∗ -0.86
Nos of Positive CAAR 321 313 8
GST 2.42∗∗ 2.68∗∗∗ -1.12
Panel C: CHNG>Median
Nos. of Observations 591 425 166
AAR -0.0001 0.0021 -0.0056 0.0035 4.06∗∗∗
z-statistic -0.96 3.31∗∗∗ -1.92∗
Nos. of Positive AAR 335 238 97
GST 2.66∗∗∗ 2.72∗∗∗ 0.69
CAAR 0.0002 0.0064 -0.0157 0.0093 6.01 ∗∗∗
z-statistic -1.55 3.37∗∗∗ -2.90∗∗∗
Nos. of Positive CAAR 341 244 97
GST 3.16∗∗∗ 3.30∗∗∗ 0.69
Panel D: Test of Difference
CHNG<Median-
CHNG>Median
Mean difference on AAR -0.0001 -0.0018 -0.009
t-statistic -0.07 -1.49 -0.43
Mean Difference on CAAR 0.0024 -0.0036 0.0121
t-statistic 0.61 -1.63 0.35
The table reports the tests of significance of average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal
returns (CAAR) as well as tests of difference on average abnormal returns as well as cumulative average abnormal
returns between efficient and inefficient dividend announcing banks. The sample consists of 995 dividend increases
and 187 dividend decreases announced over the period 1998 to 2007. The estimation period is over days -100
to -11 relative to the announcement date. CAAR refers to the three day (day -1, day 0, and day 1) cumulative
average abnormal returns. AAR refers to the average abnormal returns on the announcement day (day 0). Nos.
of Positive AAR (CAAR) refers to the number of positive average abnormal returns (cumulative average abnormal
returns). Z-statistics are based on Boehmer et al.’s (1991) approach. GST is the generalised sign test (Corrado,
1989; Cowan, 1992). The reported t-statistics relate to the mean comparison tests. ***, **,* indicate significant
at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 2.7: Market Reaction by Dividend Yield
All Increasers Decreasers Difference t-statistic
Announcers in Absolute
Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: YLD>Median
Nos. of Observations 621 506 115
AAR 0.0020 0.0021 0.0078 0.0057 1.99∗∗
z-statistic 2.73∗∗∗ 3.83∗∗∗ -1.29
Nos Positive AAR 320 272 67
GST 1.63 2.03∗∗ -0.29
CAAR 0.0046 0.0049 -0.0034 -0.0005 -5.80∗∗∗
z-statistic 3.15∗∗∗ 3.88∗∗∗ -1.52
Nos Positive CAAR 337 285 63
GST 3.00∗∗∗ 3.18∗∗∗ 0.46
Panel B: YLD<Median
Nos. of Observations 561 489 72
AAR 0.0022 0.0016 -0.1728 0.1712 4.86∗∗∗
z-statistic 1.27 0.59 -1.45
Nos Positive AAR 283 250 42
GST 0.6584 0.7369 0.0833
CAAR 0.0074 0.0038 -0.3200 0.3162 6.86∗∗∗
z-statistic 3.19∗∗∗ 2.27∗∗ -3.36
Nos Positive CAAR 302 272 39
GST 2.26∗∗ 2.73∗∗∗ 0.70
Panel C: Test of Difference:
YLD<Median -YLD>Median
Mean difference on AAR 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.1806∗
t-statistic 0.25 -1.72∗ -1.22
Mean Difference on CAAR 0.0028 -0.0011 -0.2864
t-statistic 0.71 -0.49 -1.20
The table reports the tests of significance of average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal
returns (CAAR) as well as tests of difference on average abnormal returns as well as cumulative average abnormal
returns between announcing banks with high and low anticipated dividend yields. The sample consists of 995
dividend increases and 187 dividend decreases announced over the period 1998 to 2007. The estimation period is
over days -100 to -11 relative to the announcement date. CAAR refers to the three day (day -1, day 0, and day
1) cumulative average abnormal returns. AAR refers to the average abnormal returns on the announcement day
(day 0). Nos. of Positive AAR (CAAR) refers to the number of positive average abnormal returns (cumulative
average abnormal returns). Z-statistics are based on Boehmer et al.’s (1991) approach. GST is the generalised
sign test (Corrado, 1989; Cowan, 1992). The reported t-statistics relate to the mean comparison tests. ***, **,*
indicate significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 2.8: Market Reactions by Bank Efficiency
All Increasers Decreasers Difference t-statistic
Announcers in Absolute
Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Efficiency
(E)>Median
Nos. of Observations 594 502 92
AAR 0.0010 0.0024 0.0067 0.0043 1.46
z-statistic 3.29∗∗∗ 3.43∗∗∗ -0.30
Nos. of Positive AAR 325 292 51
GST 3.00∗∗∗ 3.24∗∗∗ -0.10
CAAR 0.0021 0.0038 0.0074 0.0036 3.81∗∗∗
z-statistic 3.79∗∗∗ 3.33∗∗∗ -2.15∗∗∗
Nos of Positive CAAR 327 284 57
GST 3.17∗∗∗ 3.95∗∗∗ 1.20
Panel B: Efficiency
(E)<Median
Nos. of Observations 588 493 95
AAR 0.0029 -0.0003 -0.020 0.0197 5.38∗∗∗
z-statistic 1.96∗∗ 0.38 -1.94
Nos. of Positive AAR 278 238 55
GST -0.70 1.95 0.64
CAAR 0.0098 0.0049 -0.0355 0.0306 7.83∗∗∗
z-statistic 3.78∗∗∗ 2.79∗∗∗ -2.73∗∗∗
Nos. of Positive CAAR 312 265 48
GST 2.11∗∗ -0.48 -0.80
Panel C:Test of Difference
(E<Median)-(E>Median)
Mean difference on AAR 0.0019 -0.0026 -0.0267
t-statistic 0.85 -2.25∗∗ -2.04∗∗
Mean Difference on CAAR 0.0077 0.0011 -0.0429
t-statistic 1.99∗∗ 0.48 -2.02∗∗
The table reports the tests of average abnormal returns (AAR) and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR)
as well as tests of difference on average abnormal returns as well as cumulative average abnormal returns between
efficient and inefficient dividend announcing banks. The sample consists of 995 dividend increases and 187
dividend decreases announced over the period 1998 to 2007 that meet the following criteria. The estimation
period is over days -100 to -10. CAAR refers to the three day (day -1, day 0, and day 1) cumulative average
abnormal returns. AAR refers to the average abnormal returns on the announcement day (day 0). Nos of Positive
CAAR (or AAR) refers to the number of positive cumulative abnormal returns (or average abnormal returns).
Z-statistics are based on Boehmer et al. (1991) approach. GST is the generalised sign test (Corrado, 1989;
Cowan, 1992). The reported t-statistics relate to the mean comparison tests. ***, **,* indicate significant at
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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2.4.3 Regression Analysis
To test the relation between market reaction to dividend change announcements and
changes in bank efficiency, controlling for other potential explanatory factors, we es-
timate the following empirical model separately for the dividend increasers and dividend
decreasers using ordinary least squares:
CAARi,t = β0+β1DIVCHGi,t +β2DIVYLDi,t +β3LnMVALi,t +β4CHGEFFi,t + εi,t (2.4.1)
where CAAR is the 3-day market model cumulative abnormal returns. DIVCHG is the
change in cash dividend amount; LnMVAL is the natural log of market value of equity
at the beginning of the year. DIVYLD is the anticipated dividend yield; CHGEFF is
the change is efficiency level relative to the previous accounting year, where CHGEFF is
CHGEFF1, CHGEFF2 or CHGEFF3.16
The first control variable that we include in our announcement effect regression is the
magnitude of dividend change (DIVCHG). Various signalling models suggest that man-
agement use large dividend changes to signal (large) changes in cash flows. For example,
Asquith and Mullins Jr (1983) argue that if dividends signal valuable information, the
wealth effect of dividends should exhibit a positive relation with the size of the signal (see,
also, Yoon and Starks, 1995). Filbeck and Mullineaux (1993, Table 1) show that the
abnormal returns following bank dividend change announcements increase monotonically
with the size of the dividend change, suggesting a positive relation between CAAR and
DIVCHG. Following Nissim (2003) and Mikhail et al. (2003), we define the magnitude
of dividend change (DIVCHG) as change in the quarterly cash amount deflated by share
price two days before the dividend declaration date.17
The second control variable that we consider is the dividend yield variable that ac-
counts for the dividend clientele effect. The clientele explanation of dividends holds that
investors with low marginal tax rates value dividends and invest in high-yield stocks and
16Since the DEA models that generated the efficiency scores were estimated using the pooled annual
data the one-year change in efficiency at the end of year t signals for all abnormal returns relating
to dividend announcements in year t + 1. Our results are qualitatively similar if we estimate the
efficiency scores on quarterly basis and calculate the change in efficiency on quarterly basis.
17Nissim (2003) evaluates the choice between prior dividends and pre-announcement price as the appro-
priate deflator of the dividend change variable. While noting that the deflation with prior dividends is
consistent with the literature, he demonstrates that deflating by price results in more precise measure
of the magnitude of dividend change, at least in the context of announcement returns regressions.
Denis et al. (1994) follow similar method but deflate dividend change by the price two days before
the announcement.
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will react more to announcements of dividend changes (Fehrs et al., 1988; Bajaj and
Vijh, 1990). In line with this argument, Fehrs et al. (1988), Bajaj and Vijh (1990),
Mikhail et al. (2003) document a positive (negative) relation between market reactions
to dividend increase (decrease) and dividend yield (DIVYLD). We measure past dividend
yield as the most recent dividend before the current dividend divided by the market price
two days prior to the current period dividend announcements. Finally, we also control
for the information environment of banks using the natural logarithm of total market
value of equity (LnMVAL) at the beginning of the year of the dividend change announce-
ments. Bajaj and Vijh (1990) report that dividend announcement effects are negatively
(positively) related to firm size for dividend increases (decreases).18
Table 2.9 presents the results from the estimation of Equation 2.4.1 for the dividend in-
crease and dividend decrease subsamples. Consistent with expectation, we find a strong
positive relation between market reaction to dividend increases and the magnitude of
dividend changes whatever the model of efficiency used in estimating change in bank
efficiency. In addition, our bank data also seem to support a role for the dividend cli-
entele explanation of market reactions to dividend change announcements. We find a
strong and significantly positive relation between abnormal returns at dividend change
announcements and anticipated dividend yield. However, the coefficient on bank size
in not statistically significant in any of the three models. Most importantly, our results
establish a link between bank share price and changes in bank efficiency at dividend an-
nouncements.19 Controlling for dividend change, information environment, and dividend
clientele effect we find that market reaction to dividend increase is positively related to
change in bank efficiency, whatever the model of bank efficiency that we use. This result
supports the agency cost explanation of dividends under which markets react positively
to change in management investment policy and the desire to mitigate overinvestment
problem as signalled by the reduction in bank inputs used in generating outputs through
an increase in dividends.
Columns 4-6 of Table 2.9 present the results of the estimation of Equation 2.4.1 for
dividend decrease subsample. Contrary to expectation, we find no support for a role
of cash flow signalling and the information environment of bank around announcement
of dividend decreases. The coefficients on DIVCHG and LnMVAL are not significantly
different from zero. In addition, while the coefficients on LnMVAL are of the expec-
ted sign in all the models those on DIVCHG are generally negative contrary prediction.
18See, also, Eddy and Seifert, 1988; Haw and Kim, 1991; Mitra and Owers, 1995; Mikhail et al., 2003
19However, in untabulated results, we find no evidence that market reactions to dividend change an-
nouncements is related to subsequent change in bank efficiency.
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Moreover, while the coefficient on DIVYLD loads significantly in each model of efficiency,
the coefficient is of the wrong sign in the models. Most importantly, we find no evidence
that changes in bank efficiency moderate market reactions to announcements of dividend
decreases. One can only speculate the reasons for the weak link between the various
theories of dividends and market reactions to dividend decreases in our sample. The lack
of support for the dividend decreases subsample may be due to lack of power because of
the relatively small size of the sample. Second, dividend decreases may not be inform-
ative of bank “efficiency news” if banks decreasing dividends are already assessed by the
market as financially troubled. While regulatory assessments of banks are usually not
formally released to the public evidence suggest that markets react to shares of troubled
in a manner consistent with supervisory assessments of banks. Therefore, the lack of
support for the role of efficiency changes in dividend decrease subsample may also be due
to moderating role of regulatory and supervisory environments of banks.
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Table 2.9: Regression Results - Market Reactions and Change in Efficiency
Dividend Increasers Dividend Decreasers
Technical
Efficiency
Profit
Efficiency
Profit
Efficiency
Technical
Efficiency
Profit
Effi-
ciency
Profit
Effi-
ciency
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
DIVCHG +/+ 6.4754*** 6.7613*** 6.3333*** 0.0603 -0.1812 -0.0517
(3.45) (3.57) (3.33) (0.01) (-0.06) (-0.02)
LnMVAL - /+ -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0004 0.0113 0.0098 0.0108
(-0.53) (-0.65) (-0.44) (1.25) (1.07) (1.19)
DIVYLD +/- 0.2189** 0.2220** 0.2567** 2.2483** 2.3654** 2.3694**
(2.04) (2.07) (2.38) (2.20) (2.30) (2.29)
CHGEFF1 +/- 0.0843*** 0.2600
(2.84) (0.90)
CHGEFF2 +/- 0.0414** 0.1520
(2.36) (0.89)
CHGEFF3 +/- 0.0436*** 0.1199
(2.80) (0.71)
Intercept ?? -0.0027 -0.0020 -0.0044 -0.1612** -
0.1531**
-
0.1624**
(-0.36) (-0.27) (-0.58) (-2.13) (-2.02) (-2.14)
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.06
N 782 782 782 129 129 129
The table presents the estimates of coefficients (above) and t-statistics (below) of the regression of the 3-day
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) on change in bank efficiency using ordinary least square estimation.
DIVCHG is a measure of the magnitude of dividend change, defined as the change in dividends divided by the
market price of equity two days before the dividend announcement day. DIVYLD measures the anticipated dividend
yield as sum of the prior year dividend divided by the market price two days before the dividend announcement
day. LnMVAL measures the information environment of the bank and is defined as the natural logarithm of
market value of equity at the beginning of the year. CHGEFF1, CHGEFF2, and CHGEFF3 are measures of
one-year change in the level of efficiency. CHGEFF1 measures a changes in technical efficiency (Model 1) while
CHGEFF1 and CHGEFF3 (Model 2 and Model 3) measure changes in profit efficiency. All inputs and outputs
used in the estimation of the DEA models are defined in Table 2.1. ***, *,* indicate significant at 1%, 5%, and
10%, respectively.
2.4.4 Additional Analysis
Our finding linking market reactions to changes in bank efficiency draws evidence from the
standard event study methodology that models only the announcement returns. Analyt-
ical evidence suggests that the standard event study produces biased estimates when the
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event is voluntary, as it is the case with the decision to change dividends. In addition, the
standard event study methodology may result in biased estimation of abnormal returns
as it fails to incorporate market anticipation of the event (Eckbo et al., 1990). Under
these conditions, both the announcement returns and the decision to change dividends
are endogenous variables. We employ a standard Heckman (1979) two-stage regression
methodology to control for the potential sample selection bias. In line with this, we
first estimate an ordered probit regression to obtain an additional control variable - the
inverse Mills ratio (IMR) - which we include in the market reaction model to control for
the selection bias and the potential anticipation of the dividend change event.
Our conditional event study methodology models dividend change decisions and market
response in separate equations. The decision to increase, maintain, or decrease dividends
is clearly an ordinal variable. Therefore, a simple multinomial logit or probit model would
fail to account for the ordinal nature of the variable. An OLS regression would also fail
to discriminate between the ordering of the decision as it treats the difference between
decreasing and maintaining dividends in the same way as one between maintaining and
increasing dividends. To account for the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, and
following Goergen et al. (2005) and Christensen and Prabhala (1995), we use the ordered
probit model developed by McElvey and Zavoina (1975).
We assume that on each dividend date, banks choose one of three mutually exclusive
alternatives: increase dividends (I), maintain dividends (M) or decrease dividends (D).20
We also assume that the choice among these alternatives is governed by latent variable y∗i ,
the net benefit of the dividend decision. Prior to each dividend announcement, investors
form expectation about y∗i based on publicly available firm-specific stock market and
financial variables. Thus, dividend decisions are not only a function of management’s
self-selection based on their assessment of the net benefits resulting from their choice,
they are also partially anticipated events suggesting that market reaction to such events
is a function of market expectations based on the publicly available information. Suppose
that these expectations are governed by:
E(y∗) = β
′
x (2.4.2)
where x denotes the vector of variables in the market information set and E(.) denotes
the expectation operator, conditional on the pre-announcement information set. We can
express y∗ as:
20These options are not exhaustive. For example, banks can take additional dividend decision alternatives
such stock dividends or stock repurchase. However, the focus of the study is on cash dividends.
68
y∗ = β
′
x+ψ (2.4.3)
We interpret ψ as the bank’s private information about the net benefit of the dividend
change decision. Although y∗ is not observed by the market, we observe y, which takes
the value of 0, 1, and 2 for dividend decreases, maintained, and increases, respectively.
Following this assumption we can specify our ordered probit choice model as:
Dividend Increases (I)=y=2 if y∗ = β ′x+ψ ≥ υD (2.4.4)
Dividend Decreases (D)=y=0 if y∗ = β ′x+ψ ≤ υD (2.4.5)
Dividend Maintained (M)=y=1 if y∗ = β ′x+ψ = υD (2.4.6)
According to this model bank i increases dividends if the underlying latent information
y∗ is equal to, or above, a threshold (good news) and decreases dividends if y∗ is below a
threshold (bad news). For interim values of y∗ the bank chooses to maintain dividends.
Parameters υD and υI are the cut-off (threshold) guiding the decision process. Under the
assumption that each bank’s dividend choice reflects its private information about the
net benefit of the dividend change, the announcement of a dividend decision by a bank
reveals some private information about the bank and results in market’s revision of the
expectation about ψ conditional on bank i dividend choice C, C ∈ (D,M, I). The updated
expectation of ψ following dividend announcement depends on the statistical distribution
of ψ . If we assume that the random error ψ has a standard normal distribution, N (0,1),
an assumption that defines the ordered probit model, then we can calculate the following:
λ1(.) =
φ(υI−β ′x)
Φ(υI−β ′x) (2.4.7)
λU(.) =
φ(υI−β ′x)−φ(υD−β ′x)
Φ(υI−β ′x)−Φ(υD−β ′x) (2.4.8)
λD(.) =
φ(υD−β ′x)
1−Φ(υD−β ′x) (2.4.9)
where φ(.) is the standard normal density function and Φ is the cumulative distribution
function of the same distribution evaluated at x. The conditional expectations λD(C) are
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indicator variables for private information and proxy for the unexpected information in di-
vidend change announcements. The coefficient on the respective conditional expectation,
analogous to the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) of the Heckman model, should be significant
if selection bias is a significant factor in estimating the abnormal returns. The paramet-
ers (βs, υD, and υI) of the ordered probit model, describing banks information revelation
process can be consistently estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation. In line
with Greene (2003, 736) parameter υD can be set to zero without any loss of generality.
Our ordered probit model requires that we specify a set of firm-specific characteristics
and market fundamentals that determine bank decision to change dividends and the
market expectation of forthcoming dividend change - the independent variables in our
ordered probit model. We estimate market assessment of a bank’s probability to change
dividends using five of the variables included in the study by Nayak and Prabhala (2001).
Specifically, our first stage ordered probit regression includes measures of bank dividend
history, bank risk, as well as price history before the dividend change announcements.
We include the past dividend variable (PR1DUMMY) that takes the value of -1, 0, or
+1 depending on whether the previous quarter’s dividend was decreased, unchanged, or
increased, respectively. Nayak and Prabhala (2001) suggest a negative relation between
the dividend variable and the likelihood that the current dividend is increased. In line with
Eades (1982), they argue that firms with high risk are less likely to increase dividends.
We account for bank risk using three of their variables - LnMVAL, RUNUP, STKVOL.
LnMVAL measures bank size and is the natural logarithm of the market value of bank
equity five days before the dividend change announcement. STKVOL is the stock returns
volatility computed as the standard deviation of stock returns six months before the
dividend change announcement date. RUNUP is the ratio of stock price five trading days
prior to and stock price one year before the dividend change announcement. Finally, we
also include the bank stock price five days before the announcement of the dividends
(PRC5).
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Table 2.10: Additional Regression Results - Market Reactions and Change in Efficiency
Technical Efficiency Profit Efficiency Profit Efficiency
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
DIVCHG + 6.4931*** 5.1744** 6.5949***
(2.60) (2.07) (2.66)
DIVYLD + 0.3053** 0.3614*** 0.3072**
(2.41) (2.86) (2.43)
CHGEFF1 + 0.0743** 0.0681*
(2.02) (1.86)
CHGEFF2 + 0.0647*** 0.0640***
(3.89) (3.81)
CHGEFF3 + 0.0610** 0.0595**
(2.56) (2.51)
IMR ?? -0.0057 -0.0058 -0.0057
(-0.53) (-0.53) (-0.52)
Intercept ?? 0.0043*** -0.0051 0.0039*** -0.0061 0.0041*** -0.0054
(3.44) (-0.90) (3.18) (-1.09) (3.28) (-0.96)
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.04
N 571 571 571 571 571 571
The table presents the estimates of coefficients (above) and t-statistics (below) of the regression of the 3-day
cumulative abnormal returns (CAAR) on change in bank efficiency using ordinary least square estimation. DIVCHG
is a measure of the magnitude of dividend change, defined as the change in dividends divided by the market price
of equity two days before the dividend announcement day. DIVYLD measures the anticipated dividend yield
and is sum of the prior year dividends divided by the market price two days before the dividend announcement
day. CHGEFF1, CHGEFF2, and CHGEFF3 are measures of one-year change in the level of efficiency. CHGEFF1
measures a changes in technical efficiency (Model 1) while CHGEFF1 and CHGEFF3 (Model 2 and Model 3)
measure changes in profit efficiency. IMR is the inverse Mills ratio from the first stage ordered probit regression
of dividend change dummy variable (DIVCHG) on specified bank-level and stock market variables. All inputs and
outputs used in the estimation of the DEA models are defined in Table 2.1. ***, *,* indicate significant at 1%,
5%, and 10%, respectively.
Table 2.10 presents the estimates of regression of announcement period cumulative
average abnormal returns (CAAR) on the change in bank efficiency variables, controlling
for the magnitude of dividend change and dividend clientele. The estimated models also
include the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) to account for the potential influence of the self
selection bias. One cannot assign a negative or positive coefficient estimate to IMR, a
priori. We exclude the bank size variable in the second stage OLS regression as it already
belongs in our first pass regression. In addition, it receives no support in the uncondi-
tional abnormal returns models presented in Table 2.9 above. As shown in Table 2.10,
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consistent with the unconditional abnormal returns models, we find a consistently signi-
ficant positive relation between market reactions to bank dividend changes and changes
in bank efficiency. This relation holds even after accounting for the potential selection
bias. The insignificant coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio suggests that selection bias is
not a significant factor in the estimation of abnormal returns following dividend increases
by banks.21 Overall, the link between market reactions and change in bank efficiency
does not appear to be spurious.
2.5 Conclusion
The study examines the relation between market reactions to dividend change announce-
ments and changes in bank overinvestment problem. We measure bank overinvestment
problem as the change in bank (in)efficiency, derived from a non-parametric frontier ana-
lysis of bank input-output combination. Consistent with the agency-based explanation of
dividends and empirical studies linking firm efficiency to (changes in) share prices, we find
that controlling for bank dividend change, information environment, and dividend clien-
teles, markets react positively to improvement in the level of bank efficiency by dividend
increasing banks. This result holds whether we define bank overinvestment problem using
either technical efficiency model or profit efficiency model. However, our result fails to
hold for dividend decreasing subsample.
The limitations in our study offer great opportunities for future extensions. For ex-
ample, our study draws evidence from a sample of bank dividend announcements. It
will be interesting to examine whether the finding in this study holds for other indus-
tries and for larger dividend announcement samples, especially for the dividend decrease
subsample. In addition, we estimated our bank efficiency score using the non-parametric
data envelopment analysis. In view of the limitations of the methodology, especially re-
garding the assumption of zero measurement error, further studies could triangulate our
findings using parametric frontier methodology, such as stochastic frontier analysis.
21We do not re-examine the dividend decrease subsample for two reasons: First, our unconditional event
study results do not suggest a role for bank efficiency in market reactions to announcement of bank
dividend decrease. In addition, additional data requirements, especially for STKVOL, to estimate
inverse Mills ratio result in further loss of sample units for the dividend decrease subsample.
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3 Market Rewards Associated with
Bank Earnings Quality
Abstract
The study investigates three market consequences of bank earnings quality. We con-
struct an aggregate measure of bank earnings quality that incorporates four earnings
attributes (accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and earnings
smoothing). Using our aggregate earnings quality measure, we investigate the implica-
tions of bank earnings quality for bank cost of equity, bank valuation, and value relevance
of bank earnings. Our results suggest that markets place a value on bank earnings quality,
consistent with the idea that higher earnings quality reduces information risk by reducing
information asymmetry. The study documents three important findings. First, we find
evidence of a significantly negative relation between bank earnings quality and bank cost
of equity, measured using a battery of earnings-based valuation models. Consistent with
our primary finding, the study documents a significantly positive relation between bank
earnings quality and market valuation of banks. Finally, we find that the relation between
earnings and bank market price is conditional on the quality of earnings. After controlling
for risk, bank size, and growth, banks with better earnings quality have significantly higher
price-earnings multiples than banks with low earnings quality.
3.1 Introduction
Recent analytical and empirical studies in the field of finance and accounting focus on the
controversy regarding the implication of the quality and quantity of financial accounting
information for the cost of capital. Research in this area is of immense importance in
view of number of high profile corporate failures, in part, due to the quality of accounting
information available to investors (e.g. Enron, Worldcom, BCCI, and Parmalat). The
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is unequivocal in stating that the role
of financial statements is: ‘to provide information about the financial position, financial
performance, and cash flows of an entity that is useful to a wide range of users in making
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economic decisions’ (IAS 1, 2007).1 Implied by this primary objective of accounting is
the proposition that accounting information may have a direct and/or an indirect role in
capital markets. In line with this implication, a number of theoretical studies suggest that
the role of accounting information is distinguishable from competing candidate factors
that drive a firm’s stock market variables. Empirical attempts at documenting evidence in
support of these theories have centred on establishing an association between disclosure
level (and quality) and the cost of equity. Others have taken a stronger view by suggesting
a separate pricing of information risk associated with information asymmetry and precision
of (accounting) information.
Motivated by the various theoretical work linking the information environment of firms
to capital market variables, such as stock liquidity, stock performance, institutional own-
ership, and analyst following, our primary research question relates to whether banks with
better earnings quality enjoy lower cost of equity. However, the study also contributes
to the literature on the consequences of quality and quantity of financial reporting (e.g.
Botosan, 1997; Baber et al., 1998; Collins and Kothari, 1989; Francis et al., 2004); the
literature investigating the determinants of firm valuation (e.g. La Porta et al., 2002;
Brown and Caylor, 2006; Caprio et al., 2007; Ammann et al., 2010); and that examining
the determinants of value relevance of accounting information (e.g. Barth et al., 1999).
Theoretical work relating information risk to the cost of equity, which serves as the
foundation for the link between earnings quality and the cost of equity, provides con-
trasting prediction on this issue. For example, Easley and O’Hara (2002, 2004) argue in
support of a role of information in reducing the cost of equity by reducing information
risk. However, Lambert et al. (2007) suggest that the impact of information risk on the
cost of equity may be positive or negative but their conclusion rules out a separate risk
factor in asset pricing models.
This controversy also extends to empirical studies attempting to link the quantity and
quality of information to the cost of equity. For example, Barth et al. (2008) examine the
relation between cost of capital and earnings transparency, an earnings quality attribute.
After controlling for Fama and French and momentum factors, they find that firms
with more transparent earnings have lower cost of equity as reflected in cross-sectional
variation in the expected cost of equity, subsequent excess returns, and mean differences
in stock returns. On the other hand, McInnis (2010) examines the notion that smoother
earnings, another desirable attribute of earnings, lead to a lower cost of equity and finds
1IAS 1 - Presentation of Financial Statements - is the first of the many International Accounting
Statements (IAS) issued by the International Accounting Standards Board.
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no relation between earnings smoothness and average stock returns, the implied cost of
equity capital, and excess returns.
While we are aware of studies relating information quality to the cost of capital (e.g.
Francis et al., 2004) and those linking disclosure level to the cost of equity (e.g. Botosan,
1997; Botosan et al., 2004), except for Poshakwale and Courtis (2005), we are unaware
of studies linking bank financial reporting to the cost of equity.2 In view of the evidence
suggesting that the relation between information and the cost of equity is sensitive to
the dimensions of information, it is important to know whether this relation and/or
its economic relevance is context specific. In fact, Botosan (1997) suggests that, at
least, the first is plausible. She finds no significant relation between the cost of equity
and disclosure level for firms that attract a greater number of analysts, firms for which
information asymmetry is less of a problem. In view of this finding and the inconclusive
evidence on the link between information and the cost of equity, we revisit this hypothesis
by focusing on the banking sector that some authors argue exhibits greater level of
information asymmetry suggesting a greater link between information and the cost of
equity. However, the mitigating role of regulation and supervision aimed at reducing
information asymmetry may also attenuate the role of information disclosure on bank
cost of capital. Therefore, whether information risk plays a role in bank cost of capital
and, if it does, the magnitude of this role are empirical questions that this study aims to
answer.
In addition, we further extend the literature by offering indirect evidence on the relation
between bank cost of equity capital and earnings quality. In this regard, we examine the
relation between bank earnings quality and market valuation of banks. We ask whether
markets value bank earnings quality: If information quality is an important driver of the
cost of equity, not only should we expect a negative relation between earnings quality and
the cost of equity, this relation should translate into a positive relation between earnings
quality and bank valuation. Finally, we extend the study to the value relevance literature
in accounting and ask whether earnings of banks that are of higher quality are more value
relevant than earnings that are of lower quality.
From a practical point of view, the effect of earnings quality is of considerable import-
ance to the financial reporting community as accounting information that is of higher
quality improves decision usefulness and reduces investor uncertainty. Better quality
accounting information also enables better monitoring of managers thus reducing monit-
2Poshakwale and Courtis (2005) relate the disclosure level of 135 banks in three continents to bank
cost of equity. We study the quality of information, and not the quantity.
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oring cost that would otherwise be required to certify the accounting information released
by management. However, given that the provision of better information is costly, man-
agers would be more motivated to provide better information if they are aware of the
associated benefits that shareholders stand to gain, assuming management act in the
interest of shareholders. In addition, this study also speaks to the market discipline of
banks, which is one of the three pillars of the current Basle II framework. For example,
while discussing the costs and benefits of disclosure requirements under the Basle II
framework, the Basle Committee argues ‘that an appropriate level of timely disclosure
will have benefits for well-run institutions, investors and depositors, for financial stability
more generally, and will help support the effective and efficient operation of the capital
markets’ (Basle Committee Consultative Document, 2001, 3).3
To put the study in clearer perspective, this chapter presents the results of the in-
vestigation of three implications of earnings quality: bank cost of equity, bank valuation,
and value relevance of earnings. We measure earnings quality using a composite earnings
quality score made up of four accounting based earnings attributes, namely persistence,
predictability, smoothness, and accruals quality. In view of the fact that all cost of equity
measures are ‘unavoidably imprecise’ (Fama and French, 1997, 153), to mitigate the
sensitivity of our results to the choice of the cost of equity adopted (e.g. Botosan and
Plumlee, 2002), we first validate individual cost of equity measures. We use the expected
positive association between the cost of equity and beta as our primary benchmark.
The study then examines the association between earnings quality and the cost of
equity by regressing bank-specific estimate of cost of equity, derived as the average of
five earnings-based measures of cost of equity, on market beta, firm size, book to market
ratio, and individual as well as composite accounting based measures of earnings quality.
Consistent with the hypothesis that information quality is negatively associated with
bank cost of equity, we find a significant negative relation between the cost of equity
and composite measure of earnings quality. The magnitude of the difference in cost of
equity capital suggests that one unit increase in aggregate earnings quality is associated
with approximately 10 basis point reduction in the cost of equity capital after controlling
for market beta, bank size, and book to market ratio. The lower reduction in the cost
of equity for banks, compared with those reported in other non-banking studies, seems
to support our proposition that the role of accounting information is context specific
and may be of lower economic significance for firms exposed to high regulation and
3The proponents of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act put forward a similar argument (e.g. see, Ogneva et al.,
2007).
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supervision, primarily aimed at reducing information asymmetry. For example, Botosan
(1997) reports a reduction in the cost of equity that average about 28 basis points for
manufacturing firms that attract low analyst following while Botosan and Plumlee (2002)
report a reduction in the cost of equity that average about 0.7 percentage points for firms
providing the most annual report disclosure relative to those providing the least. Our
results also show that the relation between the cost of equity and components of earnings
quality is neither consistently significant nor exhibit similar direction across all earnings
quality dimensions. For example, while we report a negative and significant relation
between the cost of equity and predictability as well as accruals quality, the relation
between the cost of equity and persistence is insignificantly positive at all conventional
levels.
Consistent with the idea of a negative relation between the cost of equity and bank
earnings quality, we also find significant positive relation between our composite meas-
ure of earnings quality and bank valuation. However, of the four earnings attributes
considered in this study, only persistence and smoothing dimensions exhibit consistently
positive relation with bank value, no matter the definition of bank value that we adopt.
While the quality of loan loss provisions (accruals) exhibits a consistently negative relation
with bank value, this relationship is not significant across different model specifications.
In addition, and contrary to expectation, our predictability dimension of earnings exhibits
a consistently significant negative relation with bank value. These results are consistent
with Dechow et al. (2010) who note that different earnings quality measures do not
necessarily generate similar outcomes.
We address the potential endogeneity bias inherent in the relation between bank value
and earnings quality using instrumental variable approach. While not perfect, we believe
that the instrumental variables that we advance in this study provide innovative variables
for dealing with the endogeneity of earnings quality in empirical models linking bank earn-
ings quality to specified market and non-market outcomes. Specifically, our instrumental
variables strategy involves the categorisation of banks based on whether they are subject
to a provision of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 requir-
ing internal control reports. We use this variable as evidence suggests an improvement
in earnings quality for banks that are subject to this requirement. In addition, we also
use a dummy variable to account for the documented positive impact of the Sarbanes
and Oxley Act of 2002 on the quality and reliability of reported financial information.
Finally, in view of the tax-incentive to manage earnings, we use bank lagged tax liability
as an instrument for earnings quality. The relationship between our composite measure
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of earnings quality and bank valuation remains significantly positive even after addressing
the potential impact of endogeneity of earnings quality.
Finally, we extend our study to the value relevance literature in accounting. Consistent
with past studies we find a positive relation between (change in) stock price and bank
earnings. Most importantly, in further support of a negative relation between cost of
equity and earnings quality, our results show that the value relevance of earnings is
conditional on market assessment of bank earnings quality. Banks with high earnings
quality enjoy higher price-earnings multiples compared to similar banks with low earnings
quality.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2 we discuss the the-
oretical and conceptual framework of the study and present the hypotheses tested in
this study. Section 3.3 describes the methodology we adopt in investigating the relation
between earnings quality and capital market variables. Section 3.4 presents and discusses
the empirical results on the relation between bank cost of capital and earnings quality.
Section 3.5 presents and discusses the empirical results on the relation between earnings
quality and bank valuation while Section 3.6 presents and discusses the empirical results
on the impact of earnings quality on value relevance of earnings. Finally, Section 3.7 con-
cludes the chapter by providing a summary of the results and laying out the implications
for investors, bank regulators, as well as policy-makers.
3.2 Development of Hypotheses
In the traditional asset pricing literature, only systematic risk affects expected stock
returns. Under this framework, it is impossible to establish a relation between firm-
specific risk and the cost of capital as such diversifiable risk does not affect the variance
of a well-diversified portfolio. However, recent theoretical models suggest a link between
nondiversifiable information risk, resulting from information asymmetry, and the cost of
capital. Two strands of research provide theoretical support for an association between
information risk and the cost of capital.
The first strand of research relies on the assumption that private information gives
rise to greater information asymmetry, greater information risk, and results in higher
cost of capital. Therefore, greater public information, whether mandated or voluntary,
reduces information asymmetries among informed and uninformed market participants
thereby increasing stock market liquidity leading to a reduction in the cost of equity,
through either a reduction in transaction cost or increased demand for a firm’s securities.
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For example, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) show that the cost of equity is higher for
stocks with wider bid-ask spreads because investors demand compensation for additional
transaction cost. Therefore, greater disclosure lowers information asymmetry and the
associated adverse selection component of the cost of capital by attenuating the bid-
ask spread, enhancing trading volume, and reducing stock return volatility. Diamond
and Verrecchia (1991) suggest that greater information disclosure reduces the adverse
price effect associated with information revelation of large trades. The reduction in
information asymmetry associated with the release of information triggers more active
and larger trading in the shares of the firm, thus increasing market liquidity and firm’s
current price, and reducing the cost of equity (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). More recently,
Easley and O’Hara (2004) develop a multi-asset, multi-period rational expectation model
that suggests a pricing role for the quantity of private versus public information available
to informed and non-informed investors. In their model, the information risk faced by the
uninformed investor is nondiversifiable and investors require an appropriate compensation
for bearing this risk. As informed investors are better able to shift their portfolio weight
to take advantage of new information, more private information increases uninformed
investors’ risk of holding the stock relative to informed investors. Uninformed investors
thus require higher returns as compensation for the nondiversifiable risk they bear. The
higher returns translate into higher cost of capital for the information opaque firms.
While their conclusion is indistinguishable from those arguing for a role of information
in the cost of equity through market liquidity and transaction cost, the second strand
of studies shows that information affects the cost of equity through its impact on the
estimation of the parameters of stock returns or payoff distributions. It argues that the
estimation risk, which explains the proposed negative link between information quality
and cost of capital, results because investors have to estimate the parameters of a se-
curity’s return or its payoff distribution from available information when forming their
optimal portfolio. Therefore, low information quality results in high estimation risk that
is nondiversifiable (Clarkson and Thompson, 1990; Handa and Linn, 1993; Lambert et al.,
2007).
An important implication from the “market liquidity” and “estimation risk” strands of
studies is that firms can reduce their cost of capital by making available better quality (i.e.
more precise) and larger quantity of information (i.e. higher disclosure level) to investors.
However, a handful of accounting and asset pricing empiricists extend this implication and
suggest a separate market pricing of accounting information distinct from that proposed
by the CAPM, Fama and French, and momentum factors.
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Botosan (1997) provides the first evidence linking disclosure level to the cost of equity.
Using a sample of 122 manufacturing firms for the year 1990, she shows that for firms
that attract a low analyst following greater disclosure level is associated with a lower
cost of equity. However, she reports no relation between disclosure level and the cost of
equity for the full sample and the subsample of firms that attract high analyst following.
Botosan and Plumlee (2002) re-examine the association between the cost of equity and
levels of annual report, timely disclosure, and investor relations activities using a larger
sample. They find that the cost of equity decreases in the annual report disclosure level
but increases in the level of timely disclosure. While the latter evidence is inconsistent
with theory it is consistent with the view held by managers that greater timely disclosure
results in higher price volatility resulting in an increase in the cost of equity capital (e.g.
Berton, 1994). Contrary to Botosan (1997), Botosan and Plumlee (2002) show that
firms that attract high analyst following benefit from providing greater information.
Poshakwale and Courtis (2005) extend the link between the cost of equity and disclos-
ure level to the banking sector using a sample of 135 banks from Europe, North America,
and Australia. Their disclosure score consists of six disclosure categories i.e. strategy,
customers and markets, people and reputation, risk management, financial position, and
financial performance. The authors argue that higher level of voluntary disclosure lowers
investor uncertainty, which encourages investors to accept lower dividend payout. A lower
dividend stream reduces the cost of capital because of a lower risk premium expected by
investors. Consistent with their prediction, after controlling for cross-sectional variation
in firm characteristics such as market beta, firm size, book to market ratio, and price to
earnings ratio, they find a negative relation between their disclosure score and the price
to book value multiple, their proxy for bank cost of equity. However, they report that the
primary driver of this relation is management’s disclosures about risk management; that
is, not all disclosures matter. In addition, their results suggest a geographical dimension
to the issue as European banks show greater reduction in the cost of equity capital from
improved disclosures compared to their non-European counterparts.
A handful of accounting and asset pricing empiricists suggest a separate market pri-
cing of accounting information distinct from that proposed by the CAPM and the Fama
and French and momentum factors. The guidance from this line of research remains
inconclusive. For example, Easley et al. (2002) show that differences in the probability
of information-based (PIN) trading is associated with differences in expected returns.
However, while Mohanram and Rajgopal (2009) also find some evidence that PIN pre-
dicts future returns their finding is not robust to alternative specifications and sample
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periods. In addition, their study shows no evidence that PIN loadings predict returns
after controlling for the usual firm characteristics.
Using an accruals quality factor as proxy for information risk, Francis et al. (2005) find
evidence in support of market pricing of accruals quality and conclude that information
risk is a priced risk factor. However, Core et al. (2008) query this conclusion. Specifically,
they note that it is impossible to conclude a positive pricing of accruals quality merely by
establishing a positive factor loading in a contemporaneous time series regression. Using
an analogy similar to positive factor loading on the market portfolio, they argue that
average positive coefficient on the AQ factor does not imply that AQ is a priced risk
factor. Rather, an average positive regression coefficient means that, on average, firms
have a positive contemporaneous exposure to the AQ factor mimicking strategy. Using
a battery of asset pricing tests, they find no separate role for information risk, as proxied
by accruals quality.4
If information asymmetry is an important driver of the cost of equity, the best research
setting that provides the greatest opportunity to uncover this relation should be one char-
acterised by high information asymmetry. Using Jin and Myers’ (2006) model, Haggard
and Howe (2007) examine the relative firm-specific information in bank equity returns
compared with industrial matched firms. They show that banks have less firm-specific in-
formation compared to matched firms. They interpret their results as consistent with the
notion that banks are more opaque than industrial firms are. Thus, ceteris paribus, banks
should provide stronger evidence on the implication of earnings quality cum information
risk for the cost of equity. The higher opaqueness of banks relative to industrial firms
would seem to suggest that banks are more risky than their corporate customers are.
Higher information risk make for more risky equity and the expected rate of return de-
manded by investors should reflect this additional risk. However, the relative opaqueness
of banks is also an important argument for bank regulation and supervision, suggesting
that the role of information asymmetry for the cost of equity may be weak. Ultimately,
whether information quality has an impact on bank cost of capital is an empirical question.
The theoretical and empirical studies that we discuss above suggest that higher quality
information is associated with lower cost of capital. In the context of financial reporting,
we interpret higher quality information as more earnings quality. This gives support for
our basic hypothesis stated in its alternative form:
4However, see Gray et al. (2009) for Australian evidence of positive pricing of accruals quality based
on asset pricing tests suggested by Core et al. (2008)
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H1: There is a negative relationship between bank cost of equity capital and bank
information quality, as measured by earnings quality.
The theoretical and empirical studies also suggest an indirect link between information
quality and firm valuation. Given that a firm’s value is a function of its future cash flows
and the cost of capital, if information risk matters, management could reduce bank cost
of capital and increase the value of the bank by providing better quality information.
This argument supports our second hypothesis stated in its alternative form:
H2: There is a positive relationship between market valuation of banks and bank
information quality, as measured by earnings quality.
Lev (1989) states that one explanation for low R-squares in earnings or returns model
is that ‘no serious attempt is being made to question the quality of the reported earnings
number prior to correlation with returns.’ Botosan (2000) suggests that the ultimate
benefit of providing more information to the capital market is a lower cost of equity
capital and thus a higher stock price, for a given level of earnings. Thus, both authors
imply that the relation between earnings and price is conditional on the quality of earnings,
which suggests our third hypothesis stated in its alternative form:
H3a: The price-earnings relation is dependent on bank information quality, as measured
by earnings quality.
H3b: The price-earnings relation is more positive for banks with higher information
quality, as measured by earnings quality.
3.3 Methodology
Section 3.3.1 discusses the procedure we follow in constructing the composite earnings
quality score (EQS) and its individual components. Section 3.3.2 describes the data
sources and sample construction procedure. Model specifications and measurements of
variables are reserved for relevant sections of the issues that we examine.
3.3.1 Measuring Bank Earnings Quality
Earnings quality is a multi-dimensional descriptive characteristic of earnings first intro-
duced to the accounting literature by Lev (1989). Dechow et al. (2010), who define
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earnings quality from the point of view of the decision usefulness, provide one interpret-
ation of earnings quality. According to these authors, higher quality earnings that more
faithfully represent the features of a firm’s fundamental earnings process are relevant to
specific decision made by the decision maker.
In view of the multi-dimensional nature of earnings quality, researchers have proposed
different constructs to capture the properties of earnings. Schipper and Vincent (2003)
propose that persistence, predictability, and volatility of earnings reflect earnings quality.
Penman and Zhang (2002) and Richardson (2003) suggest that higher earnings quality
is associated with more persistent earnings while Bricker et al. (1995) and Mikhail et al.
(2003) define earnings quality as the extent to which a firm’s past earnings is associ-
ated with its future cash flows. Other authors distinguish between accounting based
and market based measures of earnings quality. Our study is restricted to accounting
based measures of earnings quality.5 Following previous studies, in particular those by
Francis et al. (2004) and Ecker et al. (2006), we use four accounting based measures
of earnings quality to capture various dimensions of the construct. These are accruals
quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability, and earnings smoothness. While the
operationalisation of these constructs is consistent with previous studies, in view of the
special nature of banking and banking data, we differ, where necessary, in the way that
we construct these variables.
3.3.1.1 Accruals quality - Loan Loss Provisions Quality
Prior studies measure accruals quality using either the mapping of current accruals into
cash flows or some measure of abnormal accruals (e.g. Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Francis
et al., 2004, 2005). These studies suggest that earnings that map more closely into cash
are more desirable. Given that the purpose of accruals is to alter the timing of cash flow
recognition and earnings, Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure accruals as a function of
past, present, and future cash flows. The standard deviation of the firm-specific residuals
and the absolute values of the residuals from models of accruals are used as (reliable)
proxies for accruals quality. However, measuring accruals for banks is difficult because
the accruals components of interest, such as revenue and expenses, are not available
from Compustat Bank and other data providers. In addition, necessary data relating to
depreciation expenses and deferred tax expense are largely missing. However, because
they represent the major component of bank accruals, loan loss provisions (LLP) represent
5Dechow et al. (2010) provide a detailed review of the current state of the literature on the determinants
and consequences of earnings quality.
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the key accrual accounting choice in bank income statements. They are therefore likely
to have a first order effect on the information properties of bank earnings (Bushman
and Williams, 2009). Thus, we circumvent the difficulty with data by operationalising
accruals quality using the magnitude of discretionary loan loss provisions.
The earnings management literature on banks has traditionally treated large values of
discretionary loan loss provisions as indicative of earnings management because discre-
tionary loan loss provisions can be used to both increase or decrease earnings. Kanagaret-
nam et al. (2009) argue that the inherent uncertainty and the permitted discretion in
estimating loan loss provisions contribute to information asymmetry. In addition, as
Kanagaretham et al. (2010) argue, abnormal loan loss provisions may provide a better
measure of earnings quality than the more popular abnormal accruals based model. They
argue that such a model mitigates error in measuring managerial discretion by focusing
on a single accrual, and in this case a single industry. We adopt a model similar to the
LLP model by Collins et al. (1995) and Ahmed et al. (1999). Specifically, for each quarter
in the study we run the following model:6
LLPi,t = β0+β1LLAi,t−1+β2CHGLOANi,t +β3LOANi,t
+β4LCOi,t +β5NPLi,t + εi,t (3.3.1)
where i and t are the bank and date (quarter) subscripts, respectively; LLP is the
loan loss provisions, LLA is the loan loss allowance, LOAN (CHGLOAN) is gross loans
(change in gross loans) and NPL is non-performing loans. We deflate all variables by
total assets. In view of the potential loss of data if we ran bank-specific regressions, we
estimate Equation 3.3.1 cross-sectionally with the implicit assumption that banks have
similar parameters for each quarter.
We measure abnormal or discretionary accruals (ABACC) as the absolute value of
the residuals from the quarterly regressions. That is, ABACC is the difference between
the reported loan loss provisions (LLP) and the expected (normal) loan loss provisions,
estimated in Equation 3.3.1. The use of the error terms of the above regression as
a measure of accruals quality is also supported by Dechow et al. (2010), who note
that residuals from accrual models represent management discretion or estimation errors,
6Even though we use annual data in our analysis, because of the dearth of time series data to construct
the bank-specific earnings quality attributes, we estimate these attributes using quarterly data. The
final sample is made of quarter 4 earnings quality measures.
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both of which reduce decision usefulness.7 Lower values of non-discretionary accruals
are associated with higher accruals quality (loan loss provisions) and higher quality of
earnings (lower information risk). That is, ABACC is the negative of the absolute values
of non-discretionary loan loss provisions.8
3.3.1.2 Earnings Persistence
Earnings persistence captures the sustainability of earnings and refers to the time series
relation between current period earnings shock and future earnings. Persistence meas-
ures the extent that current earnings persist or recur in the future. High persistence is
positively associated with high earnings quality since it indicates a stable, sustainable and
less volatile earnings that is of value to investors. In addition, the desirability of earnings
persistence as a measure of earnings quality is motivated on the assumption that more
persistent earnings yield better inputs to equity valuation and thus generate more accurate
DCF-based equity valuation, implying greater decision usefulness (Dechow and Schrand,
2004; Dechow et al., 2010) and lower information risk. Dechow et al. (2010) argue that
earnings persistence fits well with a Graham and Dodd’s (1934) view of earnings as a
summary metric of expected cash flows useful for equity valuation.
Francis et al. (2004) suggest a direct link between earnings persistence and information
risk. According to these authors, because earnings persistence is associated with a more
sustainable earnings stream, investors need not be concerned about the extent to which
the innovation in the current period earnings will continue thus reducing one source of
uncertainty.
It is common to estimate earnings persistence using the slope coefficient from a regres-
sion of current earnings on lagged earnings, or its components, such as cash flows and
accruals. Following Kormendi and Lipe (1987), we obtain the slope coefficient estimates
of the earnings persistence from the bank-level regression of current earnings on lagged
earnings. Therefore, under the assumption that earnings follow an AR(1) process we
measure earnings persistent as the slope coefficient estimate, β1,i, from an autoregressive
model of order one (AR1):
7We acknowledge, however, that like many non-bank specific accrual models, this model can be im-
precise in estimating abnormal (discretionary) accruals. Guay et al. (1996) provide some criticisms
of these models.
8As accruals tend to reverse within a one to 2-year period (Richardson et al., 2005), we also use the
average values of absolute accruals over the past three years to mitigate the effects of any temporary
large abnormal accruals. As we obtain similar qualitative results using the current period abnormal
accruals, we report only the results using current year accruals as these are based on larger sample
thus increasing the power of our tests.
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EARNi,t = β0,i+β1,iEARNi,t−1+ εi,t (3.3.2)
Equation 3.3.2 describes the univariate characteristic of earnings where EARN is net
income before extraordinary items deflated by total assets; β1 is the autoregressive coef-
ficient and ε is the serially uncorrelated earnings shock. Kormendi and Lipe (1987) show
that large β1 coefficients cause the current period earnings shock to have a larger impact
on future earnings (greater persistence). We estimate Equation 3.3.2 for each bank-
quarter using a ten-quarter rolling window.9 Values of β1 close to 1 (or greater than
1) imply highly persistent earnings, while values of β1 close to 0 imply highly transitory
earnings. Persistent earnings are indicative of higher quality earnings while transitory
earnings are indicative of lower earnings quality.10
3.3.1.3 Earnings Predictability
Lipe (1990) provides a measure of earnings predictability defined as the variance of the
earnings shock, the residual from the AR(1) model of earnings above. We derive our
measure of earnings predictability as the square root of the estimated error variance of
Equation 3.3.2:11
PREDICTi,t = [σ2(εi,t)](1/2) (3.3.3)
9We acknowledge a limitation of our research design in this regard. Expectedly, the concepts of earnings
persistence, predictability and smoothing are more meaningful in the presence of more time series
data. Requiring ten quarterly data amounts to about two and half years of data; longer data should
give a more reliable estimate of any of our earnings quality measures, especially using bank-specific
regression, as this minimises the impact of any short-term shock in the data generation process.
However, using longer period results in almost a complete loss of our potential sample. In addition,
the use of longer data restricts the sample to larger, more successful banks and limits the extent
to which our findings may be generalised. We believe that by using an aggregate earnings quality
measure, we are able to mitigate any concern regarding the short window adopted in estimating the
earnings attributes. We are also motivated by the fact that Beatty and Liao (2011) use quarterly
data of the same duration in estimating bank-specific variables.
10We also use a naive measure of persistence, adopted from Dechow and Dichev (2002), Wysocki (2009),
and Altamuro and Beatty (2010), by estimating the correlation between current earnings and future
earnings. As expected, given that this measure uses the same variables as our persistence model, we
obtain qualitatively similar results.
11Traditionally, this construct measures the ability of current earnings to predict future cash flows from
operations. Wysocki (2005) argues that if investors ultimately value future cash flows, then the
predictive ability of current earnings for future cash flows is an important earnings quality metric
for investors. Following this argument, we also measure predictability of earnings as bank-specific
Pearson correlation between current earnings (net income before extraordinary) and future cash flows
from operations (net income before extraordinary plus loan loss provisions). This measure exhibits a
high and positively significant correlation with the PREDICT variable that we adopt in this study.
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Higher values of PREDICT indicate lower levels of earnings predictability implying
lower quality earnings. To be consistent with measures for other attributes for which
higher level of the attribute indicates higher earnings quality, we take the negative of
PREDICT. While PERSIST is related to both the level of earnings and the variability of
innovation series, PREDICT is related to the variability of innovation series (Gaio and
Raposo, 2011).
3.3.1.4 Earnings Smoothness
There is a controversy regarding whether or not smoothing is a desirable attribute of earn-
ings. This controversy hinges on two conflicting arguments the first of which suggests
that managers opportunistically smooth earnings resulting in earnings that are greater or
lower relative to the fundamentals of the business. Leuz et al. (2003) and Bhattacharya
et al. (2003), among others, adopt this view and argue that earnings smoothing is in-
dicative of accounting that obscures information about economic volatility, resulting in
accounting earnings that fail to depict the true swing in underlying firm performance.
However, the view that managers use their private information about future income
to smooth out transitory fluctuations and thereby achieve a more representative and
useful reported earnings number supports the attractiveness of earnings smoothness as
a positive attribute of earnings. For example, using the modified Jones’ (1991) model,
Chaney et al. (1998) suggest that discretionary accruals are used to smooth earnings
and interpret their findings as evidence of management’s use of discretionary accruals
to communicate information about the firm’s long-term (permanent) earnings to equity
market, potentially decreasing information asymmetry (see, also, Dechow, 1994; Dechow
et al., 1998). In line with the position taken for within-country (US firm) studies of
earnings management, our position in this study is that earnings smoothness is a desirable
attribute of earnings.
Wyscoki (2004) argues that while the use of discretionary accrual models in measures
of earnings smoothness controls for firm and industry characteristics they fail to identify
a benchmark for the underlying “economic income” that is being managed. He suggests a
measure of earnings smoothness based on the closeness-to-cash as a benchmark because it
provides a direct benchmark for the absolute magnitude of “economic income.” Following
Leuz et al. (2003), we define earnings smoothness as the ratio of income variability to
cash flows variability. Specifically, using cash flows as the reference construct, we measure
earnings smoothness, SMOOTH, as the bank-specific standard deviation of operating
income to standard deviation of operating cash flows:
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SMOOTHi,t =
σ(NIBE)
σ(CFO)
, (3.3.4)
where NIBE is the net income before extraordinary items and CFO is the cash flows
from operations; both NIBE and CFO are deflated by total assets. Given that loan
loss provisions account for the largest proportion of accruals in the banking industry and
consistent with previous research on bank earnings quality (e.g. Wahlen, 1994; Kanagaret-
nam et al., 2004), we construct our cash flow measure as the sum of loan loss provisions
and earnings before tax. We estimate Equation 3.3.4. for each bank quarter using a
ten-quarter rolling window.
Ratios below one indicate more variability in operating cash flow relative to variability in
earnings, which implies more tendencies to use accruals (loan loss provisions) to smooth
earnings. That is, a lower ratio indicates more smoothing of the earnings stream relative
to cash flows. Thus, higher values of SMOOTH indicate less earnings smoothness. To be
consistent with other measures in this study, we take the negative of SMOOTH such that
higher values of SMOOTH indicate higher earnings smoothness, higher earnings quality
and lower information risk.12
3.3.1.5 Composite Earnings Quality Score
We investigate the relation between the specified capital market consequences and indi-
vidual as well as aggregate earnings quality score (EQS), an unweighted uni-dimensional
measure of earnings quality incorporating the four sub-dimensions discussed above. We
perform the aggregation for two reasons. First, to the extent that the set of measures
capture different dimensions of earnings, intuitively each measure should add to the over-
all improvement in information from reported accounting earnings. As we show later in
Section 3.3.2 of this study, even though most of our measures of earnings quality are
reasonably correlated with each other the low correlations between different pairs sug-
gest that they capture different dimensions of earnings quality. Second, to the extent
that each of our attributes measure the same underlying phenomenon with (uncorrel-
ated) measurement error, our composite earnings quality measure will suffer less from
measurement error relative to each of the individual measures.13
We derive a composite measure of earnings quality (EQS) in two ways: First, we rank
12We also use alternative smoothness measures. For example, we use the coefficient of earnings before
loan loss provisions from the regression of loan loss provisions on earnings before loan loss provisions
and other control variables (e.g. Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2008). Our results are similar.
13See, also, Bhattacharya et al. (2003) and Leuz et al. (2003) for similar arguments.
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all raw time series measures of earnings quality at the end of the fiscal year end (quarter
4) across banks and years into deciles. Higher ranks are associated with greater earnings
quality. Hence, we assign each earnings dimension for each bank a rank ranging between
1 and 10, depending on which decile of earnings quality dimension the bank appears for
that year. For example, we rank all raw time series measures of PERSIST across banks
and years, into deciles; a rank of 5 for bank i on PERSIST in, say, year 2000 means
that bank i was in the fifth decile of the PERSIST measure across all banks and across
all years. For each bank-year, we then sum all the ranks of individual earnings quality
measures to form a time series composite earnings quality score (EQS). Therefore, the
maximum (minimum) possible earnings quality score for each bank-year is 40 (4). We
also perform a principal component analysis, which suggests the use of the first two
principal components. However, as the results are qualitatively similar, we report only
the results from the simple aggregation of the individual earnings quality ranks. As with
the individual earnings quality measures, EQS is increasing in quality of earnings.
3.3.2 Data Sources and Sample Selection
The study sample is restricted to the US banking industry. Apart from being in line with
the scope of the thesis, the restriction of the sample to the banking industry increases
the homogeneity of the sample while also serving as a holdout sample to compare, where
possible, with other similar studies on industrial firms. We obtain the financial data to
construct measures of earnings quality and other bank characteristics from Compustat
Bank (quarterly and annual) database, which consists of US publicly traded banks.14
This database provides the initial sampling frame of 16,300 (1898) bank-year (bank)
observations for the 20-year sample period, starting 1990 and ending 2009. We start from
1990 because data to calculate earnings quality proxies were not available for a substantial
proportion of banks before this date. We focus on banks included in Compustat Bank
because the issues that we study require that the banks are publicly traded companies.
We obtained analyst consensus forecasts of earnings, dividends, and long-term growth
in earnings, required to calculate implied cost of equity, from the IBES database through
DATASTREAM.15 We require that banks have earnings forecasts data for year one and
14We appreciate the existence of bank regulatory data from the Federal Reserve System (Form FR-9 C).
However, as empirical findings already confirm that these data correlate strongly with the Compustat
Bank database, we do not explore the possibility of using these regulatory data. For example, Beatty
et al. (2002) report a 99.34% correlation between net income figures from both databases.
15Results presented in this study are based on mean consensus forecasts. However, results are similar
using the median consensus forecasts.
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year two at the end of each fiscal year. However, where earnings forecast data are not
available for year two, but are available for year one, we use the growth rate in earnings
from IBES to estimate the earnings forecast for year two. In addition, consistent with
prior studies (e.g. Easton and Monahan, 2005), we impose non-negativity restriction on
one and two-year ahead consensus earnings per share forecasts but do not require that a
bank has data to estimate all our alternative cost of equity measures as this restriction
is implied by the overall cost of equity measure. This allows us to validate the individual
cost of equity measures with as large sample size as possible before calculating the overall
cost of equity (COE) as an average of these estimates. As shown in Table 3.1, these
requirements reduce our bank-year observations by 13,692 for the cost of equity study.
We collect additional bond yield data that we use to estimate Claus and Thomas’ (2001)
and Gode and Mohanram’s (2003) cost of equity models from the website of the Federal
Reserve Bank.16
To be included in the next round of sampling, we also require that banks have available,
on CRSP, stock market data to construct market beta, Tobin’s Q, and market to book
ratio. As we allow our sample to vary depending on the issue that we study, the require-
ments reduce our sample further by 314, 5653, and 2468 for the cost of equity, bank
valuation, and value relevance subsample, respectively. In the third round of sampling, we
require that each bank has, at least, 11 bank-quarter income statement and balance sheet
information for a number of accounting variables, including total assets, gross loans, loan
loss allowance, provision for loan losses, non-performing loans, income before extraordin-
ary items, common equity, and net charge-off that we use in constructing earnings quality
measures. We also impose a non-negativity constraint on the book value of equity. The
accounting data requirements limit our sample further by 378, 5132, and 5007 for the cost
of equity, bank valuation, and value relevance subsample, respectively. Our final sample
consists of 422 (1916), 1524 (5515), and 1708 (8825) bank (bank-year) observations for
cost of equity, bank valuation, and value relevance subsample, respectively.17
16http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/H15/
17The average number of bank-year observations per bank is about 5, 4, and 5 years for the cost of
capital, bank valuation and value relevance subsamples, respectively.
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Table 3.1: Sample Construction
Implied Cost of Equity Proxies
Compustat Bank rpe rpeg rct rgm rmpeg COE BV BVR
Number of Banks 1898 1898 1898 1898 1898 1898 1898 1898
Bank-year Observations 16300 16300 16300 16300 16300 16300 16300 16300
Bank-year Obs. deleted :
Missing IBES Data (12168) (11396) (13165) (11989) (11926) (13692)
Missing CRSP Data (505) (672) (398) (539) (551) (314) (5653) (2468)
Bank-year Observations 3627 4232 2737 3772 3823 2294 10647 13832
Bank-year Observations
deleted:
Missing Compustat Bank Data (378) (5132) (5007)
Bank-year Observations 1916 5515 8825
Number of Banks 422 1524 1708
The table presents sampling procedure for the construction of study samples: rpe is the price-forward-earnings
ratio (Easton, 2004), rpeg is the price-earnings-growth implied cost of equity model (Easton, 2004), rct is the Claus
and Thomas (2001) implied cost of equity model, rgm is the Gode and Mohanram (2003) implied cost of equity
model, rmpeg is the modified price-earnings-growth implied cost of equity model (Easton, 2004). Columns labelled
COE, BV, and BVR refer to the sampling stages in the construction of the cost of equity, bank valuation, and
bank value relevance study samples, respectively.
3.4 Bank Earnings Quality and the Cost of Equity
In this section, we provide evidence regarding the relation between the cost of equity and
earnings quality. Section 3.4.1 presents the empirical model that we use in the study.
Section 3.4.2 discusses the methods that we follow in measuring and validating bank cost
of equity measures while Section 3.4.3 presents the empirical evidence linking bank cost
of equity and earnings quality.
3.4.1 The Model
We test our hypothesis regarding the relation between the cost of equity and earnings
quality by examining the impact on the cost of equity of the variation in individual and
composite earnings quality measures. Specifically, we perform regressions of the implied
cost of equity measures on market beta, bank size, book to market value, and earnings
quality measures.18 That is:
18Using the decile rank of the earnings quality measures produces qualitatively similar conclusions
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COEi,t = β0+β1EQi,t +β2BETAi,t +β3LnMVALi,t +β4LnBMi,t + εi,t (3.4.1)
where i and t are the bank and time subscripts, respectively; COE is the cost of equity
obtained as the average of the individual cost of equity measures and EQ is one of
the following earnings quality measures: ABACC, PERSIST, PREDICT, SMOOTH, and
EQS. In other words, we only allow each individual earnings quality measure to enter the
regression one at a time while we allow for any possible measurement error or omitted
variable problem by using the composite earnings quality score (EQS).
While our primary interest is the EQ variable, we include BETA in the model to control
of systematic risk (Sharpe, 1964).19 We estimate BETA from the regression of stock
returns on value-weighted market returns using a minimum of 18 monthly data over
the prior 60 months to the fiscal year end. Consistent with the literature, we expect
a positive relation between BETA and COE. We include LnMVAL to control for the
size effect and mitigate any potential omitted variable problem as past studies suggest
a significant association between market value and expected returns (e.g. Berk, 1995)
and between market value and one or more earnings quality attributes (e.g. Dechow
and Dichev, 2002). We measure LnMVAL as the natural log of the market value of
outstanding common shares at the end of the bank fiscal year. We expect a negative
relation between LnMVAL and COE, as smaller banks should have larger cost of equity.
Finally, we include the logarithm of book to market (LnBM) as evidence suggests a role
for book to market in asset pricing. In line with previous studies (e.g. Fama and French,
1993), we expect a positive loading on LnBM.
3.4.2 The Cost of Equity Capital: Measurement and Validation
There has been an explosion in the expected return proxies employed in the empirical
accounting and finance literature since 2005 (Botosan et al., 2011). Yet, many, if not
all, of these measures differ from the underlying construct in predictable ways (Hughes
et al., 2009), contain significant measurement error (Easton and Monahan, 2005) and are
therefore unavoidably unreliable (Fama and French, 1997). Studies providing assessments
of the different measures are also inconsistent in their guidance. For example, Botosan
and Plumlee (2005, 2011), using the association between cost of equity proxies and firm
risk characteristics as their benchmark, suggest the use of Botosan and Plumlee’s (2002)
19See, also, Lintner, 1965 and Black, 1972
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target price method (rdiv) and Easton’s (2004) price-earnings growth (rpeg) over other
alternative proxies that they assess. However, Easton and Monahan (2005), using a linear
return decomposition approach and regressing realized returns on proxies for cash flows,
expected return news, and seven expected return estimates, report a gloomy prospect
for all the proxies, most especially the price-earnings growth ratio. They attribute the
weaknesses of these measures to poor quality of analyst forecasts, which are characterised
by high consensus long-term growth and significantly inaccurate earnings and dividend
forecasts.
In view of the limitations of the cost of equity measures and the potential measure-
ment errors resulting from these, we draw conclusion on the relation between the cost
of equity capital and earnings quality using the average of five implied cost of equity
measures. Specifically, we use the price-forward earnings ratio (rpe), the price-earnings
growth method (rpeg), the modified price-earnings growth method (rmpeg), Claus and
Thomas’ method (rct), and Gode and Mohanram method (rgm).20 The basic idea of the
last three models is to substitute price and analyst forecasts into a valuation equation and
to derive the cost of equity as the internal rate of return that equates current stock price
with the expected future series of residual incomes or abnormal earnings. Primarily, the
individual models differ with respect to the use of analyst forecasts data, the assumptions
regarding growth, dividends, the explicit forecast horizon, and the handling of inflation in
the steady-state terminal value. Table 3.2 presents the models along with the definitions
of their input variables. We solve the last three models through an iterative process using
Excel Solver by setting the minimum (maximum) value of cost of equity to 5% (100%).
The price-forward-earnings ratio is a “naive” cost of equity measure that relies on short-
term earnings forecasts that are restricted to a two-year forecast horizon. Through its
simplistic assumption that sets the earnings growth rate equal to the cost of equity after
year 2, the method implicitly mitigates the restrictive assumption concerning the growth
in earnings that is, in part, the bane of the more sophisticated methods. We include this
“naive” measure as Easton and Monahan (2005, 501) report that it ‘contains no more,
and often less, measurement error’, than other proxies they examine. The price-earnings
growth ratio (Easton, 2004) is a derivation from the fundamental dividend valuation
model and assumes that the growth in abnormal earnings over the forecast horizon is zero
and that expected one-year-ahead dividends are zero. Under these assumptions, Easton
(2004) notes that the discounted dividend model equates the price-earnings growth model
20We do not use the very popular Capital Asset Pricing Model in estimating the cost of equity as
CAPM does not allow for a premium to the cost of equity due to firm-specific information (see, also,
Botosan, 1997; Poshakwale and Courtis, 2005).
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(see Model 2 of Table 3.2). In addition, Easton (2004) shows that if the assumption
underlying rpeg - that expected dividends in year 1 are zero - is relaxed a modified form
of the price-earnings growth ratio (rmpeg) as presented in Model 3 of Table 3.2 results.
Table 3.2: Implied Cost of Equity Models
Model 1 pi,t =
epsi,t+1+rpe×dpsi,t+epsi,t+2
(1+rpe)2−1
Model 2 rpeg =
√
epsi,t+2−epsi,t+1
pi,t
Model 3 pi,t =
epsi,t+2+rmpeg×dpsi,t−epsi,t+1
rmpeg2
Model 4
pi,t = bpsi,t +
4
∑
τ=1
(roei,t+τ − rct)×bpsi,t+τ−1
(1+ rct)τ
+
(roei,t+5− rct)×bpsi,t+4× (1+ γ)
(rct − γ)× (1+ rct)4
Model 5 pi,t =
epsi,t+1
rgm +
epsi,t+2+rgm×dpsi,t−(1+rgm)×epsi,t+1
rgm(rgm−g)
The table presents valuation models for the estimation of implied cost of equity. rpe is the price-forward-earnings ratio (Easton, 2004),
rpeg is the price-earnings-growth (Easton , 2004), rmpeg is the modified price-earnings-growth (Easton, 2004), rct is the Claus and Thomas’
(2001) implied cost of equity model, rgm is the Gode and Mohanram’s (2003) implied cost of equity model. g is the yield on a ten-year
government bond (Federal Reserve Bank) less 3 percent. roe=epsi,t+τ /bpsi,t+τ−1 where epsi,t+τ = epsi,t+2 × (1+LTFi)τ−2∀τ > 2. bpsi,t+τ =
bpsi,t+τ−1+epsi,t+τ × (1−K). For profitable banks K =max(0,min(dpsi,t/epsi,t ,1). For loss making banks K =max(0,min(dpsi,t/(0.06×bpsi,t ),1)).
LTF is the long run forecast of growth in earnings per share from IBES; bps is the book value share (Compustat Bank- seq/csho). pi,t
is the closing share price for fiscal year (CRSP-absolute value prc), epsi,t is the actual earnings per share for year t (Compustat Bank:
ibcom/csho), epst+1 (epsi,t+2) is the mean earnings per share forecast for year t+1 (t+2) from IBES. Missing forecasts for epsi,t+2 are
replaced by epsi,t+1× (1+LFTi). All banks must have positive values for bpsi,t and bpsi,t+1 and epsi,t+2 must be greater than epsi,t+1 .
A criticism of price-earnings-growth ratio and modified price-earnings-growth ratio is
the restrictive assumption regarding the constant abnormal growth in earnings. The Gode
and Mohanram (2003) model, which is a modification of Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth
(2005) model, avoids this criticism by assuming that the abnormal growth rate in earnings
increases after year 1 but is a cross-sectional constant equal to the difference between the
risk-free rate of interest and 3 percent - their proxy for inflation rate. Finally, Claus and
Thomas (2001) model, which is derived from the residual income model, assumes that
earnings grow at the analysts’ consensus long-term growth rate until year 5. However,
earnings after year 5 grow at the rate of inflation, which is set equal the risk-free rate
less 3 percent.
As we are unaware of any study in banking that draws on these cost of equity measures,
we follow the standard practice in the literature by validating the reliability of the proxies.
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Botosan et al. (2011) note that existing literature employs two general approaches to
assess the validity of alternative proxies of firm-specific cost of equity capital or expected
returns. The first approach involves examining the association between the proxy and
future realized returns while the second approach focuses on the association between the
proxy and contemporaneous risk characteristics of firms. We follow the latter approach
in this study by relating each cost of capital measure to BETA, LnMVAL and LnBM, as
defined in Section 3.4.1 above.
Panel A of Table 3.3 presents the descriptive statistics of the cost of equity measures.
The mean cost of equity ranges between 8% (rpe) and 12% (rgm and rmpeg).21 Interest-
ingly, the mean values reported in Table 3.3 are similar to those reported by Easton and
Monahan (2005, Table 2) for a sample of 15,680 firm-year observations over 1981 to
1998. Two important observations emanate from this comparison. First, if, as literature
suggests, banks are more opaque than industrial firms are, this result does not suggest
that markets require higher returns to bear any additional risk resulting from such opa-
city. Thus, the similarity between the means seems to give support to Flannery et al.
(2004) who note that ‘banking assets are not unusually opaque; they are simply boring,’
suggesting that banks may not have to bear additional cost over and above that bore by
a non-banking firm. Second, even though our sample period overlaps by just eight years
with those of Easton and Monahan (2005), the result suggests that the implied cost of
equity capital, at least for banks, has remained relatively stable over time.
Panel B of Table 3.3 presents the correlation matrix for the cost of equity measures
and the risk factors. The results show a strong positive correlation between the pairs of
the cost of equity measures suggesting that they measure similar underlying construct,
The highest correlation is between rmpeg and rgm. Most importantly, as expected, we
document positive and significant relation between each cost of equity measure and
BETA, the primary risk proxy. However, the correlation matrix provides little evidence
that the book to market ratio plays a role in bank cost of equity while, contrary to
expectation, bank size exhibits significantly positive correlation with the cost of equity
measures.
21Since we doubt that a bank’s cost of capital would be greater than 50%, we restrict cost of capital
measures to a maximum of 50%. This decision affects only 4, 1, and 7 value(s) of rgm , rpeg and
rmpeg, respectively
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Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix - Cost of Equity and Risk Proxies
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics
Mean SD Min Max Q1 Q2 Q3 N
rpe 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.28 0.07 0.08 0.10 4259
rct 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.24 0.08 0.09 0.10 3222
rgm 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.50 0.10 0.11 0.14 4425
rpeg 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.50 0.08 0.09 0.11 5049
rmpeg 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.50 0.09 0.11 0.13 4497
COE 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.41 0.09 0.10 0.12 2686
BETA 0.60 0.42 0.20 3.45 0.25 0.49 0.80 4620
MVAL (US$ billion) 1.93 9.50 0.04 239.76 0.96 0.24 0.79 5482
BM 0.75 0.51 0.03 10.06 0.48 0.64 0.86 5473
Panel B: Correlation Matrix
rpe rct rgm rpeg rmpeg COE BETA MVAL BM
rpe 1
rct 0.87*** 1
rgm 0.52*** 0.56*** 1
rpeg 0.61*** 0.62*** 0.99*** 1
rmpeg 0.42*** 0.52*** 0.72*** 0.74*** 1
COE 0.73*** 0.76*** 0.95*** 0.97*** 0.79*** 1
BETA 0.27*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.31*** 1
MVAL 0.44*** 0.40*** 0.27*** 0.34*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.17*** 1
BM -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03** -0.01 0.11*** -0.07*** 1
The table above presents the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the cost of equity measures and risk proxies. rpe is the
price-forward-earnings ratio (Easton, 2004), rct is the Claus and Thomas’ (2001) implied cost of equity model, rgm is the Gode and
Mohanram’s (2003) implied cost of equity model, rpeg is the price-earnings-growth (Easton , 2004), rmpeg is the modified price-earnings-
growth (Easton, 2004). COE is the average cost of equity derived from the five models. By construction, all the implied cost of equity
measures are for bank fiscal year t+ 1. All measures of the cost of equity capital are as described in Table 3.2 above. BETA is the
measure of market risk and is estimated via the market model by regressing stock returns (CRSP: ret) on value weighted returns (CRSP:
vwretd) using a minimum of 18 monthly returns over the prior 60 months to the fiscal year end. MVAL is the market value of equity
(CRSP price data- prc mutiplied by CRSP share outstanding data -shrout) at the end of the fiscal year end. BM is the book value of
equity (Compustat Bank: seq) to market value of equity. ***,**,* indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
To provide additional multivariate support for the cost of equity measures, we also
regress each measure against the candidate risk proxies. Our conclusion is similar to
those under the univariate analysis using pooled regression and the Fama and MacBeth
(1973) regression. As expected, the results show that each cost of equity is increasing in
BETA and BM. However, the role of MVAL within the multivariate analyses is both weak
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and inconsistent.22 While the results (using the pooled regressions) show that market
beta, bank size, and book to market ratio explain a considerable variation in the cost
of equity capital (R-squares range between 13% and 50%), the results also suggest that
the included risk factors are not exhaustive in explaining the variation in cost of equity.
While other factors, such as noise in the measurement of the cost of equity and risk
proxies may explain the low R-squares, we proceed in the next section to evaluate our
basic hypothesis, which suggests a missing risk proxy, such as estimation risk as captured
by poor information quality (earnings quality).
22In an untabulated set of results, we find that each implied cost of equity measure is decreasing in
MVAL in models consisting of only BETA and MVAL risk proxies. Thus, the BM variable seems to
dominate the MVAL variable for banks in our sample.
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3.4.3 Empirical Results: Bank Earnings Quality and The Cost of
Equity
Panel A of Table 3.5 presents the descriptive statistics for the earnings quality proxies and
other variables included in the empirical Model 3.4.1. As discussed earlier, we construct
all measures of earnings quality such that a higher value implies higher earnings quality.
The mean (median) bank has a market value of US$1.9 billion (US$0.24 billion). The cost
of equity for the mean and median bank is 10% suggesting that this variable is normally
distributed. The table also shows that the composite earnings quality measure exhibits
greater variation than the individual earnings quality measures. The mean (median) bank
has an earnings quality score of 22.61 (23.00). The mean (median) bank has a market
beta of 0.60 (0.49) and a mean and median book to market value of 0.75 and 0.64,
respectively.
We do not provide separate validity tests of our earnings quality measures. However,
to provide some insight into the validity of our measures, we note that the bank with
the highest level of composite earnings quality is Comerica Inc (cusip 20034010). This
bank has as its auditors Ernst and Young, one of the Big 4 accounting firms. The high
earnings quality exhibited by this bank is consistent with empirical evidence suggesting
that Big 4 clients have higher earnings quality. As noted by Francis and Wang (2008),
one explanation for this is that Big 4 clients have smaller abnormal accruals as Big
4 auditors constrain aggressive earnings management through accruals. The positive
correlation between earnings quality and Big 4 auditors may also arise because large and
more wealthy companies which are more likely to use the Big 4 auditors are also more able
to finance costly accounting and internal control measures that promote better earnings
quality. On the other hand, one of the two banks with the lowest composite earnings
quality measure, Integra Bank Corp (cusip 45814P10 ) went bust in July 2011. While
we make no claim that poor earnings quality explains the bankruptcy of the bank, extant
empirical evidence supports the view that the incentive to manage earnings increases with
the probability of bankruptcy (e.g. Rosner, 2003).
Panel B of Table 3.5 shows the Pearson correlations of the five earnings quality meas-
ures as well as the composite earnings quality measure and other control variables. While
a positive correlation between pairs of earnings quality attributes is potentially desired,
Dechow et al. (2010) note that low and negative correlations should not be a surprise
as though the earnings quality proxies represent properties of the same reported earn-
ings number, they measure different attributes of earnings. The correlation coefficients
presented in this table is consistent with their view. Importantly, the table also shows a
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low correlation between EQS and all the other candidate risk proxies - BETA, LnMVAL
and LnBM - suggesting that earnings quality is a bank characteristic distinct from the
specified risk proxies. The generally negative correlation between each earnings quality
measure and the implied cost of equity provides a univariate support for the predicted
negative relation between earnings quality and the cost of equity.
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Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix - Earnings Quality and Risk Proxies
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics: Risk Proxies and Earnings Quality Dimensions
Mean SD Min Max Q1 Q2 Q3 N
SMOOTH -1.10 1.07 -23.54 -0.02 -1.11 -0.91 -0.70 4409
PERSIST 0.38 0.48 -0.65 1.41 0.00 0.35 0.78 4532
PREDICT -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 4532
ABACC -0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 4903
EQS 22.61 6.24 4.00 39.00 18.00 23.00 27.00 4066
BETA 0.60 0.42 0.20 3.45 0.25 0.49 0.80 4647
BM 0.75 0.64 0.03 29.06 0.48 0.64 0.86 5488
MVAL (US$’ billion) 1.90 9.50 0.01 239.76 0.10 0.24 0.79 5497
COE 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.41 0.09 0.10 0.12 2679
Panel B: Correlation Matrix: Risk Proxies and Earnings Quality Dimensions
SMOOTH PERSIST PREDICT ABACC BETA EQS BM MVAL COE
SMOOTH 1
PERSIST 0.10*** 1
PREDICT 0.03** -0.31*** 1
ABACC 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.30*** 1.00
BETA -0.08*** 0.11*** -0.08*** -0.00 1
EQS 0.33*** 0.42*** 0.41*** 0.63*** 0.06*** 1
BM -0.06*** 0.02 -0.18*** -0.20*** 0.19*** -0.22*** 1
MVAL -0.03* 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.27*** -0.06*** 1
COE -0.13*** 0.04*** -0.14*** -0.10*** 0.31*** -0.07*** 0.36*** -0.01 1
The table presents the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the implied cost of equity measure and risk proxies, including
earnings quality measures. SMOOTH is the ratio of standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items (Compustat Bank:
ibcomq) to the standard deviation of cash flow from operations (Compustat Bank: coeitq+dpq+pllq) - both variables are standardised
by total assets (Compustat Bank: atq). PERSIST is the slope coefficient from the AR(1) model of earnings (Compustat Bank: ibcomq)
on lagged earnings - both standardised by total assets. PREDICT is the standard deviation of the error terms from the AR(1) earnings
persistent model (Equation 3.3.2 ). We estimate SMOOTH, PERSIST, and PREDICT using a 10-quarter rolling window. ABACC is
the negative of the absolute value of the error term of the non-discretionary loan loss provisions model (Equation 3.3.1), estimated
cross-sectionally. EQS is the sum of the ranks of individual earnings quality measures: we rank each raw time series of earnings quality
measure at the end of the fiscal year end (quarter 4) across banks and years into deciles - higher ranks are associated with greater earnings
quality. BETA is the measure of market risk and is estimated via the market model using a minimum of 18 monthly returns over the
prior 60 months to the fiscal year end. Returns data (stock returns - ret- and value weighted returns - vwretd) are from CRSP. MVAL is
the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year end (CRSP absolute price data - prc multiplied by CRSP share outstanding data
- shrout). BM is the book value of equity (Compustat Bank: seq) to market value of equity (MVAL). COE is average of five implied
cost of equity measures (see Table 2.2). ***,**,* indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 3.6: Quintile Analysis - The Implied Cost of Equity and Earnings Quality
Mean
rpe rpeg rgm rmpeg rct COE
Lowest 1 0.0813 0.1069 0.1269 0.1240 0.0941 0.1044
E
ar
ni
ng
s
Q
ua
lit
y
D
ec
ile
2 0.0782 0.0990 0.1166 0.1130 0.0914 0.1017
3 0.0793 0.0978 0.1192 0.1147 0.0918 0.1001
4 0.0768 0.0946 0.1140 0.1098 0.0882 0.0982
5 0.0766 0.0937 0.1165 0.1113 0.0877 0.0984
6 0.0767 0.0912 0.1117 0.1072 0.0875 0.0959
7 0.0772 0.0915 0.1114 0.1071 0.0867 0.0957
8 0.0791 0.0903 0.1128 0.1087 0.0875 0.0966
9 0.0788 0.0902 0.1147 0.1101 0.0878 0.0985
Highest 10 0.0806 0.0886 0.1125 0.1088 0.0903 0.0979
Q10-Q1
t-statistic -0.4969 -7.0597*** -4.7832*** -5.2100*** -2.2214*** -2.7600***
z-statistic 0.1072 -6.1938*** -4.2193*** -4.5703*** -0.8002 -2.2983***
The table presents the quintile analysis of cost of equity across 10 composite earnings quality (EQS)
groups. rpe is the price-forward-earnings ratio (Easton, 2004), rpeg is the price-earnings-growth (Easton,
2004), rmpeg is the modified price-earnings-growth (Easton, 2004), rct is the Claus and Thomas’ (2001)
implied cost of equity model, rgm is the Gode and Mohanram’s (2003) implied cost of equity model. By
construction, all implied cost of equity measures are for bank fiscal year t+1. COE is the average cost
of equity derived from the five models. t-statistic and z-statistic are the test of difference of means and
Mann-Whitney test of median respectively. Decile 1 (10) is the least (highest) decile of earnings quality.
*** indicates statistically significant at 1%
Table 3.6 also presents the results of the quintile analysis of the mean of the cost
of equity measures across earnings quality deciles. In general, the tests of difference
in mean (and the untabulated median) support the idea of a negative relation between
bank earnings quality and the cost of equity. The results show that the cost of equity of
the lowest earnings quality decile is significantly higher than the highest earnings quality
decile. The difference in the mean cost of equity ranges between 0.38% (rct) and 1.83%
(rpeg). Figure 3.1 shows the relation between the implied cost of equity capital estimates
and earnings quality measures grouped into ten deciles. While the relation is definitely
not monotonically downward, it seems that there is a negative association between the
estimates of the cost of equity and the earnings quality measures, confirming the results
in Table 3.7.
The results of the regression of the cost of equity on earnings quality are presented in
Panel A (pooled regression) and Panel B (yearly cross-sectional regressions) of Table 3.7.
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Figure 3.1: Implied Cost of Equity and Earnings Quality
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The results under each of the estimation procedures are quantitatively and qualitatively
similar. Consistent with expectation and the univariate analysis reported earlier in this
study, in all the models, the coefficients on BETA and LnBM are significantly positive.
The coefficient on LnMVAL is insignificantly different from zero in all the earnings qual-
ity models.The magnitude of the coefficient on BETA suggests a market risk premium
of about 1% which is substantially lower than the reported historical risk premium of
between 3 percent (e.g. Claus and Thomas, 2001) and 9 percent (e.g. Ibboston Associ-
ates). However, Siegel (1999) notes that many of the studies attempting to estimate risk
premium overstate the premium by understating the real return on fixed-income assets
and overstating the expected return on equities.
Columns for Model 9 and Model 10 of Table 3.7 show the results of estimating our
empirical model using the composite earnings quality measure (EQS). Consistent with
expectation the coefficient on EQS is significantly negative and suggests a reduction of
0.1 percentage (10 basis) point in the cost of equity even after controlling for market
beta, bank size, and book to market ratio. However, the results suggest that the predict-
ability and accruals quality variables seem to drive the reported negative relation between
earnings quality and the cost of equity. Specifically, we find a mild support for a positive
relation between the cost of equity and earnings quality, as measured by the persistence
variable and, consistent with McInnis (2010), we find no relation between cost of equity
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and earnings smoothness after controlling for market beta, bank size, and book to market
ratio.In untabulated results we repeat the analyses using the values of the earnings quality
measures instead of the ranks. Our results are consistent with those reported in Table
3.7.
Panel B of Table 3.7 shows the results of estimating the empirical model using yearly
cross-sectional regressions (Fama and MacBeth, 1973). Consistent with the pooled re-
gression results, we find that a significantly negative relation between earnings quality
and cost of equity. However, this relation seems driven by the predictability variable.
While the coefficients on ABACC and SMOOTH is insignificantly negative, as with the
pooled regression result, the coefficient on PERSIST is positive but insignificant.
Two practical implications emanate from the results reported in Table 3.7. While
our aggregate earnings quality measure exhibits a significant negative relation with the
cost of bank equity, our results show that relative to similar studies on industrial firms
the impact of earnings quality on the cost of equity is less economically significant. This
result calls into question the often-held view that banks are inherently more informational
opaque than industrial firms are. Perhaps, the mitigating role of bank regulation and
supervision on information asymmetry explains the relatively weak economic significance
of information quality. In addition, our results also suggest that better information does
not necessarily result in lower cost of equity for banks. The relation between earnings
quality and the cost of equity is contingent on the dimension of earnings quality. This
is consistent with the view that the release of more and better information is associated
with frequent trading in shares and higher price volatility (risk).
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3.5 Earnings Quality and Bank Valuation
In this section, we investigate the relation between market valuation of banks and earnings
quality (H2). To recap, theoretical and empirical evidence on the effect of earnings quality
on the cost of capital suggests that low quality earnings results in higher information risk
and higher cost of capital. As the firm’s market price is the present value of expected
current and future cash flows discounted at the risk-adjusted cost of capital, all else
equal, a reduction in a firm’s cost of capital should result in an increase in firm value.
Therefore, banks with higher earnings quality should enjoy higher valuation, suggesting
a positive relation between bank value and earnings quality.
To assess the impact of earnings quality on bank valuation, we regress measures of
bank valuation on individual measures of earnings quality, the overall earnings quality
score and a number of control variables. Specifically, we test the hypothesis of a positive
relation between bank valuation and earnings quality by estimating the following pooled
cross-sectional and time series regression model:
Qi,t = α0+β1EQi,t +β2LnSIZEi,t +β3INVOPPi,t +β4LnAGEi,t
+β5ROAi,t +β6ROAi,t−1+β7CAP−ASSETi,t +β8LLPRi,t (3.5.1)
+β9LQDi,t +Year Controls+ εi,t
where i and t are the bank and year subscripts, respectively; Q is the bank value, EQ
is the individual or aggregate earnings quality measure for bank i in year t.
Our primary measure of bank valuation (Q) is the Tobin’s Q which is a widely used
valuation proxy in studies on corporate governance (e.g. Gompers et al., 2003; Caprio
et al., 2007), corporate diversification (e.g. Lang and Stulz, 1994) and investor protection
(e.g. La Porta et al., 2002). Tobin’s Q, the market valuation of bank i assets-in-place
and growth opportunities, is defined as the ratio of market value to replacement cost of
assets. A value higher than one indicates that the bank is using its resources efficiently
and creating positive economic value that reflects in its market value. Assuming financial
markets are efficient and that market value is an unbiased estimate of the present value
of a firm’s future cash flows (Gaio and Raposo, 2011), we interpret Tobin’s Q as the
market long-run valuation of a bank’s economic returns generated from the use of its
assets (Bitner and Dolan, 1996). However, because of the practical difficulty of obtaining
replacement value of assets, we calculate Tobin’s Q as the ratio of market value of equity
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plus the book value of liabilities to the book value of assets.23 Because banks are highly
levered, following Caprio et al. (2007), we also use a second measure of bank value
obtained as the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity.
Equation 3.5.1 controls for a number of variables. These variables cover the bank-
specific CAMEL characteristics used in the assessment of bank soundness and have sig-
nificant influence on bank valuation and, possibly, earnings quality.24 Studies report
a positive impact of investment opportunities (INVOPP) on the valuation of banking
and non-banking firms. We measure INVOPP as the annual change in bank revenue,
defined as the sum of interest and non-interest income. However, as with other altern-
ative accounting based measures, this measure may not perfectly capture investment
opportunities as it relies on accounting data that are subject to managerial manipula-
tion and provide little or no information about the market valuation of growth options.25
Empirical evidence suggests that smaller and younger firms have lower market valuation
but greater investment opportunities while older firms have better earnings quality (and
internal control) thus suggesting an important role for bank size and age. We measure
bank size (LnSIZE) as the log of total assets and bank age (LnAGE) as the log of the
number of quarters between 1961 and 2009 that the bank appears in Compustat Bank
database.
We also control for bank risk and capital adequacy as banks with low equity to asset
ratio are closer to insolvency and should enjoy lower market valuation predicting a positive
relation with Q. We measure capital-asset ratio (CAP_ASSET) as the ratio of capital
to total assets. We define capital as the combination of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. The
model also controls for the liquidity structure (LQD) of banks. We measure bank liquidity
as the ratio of cash and due from bank to total assets and predict a positive relation
with Q as banks with higher liquidity should have lower risk and better able to take
advantage of investment opportunities that generate greater benefits. We control for
bank performance using the current and lagged returns on asset (ROA), defined as the
ratio of income before tax to total assets. We predict a positive relation between bank
23Our measure is strongly correlated with two other measures of Tobin’s Q that we identify from the
literature: (1) the ratio of book value of assets plus market value of equity minus deferred tax, where
available, plus book value of equity to book value of assets, and (2) the ratio of the sum of total
assets and market value of equity less book value of equity to total assets. This is not surprising as
the values of deferred tax are largely missing and set to zero in our analysis. Notwithstanding the
strong correlations, we acknowledge that as in many studies Tobin’s Q is measured with error (e.g.
due to mispricing).
24CAMEL is an acronym for capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, and liquidity, which
are supervisory and regulatory criteria for the assessment of banks.
25Our results do not change if we use the rate of growth in loans.
108
Ta
bl
e
3.
8:
D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e
St
at
is
tic
s
an
d
C
or
re
la
tio
ns
-
Ea
rn
in
gs
Q
ua
lit
y
an
d
B
an
k
C
ha
ra
ct
er
is
tic
s
Pa
ne
lA
:D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e
St
at
is
tic
s
M
ea
n
SD
M
in
M
ax
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
N
T
Q
1.
03
0.
08
0.
01
3.
40
0.
99
1.
02
1.
07
94
47
M
T
B
1.
54
0.
86
0.
04
30
.3
3
1.
02
1.
40
1.
89
94
44
E
Q
S
21
.7
5
5.
93
4.
00
39
.0
0
18
.0
0
22
.0
0
26
.0
0
67
40
P
E
R
S
IS
T
0.
34
0.
47
-0
.6
5
1.
41
-0
.0
2
0.
29
0.
71
67
39
P
R
E
D
IC
T
-0
.0
0
0.
00
-0
.0
0
-0
.0
0
-0
.0
0
-0
.0
0
-0
.0
0
76
20
S
M
O
O
T
H
-1
.1
1
1.
12
-3
3.
86
-0
.0
2
-1
.1
3
-0
.9
4
-0
.7
2
65
91
A
B
A
C
C
-0
.0
0
0.
00
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
0
-0
.0
0
-0
.0
0
-0
.0
0
82
82
S
IZ
E
(U
S
$’
bi
lli
on
)
8.
22
61
.3
4
0.
02
22
23
.3
0
0.
41
0.
90
2.
74
95
03
IN
V
O
P
P
0.
03
0.
07
-0
.6
8
1.
44
0.
00
0.
03
0.
05
88
98
A
G
E
65
.2
1
34
.7
5
7.
00
19
2.
00
43
.0
0
57
.0
0
87
.0
0
95
03
R
O
A
0.
00
0.
01
-0
.4
8
0.
08
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
94
06
R
O
A
lg
1
0.
00
0.
01
-0
.0
8
0.
08
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
89
27
C
A
P
_
A
S
S
E
T
0.
03
0.
07
0.
00
1.
50
0.
01
0.
02
0.
04
83
95
L
L
P
R
0.
07
0.
21
-0
.8
9
5.
77
0.
01
0.
03
0.
06
90
15
L
Q
D
0.
04
0.
03
0.
00
0.
39
0.
02
0.
03
0.
05
93
29
Pa
ne
lB
:C
or
re
la
tio
n
M
at
rix
T
Q
M
T
B
E
Q
S
P
E
R
S
IS
T
P
R
E
D
IC
T
S
M
O
O
T
H
A
B
A
C
C
S
IZ
E
IN
V
O
P
P
A
G
E
R
O
A
R
O
A
lg
1
C
A
P
_
A
S
S
E
T
L
L
P
R
L
Q
D
T
Q
1
M
T
B
0.
91
**
*
1
E
Q
S
0.
18
**
*
0.
24
**
*
1
P
E
R
S
IS
T
0.
04
**
*
0.
07
**
*
0.
25
**
*
1
P
R
E
D
IC
T
0.
10
**
*
0.
11
**
*
0.
40
**
*
-0
.1
6*
**
1
S
M
O
O
T
H
0.
10
**
*
0.
10
**
*
0.
19
**
*
0.
07
**
*
0.
01
1
A
B
A
C
C
0.
16
**
*
0.
17
**
*
0.
41
**
*
-0
.0
3*
**
0.
33
**
*
0.
04
**
*
1
S
IZ
E
-0
.0
8*
**
0.
02
**
0.
18
**
*
0.
12
**
*
0.
08
**
*
-0
.0
3*
*
0.
05
**
*
1
IN
V
O
P
P
0.
14
**
*
0.
13
**
*
0.
06
**
*
0.
04
**
*
0.
00
0.
06
0.
15
0.
04
1
A
G
E
0.
11
**
*
0.
20
**
*
0.
29
**
*
0.
18
**
*
0.
12
**
*
-0
.0
3*
**
0.
09
**
*
0.
30
**
*
0.
07
**
*
1
R
O
A
0.
20
**
*
0.
16
**
*
0.
20
**
*
-0
.0
4*
**
0.
14
**
*
0.
03
**
0.
36
**
*
-0
.0
1
0.
28
**
*
0.
06
**
*
1
R
O
A
lg
1
0.
23
**
*
0.
19
**
*
0.
13
**
*
-0
.0
3*
*
0.
07
**
*
0.
06
**
*
0.
21
**
*
-0
.0
1
0.
11
**
*
0.
04
**
*
0.
23
**
*
1
C
A
P
_
A
S
S
E
T
-0
.1
5*
**
-0
.1
8*
**
-0
.1
0*
**
-0
.1
1*
**
0.
02
**
-0
.1
9*
**
0.
04
**
*
-0
.0
6*
**
-0
.1
1*
**
-0
.2
6
0.
02
**
0.
03
**
*
1
L
L
P
R
-0
.1
4*
**
-0
.1
0*
**
-0
.1
9*
**
0.
10
**
*
-0
.2
4*
**
-0
.0
5*
**
-0
.5
9*
**
0.
06
**
*
-0
.2
1*
**
0.
02
-0
.4
5*
**
-0
.1
8*
**
-0
.0
8*
**
1
L
Q
D
0.
01
0.
03
**
*
0.
04
**
*
0.
07
**
*
-0
.0
2*
*
-0
.0
5*
**
-0
.0
2*
0.
04
**
*
-0
.0
1*
**
0.
19
**
*
-0
.0
1
-0
.0
3*
**
0.
11
**
*
0.
03
**
*
1
T
he
ta
bl
e
pr
es
en
ts
th
e
de
sc
ri
pt
iv
e
st
at
is
ti
cs
an
d
co
rr
el
at
io
n
m
at
ri
x
of
re
gr
es
si
on
va
ri
ab
le
s
in
E
qu
at
io
n
3.
5.
1.
T
Q
(T
ob
in
’s
Q
ra
ti
o)
is
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
as
th
e
ra
ti
o
of
m
ar
ke
t
va
lu
e
of
eq
ui
ty
(C
R
S
P
:
ab
so
lu
te
va
lu
e
pr
c×
sh
ro
ut
)
pl
us
to
ta
l
lia
bi
lit
ie
s
(C
om
pu
st
at
B
an
k:
to
ta
l
lia
bi
lit
ie
s
(t
b)
)
pl
us
de
po
si
t
(C
om
pu
st
at
B
an
k:
dp
tc
q)
to
bo
ok
va
lu
e
of
as
se
ts
(C
om
pu
st
at
B
an
k:
at
).
M
T
B
is
th
e
ra
ti
o
of
m
ar
ke
t
va
lu
e
of
eq
ui
ty
to
bo
ok
va
lu
e
of
eq
ui
ty
.
M
ar
ke
t
va
lu
e
of
eq
ui
ty
is
th
e
pr
od
uc
t
of
m
ar
ke
t
pr
ic
e
pe
r
sh
ar
e
(C
R
S
P
:
ab
so
lu
te
va
lu
e
pr
c)
an
d
nu
m
be
r
of
sh
ar
es
ou
ts
ta
nd
in
g
(C
R
S
P
:
sh
ro
ut
).
S
M
O
O
T
H
is
th
e
ra
ti
o
of
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n
of
ne
t
in
co
m
e
be
fo
re
ex
tr
ao
rd
in
ar
y
it
em
s
(C
om
pu
st
at
B
an
k:
ib
co
m
q)
to
th
e
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n
of
ca
sh
flo
w
s
fr
om
op
er
at
io
ns
(C
om
pu
st
at
B
an
k:
co
ei
tq
+
dp
q+
pl
lq
)
-
bo
th
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
st
an
da
rd
is
ed
by
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
(C
om
pu
st
at
B
an
k:
at
q)
.
P
E
R
S
IS
T
is
th
e
sl
op
e
co
effi
ci
en
t
fr
om
th
e
A
R
(1
)
m
od
el
of
ea
rn
in
gs
(C
om
pu
st
at
B
an
k:
ib
co
m
q)
on
la
gg
ed
ea
rn
in
gs
-
bo
th
st
an
da
rd
is
ed
by
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
.
P
R
E
D
IC
T
is
th
e
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n
of
th
e
er
ro
r
te
rm
s
fr
om
th
e
A
R
(1
)
ea
rn
in
gs
pe
rs
is
te
nt
m
od
el
(E
qu
at
io
n
3.
3.
2
).
W
e
es
ti
m
at
e
S
M
O
O
T
H
,
P
E
R
S
IS
T
,
an
d
P
R
E
D
IC
T
us
in
g
a
10
-q
ua
rt
er
ro
lli
ng
w
in
do
w
.
A
B
A
C
C
is
th
e
ne
ga
ti
ve
of
th
e
ab
so
lu
te
va
lu
e
of
th
e
er
ro
r
te
rm
of
th
e
no
n-
di
sc
re
ti
on
ar
y
lo
an
lo
ss
pr
ov
is
io
ns
m
od
el
(E
qu
at
io
n
3.
3.
1)
,
es
ti
m
at
ed
cr
os
s-
se
ct
io
na
lly
.
E
Q
S
is
th
e
su
m
of
th
e
ra
nk
s
of
in
di
vi
du
al
ea
rn
in
gs
qu
al
it
y
m
ea
su
re
s:
w
e
ra
nk
ea
ch
ra
w
ti
m
e
se
ri
es
of
ea
rn
in
gs
qu
al
it
y
m
ea
su
re
at
th
e
en
d
of
th
e
fis
ca
l
ye
ar
en
d
(q
ua
rt
er
4)
ac
ro
ss
ba
nk
s
an
d
ye
ar
s
in
to
de
ci
le
s
-
hi
gh
er
ra
nk
s
ar
e
as
so
ci
at
ed
w
it
h
gr
ea
te
r
ea
rn
in
gs
qu
al
it
y.
S
IZ
E
is
th
e
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
.
IN
V
O
P
P
is
in
ve
st
m
en
t
op
po
rt
un
it
y
gi
ve
n
by
an
nu
al
gr
ow
th
in
ba
nk
re
ve
nu
e
(t
he
su
m
of
in
te
re
st
an
d
no
n-
in
te
re
st
in
co
m
e)
.
A
G
E
is
a
m
ea
su
re
of
th
e
ba
nk
ag
e,
gi
ve
n
by
th
e
lo
g
of
nu
m
be
r
of
qu
ar
te
rs
a
ba
nk
ap
pe
ar
s
in
th
e
C
om
pu
st
at
B
an
k
da
ta
ba
se
be
tw
ee
n
19
61
an
d
20
09
.
R
O
A
is
a
m
ea
su
re
of
ba
nk
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
(p
ro
fit
ab
ili
ty
),
gi
ve
n
by
th
e
ra
ti
o
of
in
co
m
e
be
fo
re
ta
x
(C
om
pu
st
at
B
an
k:
ib
co
m
)
to
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
.
R
O
A
la
g1
is
th
e
re
tu
rn
on
as
se
ts
fo
r
th
e
pr
ev
io
us
fis
ca
l
ye
ar
.
C
A
P
_
A
S
S
E
T
is
th
e
ca
pi
ta
l
to
as
se
ts
ra
ti
o.
L
L
P
R
is
th
e
ra
ti
o
of
lo
an
lo
ss
pr
ov
is
io
ns
to
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
an
d
L
Q
D
is
th
e
ra
ti
o
of
cu
rr
en
t
as
se
ts
to
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
.
C
ur
re
nt
as
se
ts
ar
e
de
fin
ed
as
ca
sh
an
d
du
e
fr
om
ba
nk
s.
A
ll
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
co
m
pu
te
d
at
th
e
en
d
of
ea
ch
fis
ca
l
ye
ar
.
T
he
sa
m
pl
e
pe
ri
od
is
fr
om
19
90
-2
00
9.
**
*,
**
,
*
in
di
ca
te
st
at
is
ti
ca
lly
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
1%
,
5%
,
an
d
10
%
,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
109
value and current and past performance. We control for loan quality (LLPR) measured as
the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets. The lower the ratio the higher the quality
of loans and all else equal the higher the bank value, suggesting a negative relation
between LLPR and measures of bank valuation. Finally, Equation 3.5.1 includes year
dummies that control for potential year-to-year variation.
Panel A of Table 3.8 reports the descriptive statistics of the distribution of bank
valuation, earnings quality and other control variables that enter into our regression
models. For the purpose of this table, we winsorize values of each measure at the
lower and upper 1% to mitigate the impact of outliers. The mean (median) bank in
the sample has total assets (SIZE) of US$8.22 billion (US$0.90 billion) and mean (and
median) growth rate (INVOPP) of 3%. The mean (median) bank also has a mean
(median) Tobin’s Q ratio (TQ) of 1.03 (1.02). The mean (median) market to book
(MTB) ratio is 1.54 (1.40). The results show that markets seem to pay a premium over
assets for our average sampled bank possibly due, in part, to the fact that this bank has
lower information risk and/or lower cost of capital or it is seen by the market not to be
overinvesting or expropriating the resources of its shareholders.
The loan loss provisions quality (ABACC) measure has mean (median) value of -
0.00 (-0.00). PERSIST, which captures the persistence of earnings innovation, has a
mean (median) value of 0.34 (0.29) and ranges between -0.65 and 1.41 with a standard
deviation of 0.47. PREDICT, which measures the predictability of earnings has a mean
(median) value of 0.67 (0.81) and ranges between -0.93 and 1 with a standard deviation
of 0.36. The mean (median) value of SMOOTH, which captures the variability of income
relative to the variability of cash flows, is 1.21 (1.07) and ranges between 0.03 and 56.47
with a standard deviation of 0.97.
Finally, the sample mean (median) value of aggregate measure of earnings quality
(EQS), the sum of the bank-year rank of individual measures of earnings quality, is 22.42
(22.29) and ranges between 5.05 and 39.63 with a standard deviation of 6.02. EQS varies
substantially higher (lower) than TQ (MTB): The coefficient of variation of EQS is 27%
compared to that of TQ and MTB, which are 9% and 57%, respectively.
Panel B of Table 3.7 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between the measures
of bank valuation, individual and aggregate earnings quality measures, and other control
variables. The table shows a positive and significant relation between earnings quality
attributes and bank valuation, whether measured by TQ or MTB. In addition, the overall
earnings quality measure correlates positively and significantly with measures of bank
valuation. The correlations between EQS and each control variable range between 0.04
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(LQD) and 0.29 (AGE) in absolute term. The correlation coefficients are also significant
at the conventional levels. These low correlations suggest that earnings quality is a
distinct bank characteristic not subsumed in the control variables included in our model.
In addition, the correlations between each of the control variables are also low in absolute
term, suggesting that multicollinearity is of minimum concern in our bank valuation
models.
3.5.1 Empirical Results: Earnings Quality and Bank Valuation
Table 3.9 and Table 3.10 report the results of the investigation of the role of earnings
quality on bank valuation. Panel A of each table presents the coefficient estimates of the
bank valuation model (Model 3.5.1) estimated using the pooled sample of banks. Panel
B presents the estimates of the yearly cross-sectional regressions (Fama and MacBeth,
1973). The tables differ only with respect to the dependent variable; the dependent
variable in Table 3.9 is the Tobin’s Q (TQ) ratio while the dependent variable in Table
3.10 is the market to book ratio (MTB). Models 1-4 of each table report the relation
between bank valuation and earnings quality dimensions while Model 5 reports the result
of the relation between bank valuation and aggregate earnings quality measure. Given
the possibility that our individual earnings quality attribute may suffer from measurement
error we put a greater weight on the results produced in Model 5 of each table.
The regression estimates in Table 3.9 and Table 3.10 provide two key results on the
link between bank valuation and earnings quality. First, the aggregate earnings qual-
ity (EQS) enters positively and significantly as expected, consistent with the idea that
earnings quality creates a premium for which the market is willing to pay. The find-
ing is consistent with the theoretical prediction of Easley and O’Hara (2004) who argue
that the precision of information reduces information risk and the cost of equity capital
providing an explanation for an increase in market valuation of banks. However, results
presented in the tables also suggest that the relation between bank valuation and the
individual components of earnings quality is not consistently positive across the different
dimensions. For example, while as expected the PERSIST and SMOOTH variables are
positively and significantly related to bank valuation, the PREDICT and ABACC variables
exhibit a significantly negative relation with bank valuation. Again, this result supports
the idea that different dimensions of earnings quality may exhibit different relation with
the variable of interest suggesting different consequences for different earnings attributes
(see, Dechow et al., 2010). This result is consistent with analytical work of Lambert
et al. (2007), who suggest that information risk may exert either a positive or negative
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effect on the cost of equity. It is also consistent with the empirical study of Botosan and
Plumlee (2002), who find that the cost of equity capital increases as the level of timely
disclosure increases.
The control variables in Table 3.9 and Table 3.10 are generally significant and con-
sistent with expectation. We find a strong and consistently significant positive relation
between bank valuation and the explanatory variables - bank size, current and past bank
performance, and liquidity ratio. However, while our proxy for investment opportunit-
ies is significantly related to bank valuation, as measured by market to book ratio, the
variable is only significant in the model that includes ABACC as an explanatory variable
and Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. While this result is surprising and unexpected,
it is consistent with the cross-country study of the relation between bank valuation and
corporate governance by Caprio et al. (2007). These authors find no significant relation
between bank valuation and investment opportunities as measured by growth in loans.
However, they establish a significant and positive relation between bank valuation and
investment opportunities as proxied by return on equity and return on assets, both of
which enter significantly positively in our regression models. Overall, the results in Table
3.9 and Table 3.10 show that each of the models explains a substantial portion (between
34% - 37%) of the variation in bank valuation. With the caveat that different earn-
ings quality dimensions exhibit different relation with bank valuation, we conclude that
aggregate earnings quality contributes to higher valuation of bank stocks by shareholders.
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Table 3.9: Regression Results - Tobin’s Q Ratio and Earnings Quality
Panel A: Pooled Regression
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PERSIST + 0.002***
(4.98)
PREDICT + -0.001***
(-3.28)
SMOOTH + 0.001***
(3.44)
ABACC + -0.001***
(-2.95)
EQS + 0.001**
(2.50)
LnSIZE + 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010***
(12.95) (14.42) (13.48) (17.12) (12.30)
INVOPP + -0.010 -0.009 -0.008 0.004 -0.016
(-0.79) (-0.74) (-0.64) (0.33) (-1.23)
LnAGE + 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.005*** 0.002
(1.45) (1.62) (1.22) (2.64) (0.93)
ROA + 0.745*** 0.732*** 0.734*** 0.796*** 3.321***
(6.39) (6.27) (6.27) (7.34) (14.03)
ROAlg1 + 5.317*** 5.349*** 5.329*** 4.296*** 4.711***
(21.38) (21.47) (21.21) (21.35) (18.28)
CAP_ASSET + -0.079*** -0.069*** -0.072*** -0.066*** -0.083***
(-3.50) (-3.05) (-3.08) (-4.84) (-3.56)
LLPR - 0.001 0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.044***
(0.26) (0.27) (0.56) (-0.15) (7.71)
LQD + 0.184*** 0.188*** 0.185*** 0.197*** 0.182***
(6.33) (6.44) (6.21) (7.92) (5.99)
Intercept + 0.942*** 0.946*** 0.942*** 0.943*** 0.944***
(116.53) (116.78) (113.32) (148.12) (113.32)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.36
N 5783 5783 5661 7180 5515
Table 3.9 continued next page
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Table 3.9 continued
Panel B: Yearly Cross-Sectional Regressions
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PERSIST + 0.001**
(2.29)
PREDICT + -0.001*
(-2.09)
SMOOTH + 0.001***
(4.32)
ABACC + 0.001
(0.82)
EQS + 0.001*
(2.05)
LnSIZE + 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007***
(3.76) (4.14) (3.23) (4.92) (3.60)
INVOPP + -0.027 -0.026 -0.026 -0.009 -0.014
(-1.49) (-1.48) (-1.39) (-0.51) (-0.88)
LnAGE + 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.35) (0.55) (0.39) (0.69) (0.35)
ROA + 6.629*** 6.599*** 6.619*** 5.448*** 7.475***
(5.78) (5.72) (5.71) (5.35) (6.44)
ROAlg1 + 4.791*** 4.831*** 4.969*** 4.013*** 4.984***
(6.72) (6.78) (6.65) (6.25) (6.96)
CAP_ASSET + -0.119 -0.095 -0.195 -0.060 -0.163
(-1.59) (-1.34) (-1.58) (-1.44) (-1.51)
LLPR - 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 0.082*** 0.105***
(3.70) (3.63) (3.59) (3.60) (3.83)
LQD + 0.170*** 0.175*** 0.171*** 0.193*** 0.171***
(3.99) (4.14) (3.87) (4.40) (3.56)
Intercept + 0.953*** 0.954*** 0.956*** 0.947*** 0.951***
(49.18) (49.94) (48.10) (56.00) (50.30)
Average R2 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.33 0.38
N 5783 5783 5661 7180 5515
The table presents the estimates of coefficients (above) and t-statistics (below) of the regression of bank valuation
on earnings quality and other bank-specific control variables. TQ (Tobin’s Q ratio) is calculated as the ratio
of market value of equity (CRSP: absolute value of prc×shrout) plus total liabilities (Compustat Bank: total
liabilities (tb)) plus deposit (Compustat Bank: dptc) to book value of assets (Compustat Bank: at). EQS is the
aggregate earnings quality score and is the sum of the yearly rank of a bank’s individual earnings quality measures.
SMOOTH is the ratio of standard deviation of net income before extraordinary items (Compustat Bank: ibcomq)
to the standard deviation of cash flows from operations (Compustat Bank: coeitq+dpq+pllq) - both variables
are standardised by total assets (Compustat Bank: atq). PERSIST is the slope coefficient from the AR(1) model
of earnings (Compustat Bank: ibcomq) on lagged earnings - both standardised by total assets. PREDICT is the
standard deviation of the error terms from the AR(1) earnings persistent model (Equation 3.3.2). We estimate
SMOOTH, PERSIST, and PREDICT using a 10-quarter rolling window. ABACC is the absolute value of the error
term of the non-discretionary loan loss provisions model (Equation 3.3.1), estimated cross-sectionally. SMOOTH,
PERSIST, PREDICT, and ABACC are measured such that greater value of each variable indicates higher earnings
quality. LnSIZE is the log of total assets. INVOPP measures investment opportunities given by annual growth in
bank revenue (the sum of interest and non-interest income). AGE is a measure of the bank age derived as natural
logarithm of number of quarters a bank appears in the Compustat Bank database between 1961 to 2009. ROA
is a measure of bank performance (profitability) and is given by the ratio of income before tax to total assets.
ROAlg1 is the return on assets for the previous fiscal year. CAP_ASSET is the capital to assets ratio. LLPR is
the ratio of loan loss provisions to interest income and LQD is the ratio of current assets to total assets. Current
assets are defined as cash and due from banks. Data to compute all variables are from Compustat Bank database.
All variables are computed at the end of each fiscal year. For the yearly cross-sectional regressions, the reported
coefficient on each variable is the mean of the time series distribution of coefficients for that variable. The
reported t-statistics is obtained as the mean of the time series distribution of coefficient divided by its standard
deviation and multiplied by the square root of the number of cross sections. The model R-square (Average R2)
is the mean of the time series distribution of R-squares. The sample period is from 1990-2009. ***,**,* indicate
statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 3.10: Market to Book Ratio and Earnings Quality
Panel A: Pooled Sample
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PERSIST + 0.017***
(4.39)
PREDICT + -0.007*
(-1.80)
SMOOTH + 0.014***
(3.77)
ABACC + -0.002
(-0.70)
EQS + 0.018***
(4.31)
LnSIZE + 0.110*** 0.119*** 0.114*** 0.124*** 0.105***
(11.48) (12.68) (11.96) (15.84) (10.59)
INVOPP + -0.295* -0.282* -0.306* -0.080 -0.347**
(-1.86) (-1.78) (-1.88) (-0.59) (-2.10)
LnAGE + 0.048* 0.050* 0.040 0.067*** 0.038
(1.74) (1.83) (1.43) (3.23) (1.32)
ROA + 5.001*** 4.872*** 4.952*** 5.683*** 22.493***
(3.45) (3.36) (3.40) (4.28) (7.57)
ROAlg1 + 52.681*** 52.911*** 52.784*** 42.931*** 47.889***
(17.04) (17.08) (16.89) (17.41) (14.79)
CAP_ASSET + -1.854*** -1.760*** -1.698*** -1.168*** -1.836***
(-6.62) (-6.27) (-5.86) (-6.97) (-6.28)
LLPR - 0.149*** 0.153*** 0.164*** 0.156*** 0.461***
(2.69) (2.76) (2.95) (2.96) (6.48)
LQD + 2.052*** 2.086*** 2.098*** 2.004*** 2.101***
(5.67) (5.76) (5.64) (6.59) (5.52)
Intercept + 0.372*** 0.409*** 0.368*** 0.283*** 0.389***
(3.70) (4.07) (3.56) (3.63) (3.72)
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.36
N 5783 5783 5661 7180 5515
Table 3.10 continued next page
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Table 3.10 continued
Panel B: Yearly Cross-Sectional Regressions
Model (1) ( 2) (3) (4) (5)
PERSIST + 0.011**
(2.49)
PREDICT + -0.008
(-1.65)
SMOOTH + 0.009***
(4.18)
ABACC + 0.009
(1.39)
EQS + 0.011**
(2.86)
LnSIZE + 0.081*** 0.090*** 0.079** 0.098*** 0.081***
(3.33) (3.61) (2.90) (4.05) (3.08)
INVOPP + -0.416* -0.414* -0.418* -0.112 -0.271
(-1.92) (-1.93) (-1.90) (-0.64) (-1.62)
LnAGE + 0.019 0.024 0.018 0.037 0.019
(0.69) (0.86) (0.63) (1.57) (0.71)
ROA + 56.833*** 56.559*** 56.599*** 47.190*** 64.701***
(5.35) (5.29) (5.28) (5.23) (5.91)
ROAlg1 + 48.016*** 48.389*** 50.394*** 40.585*** 50.150***
(6.42) (6.50) (6.37) (5.65) (6.73)
CAP_ASSET + -2.608*** -2.352** -3.516** -1.666** -3.229**
(-2.99) (-2.90) (-2.34) (-2.72) (-2.46)
LLPR - 0.826** 0.827** 0.816** 0.855** 0.930**
(2.29) (2.26) (2.24) (2.49) (2.46)
LQD + 1.998*** 2.058*** 2.021*** 2.075*** 2.038***
(4.02) (4.13) (3.92) (4.07) (3.54)
Intercept + 0.521** 0.524** 0.557** 0.360 0.494*
(2.14) (2.19) ( 2.22) (1.62) (2.06)
Adjusted R2 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.38
N 5783 5783 5661 7180 5515
The table presents the estimates of coefficients (above) and t-statistics (below) of the regression of bank valuation
(MTB) on earnings quality and other bank-level control variables. MTB is calculated as the ratio of market
value of equity to book value of equity. Market value of equity is the product of market price per share and
number of shares outstanding. EQS is the aggregate earnings quality score and is the sum of the yearly rank
of a bank’s individual earnings quality measures. SMOOTH is the ratio of standard deviation of net income
before extraordinary items (Compustat Bank: ibcomq) to the standard deviation of cash flows from operations
(Compustat Bank: coeitq+dpq+pllq) - both variables are standardised by total assets (Compustat Bank: atq).
PERSIST is the slope coefficient from the AR(1) model of earnings (Compustat Bank: ibcomq) on lagged
earnings- both standardised by total assets. PREDICT is the standard deviation of the error terms from the
AR(1) earnings persistent model (Equation 3.3.2). We estimate SMOOTH, PERSIST, and PREDICT using a
10-quarter rolling window. ABACC is the absolute value of the error term of the non-discretionary loan loss
provisions model (Equation 3.3.1), estimated cross-sectionally. SMOOTH, PERSIST, PREDICT, and ABACC are
measured such that greater value of each variable indicates higher earnings quality. LnSIZE is the log of total
assets. INVOPP measures investment opportunities given by annual growth in bank revenue (the sum of interest
and non-interest income). AGE is a measure of the bank age derived as natural logarithm of number of quarters
a bank appears in the Compustat Bank database between 1961 to 2009. ROA is a measure of bank performance
(profitability) and is given by the ratio of income before tax to total assets. ROAlg1 is the return on assets for
the previous fiscal year. CAP_ASSET is the capital to assets ratio. LLPR is the ratio of loan loss provisions to
interest income and LQD is the ratio of current assets to total assets. Current assets are defined as cash and
due from banks. Data to compute all variables are from Compustat Bank database. All variables are computed
at the end of each fiscal year. For the yearly cross-sectional regressions, the reported coefficient on each variable
is the mean of the time series distribution of coefficients for that variable. The reported t-statistics is obtained
as the mean of the time series distribution of coefficient divided by its standard deviation and multiplied by the
square root of the number of cross sections. The model R-square is the mean of the time series distribution of
R-squares. The sample period is from 1990-2009. ***,**,* indicate statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.
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3.5.2 Endogeneity
The results of the multiple regression analysis presented so far relies on the assumption
that bank valuation and earnings quality are exogenous variables. This assumption relies
on the possibility that investors are attracted to banks with high earnings quality with
the consequence that the valuations of those banks are enhanced. If this assumption
holds then our implicit assumption that causality runs from bank earnings quality to
bank valuation holds. However, it is possible that this relation is endogenous leading to
spurious relation between bank valuation and earnings quality. For example, it is possible
that large investors are attracted to banks with high valuation and these investors are
able to extract high quality earnings from banks. In such a situation, bank valuation and
earnings quality are simultaneously determined and our results suffer from an endogeneity
bias.
To address the endogeneity bias, we estimate bank valuation and earnings quality
models using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) method. The method requires that we
identify exogenous variables that are correlated with only earnings quality but not (at least
directly) with bank valuation. However, the identification of valid exogenous variables
that explain bank earnings quality and which do not affect bank valuation is an onerous
task. Notwithstanding this difficulty, we provide what we consider an innovative way
to address the endogeneity concern regarding the relation between bank valuation and
earnings quality by using three variables as instruments for earnings quality.
First, we argue for a relationship between bank earnings quality and (potential) tax
liability. We argue that banks intending to minimise their tax liability may be motivated
to manage their earnings downwards, thus affecting the quality of these earnings. The
idea that tax impacts earnings quality finds support in empirical studies (e.g. Phillips
et al., 2003; Dhaliwal et al., 2004). If tax plays a role in earnings quality, we argue
that banks with high tax liability in the previous year are more likely to manage earnings
downwards to minimise current period tax liability. We use LAGTAX calculated as the
previous year tax liability standardised by total assets, as one instrument for earnings
quality. We expect a negative relation between LAGTAX and earnings quality. While we
argue for a link between LAGTAX and earnings quality we have no logical argument to
expect a direct link between bank valuation and LAGTAX.
Altamuro and Beatty (2010) provide evidence that internal control regulations affect
financial reporting of banks. Specifically, these authors report that the FDICIA-mandated
internal control requirements increased loan loss provisions validity, earnings persistence
and cash flow predictability, and reduced benchmark-beating and accounting conservatism
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for affected versus unaffected banks.26 They exploit the specific provision of the FDICIA
which subjects institutions with assets equal to or more than US$500 million to internal
control monitoring and reporting requirements. Management of other banks do not
have to issue a report on the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting or
have these reports attested by their public auditors. We use a dummy variable FDICIA
that takes the value of 1 for banks with assets equal to or greater than US$500 million
and 0 otherwise. While this variable correlates with bank valuation and our bank size
variables, we argue that this variable is predetermined and exogenous to our analysis, as
the reporting status of banks under this provision is externally determined, even though
it is a function of a bank characteristic. In addition, there is no reason to believe that
markets value such reporting status. We expect a positive relation between FDICIA and
earnings quality. Even though the FDICIA Act came into effect in 1991, the amendment
requiring specific banks to provide management report on internal control came into
effect in 1993. Therefore, the sample that we use for the 2SLS starts from 1993.
Finally, in 2002, the US government, in the wake of major corporate and account-
ing scandals, introduced the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that proponents claim should improve
internal control and financial reporting of public companies. The most important provi-
sions of this Act are the SOX 302 and SOX 404.27 Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) report
that relative to non-reporting firms, firms reporting internal control deficiencies under
the SOX 404 have lower quality accruals, as measured by accrual noise and absolute ac-
cruals. Most importantly, they find that the quality of internal control affects the quality
of accruals: firms whose auditors confirm the remediation of previously reported internal
control deficiencies experience significant improvement in accruals quality while firms
that receive different internal control audit opinions in successive years also experience
changes in accruals quality consistent with changes in internal control quality. We use a
dummy variable (SOX) that equals 1 for post-SOX years (from 2003) and 0, otherwise.
We expect a positive relation between this variable and earnings quality.
Table 3.11 presents the results of the first stage and second stage least square regres-
sions. Model 1 of the table regresses the composite earnings quality measure on the
26FDICIA is the Financial Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991.
27The provision of SOX 302 came into effect in August 2002 and requires management to evaluate
internal controls over financial reporting and certify the effectiveness of the controls. SOX 404,
which became effective from November 15 2004, requires companies that file annual report with
SEC to report on management’s responsibilities to establish and maintain adequate control over the
company’s financial reporting process, as well as management’s assessment of the effectiveness of
these controls. The provision of SOX 404 also requires the company’s external auditor to report on
management’s assessment, as well as on the effectiveness of the company’s control.
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proposed instrumental variables as well as other control variables in the bank valuation
model. As shown in the table our instrumental variables and three other innate variables
(SIZE, LLPR and ROAlg1) are significant in explaining bank earnings quality, even though
the tax variable is not correctly signed. F-test that these instruments and the significant
innate variables can be excluded from the first-stage regressions was strongly rejected.
Thus, we conclude that our instruments are valid instruments for earnings quality. In
the second stage we regress bank valuation (Tobin’s Q and market to book ratio) on
log of bank age, current period profitability and liquidity while instrumenting for earnings
quality using SOX, FDICIA, LAGTAX, SIZE, and ROAlg1.28 The results shown under
Model 2 and Model 3 of Table 3.11 support our primary finding of a positive and signi-
ficant relation between bank valuation and earnings quality, even after controlling for the
potential endogeneity bias.
28We exclude the investment opportunities and capital adequacy variables from the regression because
neither is significant in the 2SLS. However, our results remain the same if we include these variables.
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Table 3.11: Instrumental Variable Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
LnSIZE 0.545***
(12.14)
INVOPP 0.199
(0.34)
CAP_ASSET 0.865
(0.81)
LLPR -2.132***
(-8.74)
SOX 0.259***
(3.29)
FDICIA 0.511***
(4.15)
LAGTAX 0.001***
(3.00)
ROAlg1 72.953***
(6.35)
LnAGE 0.079 0.173*** 0.003
(0.79) (2.92) (0.75)
ROA 1.383 31.515*** 2.922***
(0.14) (11.90) (13.14)
LQD -1.36 0.842* 0.088**
(-1.00) (1.70) ( 2.12)
EQS 0.175*** 0.015***
(7.14) (7.22)
Intercept 0.674 -0.066 0.941***
(1.51) (-0.30) (55.80)
Adjusted R2 0.11 0.08 0.06
N 4882 4882 4882
The table presents the estimates of coefficients (above) and t-statistics (below) of two stage least square re-
gressions (2SLS). The dependent variables are EQS, TQ, and MTB for Models 1, 2 and 3, respectively. TQ
(Tobin’s Q ratio) is calculated as the ratio of market value of equity (CRSP:absolute value prc×shrout) plus
total liabilities (Compustat Bank: total liabilities (tb)) plus deposit (Compustat Bank: dptc) to book value of
assets (Compustat Bank: at). MTB is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity. FDICIA is a
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 (otherwise 0) for banks subjects to the internal control provisions of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Improvement Act of 1991 - banks for which assets value (Compustat: at) is equal
to or greater than US$500 million. SOX is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for post-Sarbanes-Oxley
Act years (starting 2003) and 0 otherwise. LAGTAX is the lag value of bank income tax (Compustat: txt). EQS
is the aggregate earnings quality score and is the sum of the yearly rank of a bank’s individual earnings quality
measure. LnSIZE is the log of total assets. INVOPP is investment opportunity given by annual growth in bank
revenue (the combination of interest and non-interest income). LnAGE is a measure of the bank age and is given
by the log of number of quarters a bank appears in the Compustat Bank database between 1961 to 2009. ROA
is a measure of bank performance (profitability) and is given by the ratio of income before tax to total assets. is
the return on assets for the previous fiscal year. CAP_ASSET is the capital to assets ratio. LLPR is the ratio
of loan loss provisions to interest income and LQD is the ratio of current asset to total assets. Current assets
are defined as cash and due from banks. The sample period is from 1990-2009. ***,*,** indicate statistically
significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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3.6 Bank Earnings Quality and Value Relevance
Lev (1989) states that one explanation for low R-squares in earnings or returns model is
that ‘no serious attempt is being made to question the quality of the reported earnings
number prior to correlation with returns.’ Botosan (2000) suggests that the ultimate
benefit of providing more information to the capital markets is a lower cost of equity
capital and thus a higher stock price, for a given level of earnings. Thus, both Lev (1989)
and Botosan (2000) imply that the relation between earnings and price is conditional on
earnings quality. In this section, we take another approach to establishing a link between
bank valuation (and the cost of equity) and earnings quality by investigating whether
higher quality earnings are more value relevant than lower quality earnings. Specifically,
we investigate whether the price-earnings relation depends on the quality of reported
earnings. Following extant literature (e.g. Barth et al., 1999; Bao and Bao, 2004), we
define earnings multiples as either the coefficient on earnings in price-earnings regression
or the coefficient on earnings change in price-change-earning-change regression.
For each year in the study, we classify banks into two groups depending on their
individual and aggregate earnings quality scores. Specifically, for each earnings quality
measure, including the aggregate earnings quality, we classify a bank as a high earnings
quality bank (HEQB) if its value on an earnings quality measure in that year is greater
than the median value of the earnings quality measure for all banks in that year. We
classify a bank as a low earnings quality bank (LEQB) if its value on an earnings quality
measure in that year is lower than or equal to the median value of the earnings quality
measure for all banks in that year. Using this classification, we then test whether banks
with better earnings quality generate a higher firm value. In line with the theoretical basis
already established in this chapter, we argue that higher earnings quality should translate
into higher bank value as banks with higher earnings quality exhibit lower information
risk and lower cost of capital.
Extant research (e.g. Easton and Harris, 1991; Kothari and Sloan, 1992) report a
positive and significant relation between stock price and earnings using both the price-level
regression and change regression (return regression). The following equation captures
the price-level value relevance model:
PRCi,t = α0+β1NIi,t + εi,t (3.6.1)
where PRC is the price per share and NI is the net income per share.
The change regression can be represented by the following regression equation:
121
CHGPRCi,t = α0+β1CHGNIi,t + εi,t (3.6.2)
where CHGPRC is the annual change in price, CHGNI is the annual change in net
income per share. The intercept and the error term in both Equation 3.6.1 and Equation
3.6.2 capture information relevant factors omitted in the regression models.
Barth et al. (1999) show that an indicator variable can be included in the level and
change regressions to compare the price-earnings and price-change-earnings-change mul-
tiples between two sample groups. In addition, evidence suggests that the price-earnings
ratio is a positive function of growth and a negative function of risk (Collins and Kothari,
1989; Easton and Zmijewski, 1989). Finally, Barth et al. (1999) note that cross-sectional
differences in growth and risk may result in cross-sectional differences in earnings mul-
tiples. Thus, in line with their study, we allow the coefficient on net income to vary with
measures of growth, risk, and bank size. Therefore, to examine whether earnings mul-
tiples is dependent on bank information quality (H3a), and in particular whether banks
with higher earnings quality have higher earnings multiples than banks with lower earnings
quality (H3b), we estimate the following regression:
PRCi,t = α0+β1NIi,t +β2(EQi,t ×NIi,t)+β3(EQTAi,t ×NIi,t)
+β4(TAi,t ×NIi,t)+β5(GROWTH i,t ×NIi,t) (3.6.3)
+β6(EVARi,t ×NIi,t)+Year Controls+ εi,t
where i and t are the bank and time subscripts, respectively. EQ is an indicator variable
that takes the value of 1 (0) for bank HEQBs (LEQBs).29 We include control variables
for risk (EQTA×NI) and (EVAR× NI), bank size (TA×NI), and growth (GROWTH×NI)
to account for bank-specific characteristics that may affect the price-earnings relation.
We measure GROWTH as the 3-year compound growth rate of book value of equity
(e.g. Beaver et al., 1989; Barth et al., 1999). EQTA, a measure of risk, is the ratio of
equity capital to total assets. EVAR, controls for operating risk, and is the variance of
the annual percentage change in earnings in the past four years (see, also, Barth et al.,
29HEQBs and LEQBs are defined with respect to aggregate earnings quality, earnings persistence,
earnings smoothing, predictability, and accruals quality. We use the following variables dPERSIST,
dPREDICT, dSMOOTH, dABACC and dEQS in our regressions. Thus, for example, in line with our
definition of HEQBs, EQ for the persistence variable (dPERSIST) takes the value of 1 (otherwise
0) if the bank’s persistence measure in that year is greater than the median value of the persistence
measure for all banks in that year.
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1999). In line with extant literature we expect negative coefficient on the risk interaction
variables as more risky and levered banks should have higher cost of capital and lower
price. TA is the book value of total assets. We also include dummy variable for years
to control for the year-to-year variation in the price-earnings relation. The coefficient
of interest is β2. A significantly positive coefficient on earnings quality interacted with
earnings is consistent with the hypothesis that price-earnings relation depends on bank
information quality, as measured by earnings quality, and positively stronger for higher
quality earnings.
We also consider a change regression similar to those by Barth et al. (1999) and Bao
and Bao (2004).30 We test the following change regression:
CHGPRCi,t = α0+β1CHGNIi,t +β2(EQi,t ×CHGNIi,t)+β3(EQTAi,t ×CHGNIi,t)
+β4(TAi,t ×CHGNIi,t)+β5(GROWTH i,t ×CHGNIi,t)+ (3.6.4)
β6(EVARi,t ×CHGNIi,t)+Year Controls+ εi,t
where CHGPRC is the change in price per share normalised by beginning price per
share and CHGNI is the change in earnings normalised by lagged earnings. All other
variables are as defined in Equation 3.6.3 above.
Table 3.12 presents the descriptive statistics for the full sample of banks as well as the
subsamples - high earnings banks (EQS=1) and low earnings quality banks (EQS=0).
Specifically, high earnings banks (HEQBs) are significantly larger and more risky than
high earnings banks (LEQBs). The table also shows that bank earnings quality seems to
reflect in share price. Even though the results show no significant difference between the
reported earnings for HEQBs and LEQBs, the price per share of HEQBs is significantly
larger than price per share LEQBs. This result suggests that for a given level of earnings
investors seem to reward banks with higher quality with greater price than banks with
lower earnings quality. This result is consistent with the negative relationship between
bank earnings quality and the cost of equity earlier reported in this study. Panel B of
Table 3.12 also presents the Pearson correlation matrix. The result supports a positive
and significant correlation between bank earnings (NI) and bank stock price (PRC). The
30While Barth et al. (1999) include banks in their sample and specifically allow for the coefficient of
earnings variable to vary for banks (and utility firms), their study looks at the market pricing of
pattern of increasing earnings, and not earnings quality. On the other hand, while (Bao and Bao,
2004) looks at market pricing of smoothing, a component of our aggregate earnings quality, their
sample excludes banking firms. Moreover, our operationalisation of smoothing is different from theirs.
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correlation between change in bank earnings (CHGNI) and change in bank stock price
(CHGPRC), even though economically low, is significantly positive. These results are
consistent with the positive pricing (value relevance) of earnings.
Columns for Models 1-5 in Panel A of Table 3.13 present the estimates of Equation
3.6.3 using the pooled sample of banks. Panel B shows the estimates of the yearly
cross-sectional regressions. As expected, the results show a significantly positive relation
between earnings and bank stock price. Most importantly, except for the predictability
variable, the regression coefficients for the indicator variable terms, which condition the
relation between price and earnings on bank earnings quality are significantly positive.
The results presented in Panel A show that the price-earnings multiple of banks with
higher earnings quality is significantly larger than price-earnings multiple of banks with
low earnings quality, after controlling for risk, bank size and growth. These results are
consistent with those presented in Panel B for yearly cross-sectional regressions. The
coefficients on EQTA, TA, GROWTH, EVAR, interacted with earnings, are generally
significant and consistent with expectations. These results give support to H3a: that
the price-earnings relation is dependent on bank information quality (earnings quality)
and H3b - that banks with better earnings quality have stronger positive price-earnings
relation. Thus, markets seem to place more values on earnings of banks that are of higher
quality compared to earnings of banks with the same size, risk, and growth.
Columns for Models 1-5 in Panel A of Table 3.14 present the estimates of Equation
3.6.4 using the pooled sample of banks. Panel B shows the estimates of the yearly
cross-sectional regressions. Unlike the price-level regressions, estimation of the change
regressions using the pooled sample and the yearly cross-sectional regressions provide
weak support for the differential price-change-earnings-change relation between banks
with high earnings quality and banks with low earnings quality. As reported in the table,
as expected, there appears to be a difference in price-change-earnings-change relation
between banks with high earnings quality and banks with low earnings quality. However,
only the coefficient on dABACC interacted with earnings change is consistently positive
and statistically significant whether we use the pooled sample or the yearly cross-sectional
regressions. While the dummy variable for the composite earnings quality interacted with
earnings change variable is positive it is only statistically significant under the yearly
cross-sectional regressions. This positive loading on the dummy EQS variable suggests
that banks with better earnings quality enjoy greater positive price change for a unit
change in earnings. In view of the weak evidence presented in this table, we are cautious
in linking earnings quality to price-change-earnings-change relation.
124
Ta
bl
e
3.
12
:D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e
St
at
is
tic
s
an
d
C
or
re
la
tio
n
M
at
rix
Pa
ne
lA
:D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e
St
at
is
tic
s Fu
ll
Sa
m
pl
e
H
E
Q
B
vs
.
LE
Q
B
Sa
m
pl
e
H
E
Q
B
LE
Q
B
H
E
Q
B
vs
.
LE
Q
B
M
ea
n
SD
M
in
M
ax
Q
1
Q
2
Q
3
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n
t-
st
at
is
ti
c
z-
st
at
is
ti
c
P
R
C
25
.9
8
22
.1
3
0.
37
51
8.
94
14
.3
3
22
.3
5
32
.1
4
30
.4
8
25
.7
4
21
.3
8
19
.1
6
12
.6
0
14
.7
1
N
I
0.
28
0.
95
-1
7.
91
8.
48
0.
19
0.
37
0.
55
0.
36
0.
44
0.
20
0.
30
4.
87
14
.6
5
E
Q
T
A
0.
17
0.
10
0.
00
0.
77
0.
10
0.
16
0.
23
0.
18
0.
17
0.
16
0.
14
7.
79
7.
92
T
A
20
.4
9
10
8.
03
0.
04
22
23
.3
0
0.
75
1.
94
6.
91
35
.9
1
3.
00
4.
74
1.
36
8.
75
15
.6
5
G
R
O
W
T
H
0.
16
0.
17
-0
.4
5
1.
73
0.
06
0.
13
0.
23
0.
17
0.
13
0.
15
0.
12
2.
41
3.
19
E
VA
R
5.
96
26
.2
4
0.
00
22
0.
43
0.
03
0.
15
1.
09
4.
02
0.
12
7.
94
0.
21
-4
.4
9
-7
.8
7
C
H
G
P
R
C
-0
.0
1
0.
36
-0
.9
6
7.
51
-0
.2
1
-0
.0
1
0.
18
0.
02
0.
02
-0
.0
4
-0
.0
3
4.
77
5.
18
C
H
G
N
I
-0
.8
5
12
.4
8
-4
93
.0
0
12
5.
00
-0
.3
7
-0
.0
2
0.
16
-0
.9
4
0.
02
-0
.7
6
-0
.1
1
0.
44
7.
67
Pa
ne
lB
:C
or
re
la
tio
n
M
at
rix
P
R
C
N
I
E
Q
T
A
T
A
G
R
O
W
T
H
E
VA
R
C
H
G
P
R
C
P
R
C
1
N
I
0.
49
**
*
1
E
Q
T
A
0.
02
0.
01
1
T
A
0.
15
**
*
0.
05
**
*
0.
14
**
*
1
G
R
O
W
T
H
0.
12
**
*
0.
12
**
*
0.
04
**
0.
12
**
*
1
E
VA
R
-0
.0
5*
**
-0
.0
8*
**
0.
01
0.
04
**
-0
.0
3*
*
1
C
H
G
P
R
C
0.
26
**
*
0.
21
**
*
-0
.0
2*
-0
.0
2
0.
04
**
*
0.
00
1
C
H
G
N
I
0.
06
**
*
0.
37
**
*
0.
01
-0
.0
1
0.
03
*
-0
.1
6*
**
0.
10
**
*
T
he
ta
bl
e
pr
es
en
ts
de
sc
rip
ti
ve
st
at
is
ti
cs
fo
r
re
gr
es
si
on
va
ria
bl
es
in
cl
ud
in
g
di
ff
er
en
ce
s
in
m
ea
ns
an
d
m
ed
ia
ns
of
hi
gh
qu
al
ity
ea
rn
in
gs
an
d
lo
w
qu
al
ity
ea
rn
in
gs
ba
nk
s
fo
r
a
fu
ll
sa
m
pl
e
of
C
om
ps
ut
at
ba
nk
s
fo
r
th
e
pe
rio
d
19
90
-2
00
9.
P
R
C
is
th
e
st
oc
k
pr
ic
e
(C
R
SP
-
pr
c)
.
N
I
is
th
e
ne
t
in
co
m
e
pe
r
sh
ar
e
be
fo
re
ex
tr
ao
rd
in
ar
y
it
em
s
(C
om
pu
st
at
B
an
k-
ep
sp
x)
.
C
H
G
N
Ii
s
th
e
ch
an
ge
in
ne
t
in
co
m
e
no
rm
al
is
ed
by
be
gi
nn
in
g
pr
ic
e
pe
r
sh
ar
e.
C
H
G
P
R
C
is
th
e
on
e-
ye
ar
ch
an
ge
in
pr
ic
e
pe
r
sh
ar
e
no
rm
al
is
ed
by
be
gi
nn
in
g
pr
ic
e
pe
r
sh
ar
e.
E
Q
T
A
is
th
e
ra
ti
o
of
eq
ui
ty
(C
O
M
P
U
T
A
T
B
an
k-
se
q)
to
to
ta
la
ss
et
s
(C
O
M
P
U
T
A
T
B
an
k-
at
).
G
R
O
W
T
H
is
th
e
fo
ur
-y
ea
r
an
nu
al
gr
ow
th
ra
te
of
bo
ok
va
lu
e
of
eq
ui
ty
(C
om
pu
st
at
B
an
k-
se
q)
.
E
V
A
R
is
th
e
va
ria
nc
e
of
th
e
pa
st
fiv
e
ye
ar
s’
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
ch
an
ge
in
ea
rn
in
gs
.
H
E
Q
B
s
(L
E
Q
B
s)
re
fe
rs
to
hi
gh
(l
ow
)
ea
rn
in
gs
qu
al
ity
ba
nk
s
w
it
h
ag
gr
eg
at
e
ea
rn
in
gs
qu
al
ity
hi
gh
er
th
an
(e
qu
al
to
or
le
ss
th
an
)
an
nu
al
m
ed
ia
n.
T
he
te
st
st
at
is
ti
cs
ar
e
th
e
t-
te
st
(t
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s)
of
di
ff
er
en
ce
in
m
ea
ns
an
d
W
ilc
ox
on
te
st
of
di
ff
er
en
ce
in
m
ed
ia
ns
(z
-s
ta
ti
st
ic
s)
,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
**
*,
**
,
*
in
di
ca
te
st
at
is
ti
ca
lly
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
1%
,
5%
,
an
d
10
%
,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
125
Ta
bl
e
3.
13
:E
ar
ni
ng
s
Q
ua
lit
y
an
d
V
al
ue
R
el
ev
an
ce
of
Ea
rn
in
gs
-
P
ric
e-
Le
ve
lR
eg
re
ss
io
ns
P
an
el
A
:
P
oo
le
d
Sa
m
pl
e
P
an
el
B
:
Ye
ar
ly
C
ro
ss
-S
ec
ti
on
al
R
eg
re
ss
io
ns
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
N
I
+
7.
46
3*
*
11
.8
96
**
*
9.
54
1*
**
9.
39
0*
**
8.
80
6*
**
24
.0
67
**
*
27
.9
92
**
*
23
.7
92
**
*
22
.7
24
**
*
21
.3
74
**
*
(2
.4
1)
(4
.4
1)
(3
.9
3)
(3
.7
6)
(3
.5
1)
(5
.8
8)
(4
.8
1)
(5
.8
7)
(5
.6
0)
(5
.5
5)
E
Q
T
A
×N
I
-
-1
9.
21
5*
-2
1.
02
6*
-2
1.
87
6*
*
-3
0.
60
4*
*
-2
0.
28
6*
-1
8.
69
8*
*
-1
1.
98
6
-1
7.
45
3
-1
5.
47
4
-1
9.
83
4
(-
1.
71
)
(-
1.
73
)
(-
2.
00
)
(-
2.
48
)
(-
1.
83
)
(-
2.
25
)
(-
0.
91
)
(-
1.
71
)
(-
1.
26
)
(-
1.
78
)
T
A
×N
I
+
0.
01
9*
*
0.
02
4*
**
0.
02
2*
*
0.
01
5*
0.
02
1*
*
0.
00
8
0.
00
9*
0.
01
0
0.
00
7
0.
00
5
(2
.4
5)
(2
.7
1)
(2
.3
6)
(1
.7
1)
(2
.2
3)
(1
.6
5)
(2
.0
6)
(1
.7
7)
(1
.1
1)
(0
.6
4)
G
R
O
W
T
H
×N
I
+
19
.1
47
**
20
.2
47
**
15
.5
06
*
14
.9
95
*
18
.0
61
*
16
.3
90
**
*
15
.5
42
**
*
17
.6
91
**
*
21
.5
24
**
*
20
.5
16
**
*
(2
.2
8)
(1
.9
8)
(1
.7
5)
(1
.9
2)
(1
.8
8)
(3
.6
9)
(3
.7
4)
(4
.9
6)
(4
.8
3)
(4
.9
6)
E
VA
R
×N
I
-
-0
.0
09
**
-0
.0
09
**
*
-0
.0
08
**
-0
.0
08
**
*
-0
.0
10
**
*
-0
.0
14
-0
.0
18
-0
.0
11
-0
.0
17
-0
.0
08
(-
2.
51
)
(-
2.
70
)
(-
2.
31
)
(-
3.
39
)
(-
2.
60
)
(-
1.
00
)
(-
1.
23
)
(-
0.
67
)
(-
1.
16
)
(-
0.
59
)
dP
E
R
SI
ST
×N
I
+
6.
44
1*
*
7.
76
6*
**
(2
.0
8)
(3
.3
7)
dP
R
E
D
IC
T
×N
I
+
-0
.8
04
1.
70
7
(-
0.
20
)
(0
.4
9)
dS
M
O
O
T
H
×N
I
+
4.
93
8*
7.
19
8*
**
(1
.7
1)
(3
.6
0)
dA
B
A
C
C
×N
I
+
10
.7
83
**
*
7.
84
3*
**
(2
.7
6)
(4
.5
6)
dE
Q
S×
N
I
+
4.
25
0*
10
.6
48
**
*
(1
.8
1)
(4
.2
7)
in
te
rc
ep
t
+
22
.3
99
**
*
22
.2
78
**
*
22
.2
53
**
*
21
.4
67
**
*
22
.3
59
**
*
14
.6
40
**
*
14
.2
34
**
*
14
.6
13
**
*
14
.8
59
**
*
14
.7
52
**
*
(2
7.
87
)
(2
3.
49
)
(2
2.
73
)
(2
3.
20
)
(2
4.
21
)
(2
7.
27
)
(3
4.
66
)
(2
6.
03
)
(2
9.
20
)
(2
6.
00
)
Ye
ar
D
um
m
y
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
N
A
N
A
N
A
N
A
N
A
R
2
0.
39
0.
37
0.
38
0.
42
0.
38
0.
56
0.
57
0.
55
0.
56
0.
57
N
36
05
36
05
36
05
36
05
36
05
36
05
36
05
36
05
36
05
36
05
T
he
ta
bl
e
pr
es
en
ts
th
e
es
ti
m
at
es
of
co
effi
ci
en
ts
(a
bo
ve
)
an
d
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
(b
el
ow
)
of
pr
ic
e-
le
ve
l
re
gr
es
si
on
s.
N
I
is
th
e
ne
t
in
co
m
e
pe
r
sh
ar
e
be
fo
re
ex
tr
ao
rd
in
ar
y
it
em
s
(C
om
pu
st
at
B
an
k-
ep
sp
x)
no
rm
al
is
ed
by
be
gi
nn
in
g
pr
ic
e
pe
r
sh
ar
e
(C
R
SP
-
ab
so
lu
te
va
lu
e
of
pr
c)
.
E
Q
T
A
is
th
e
th
e
ra
ti
o
of
eq
ui
ty
(C
om
pu
st
at
B
an
k-
se
q)
to
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
(C
om
pu
st
at
B
an
k-
at
).
G
R
O
W
T
H
is
th
e
fo
ur
-y
ea
r
an
nu
al
gr
ow
th
ra
te
of
bo
ok
va
lu
e
of
eq
ui
ty
(C
om
pu
st
at
B
an
k-
se
q)
.
E
V
A
R
is
th
e
va
ria
nc
e
of
th
e
pa
st
fiv
e
ye
ar
s’
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
ch
an
ge
in
ea
rn
in
gs
(C
om
pu
st
at
B
an
k-
ep
sp
x)
.
dE
Q
S
is
a
du
m
m
y
va
ria
bl
e
ea
rn
in
gs
qu
al
ity
,w
hi
ch
eq
ua
ls
1
fo
r
ba
nk
-y
ea
r
w
it
h
ag
gr
eg
at
e
ea
rn
in
gs
qu
al
ity
gr
ea
te
r
th
an
th
e
m
ed
ia
n
ag
gr
eg
at
e
ea
rn
in
gs
qu
al
ity
fo
r
th
e
ye
ar
,
an
d
0
ot
he
rw
is
e.
T
A
is
th
e
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
.
dP
E
R
SI
ST
,
dP
R
E
D
IC
T
,
dA
B
A
C
C
,
an
d
dS
M
O
O
T
H
ar
e
co
m
pu
te
d
in
si
m
ila
r
m
an
ne
r
as
dE
Q
S.
Fo
r
th
e
ye
ar
ly
cr
os
s-
se
ct
io
na
l
re
gr
es
si
on
s,
th
e
re
po
rt
ed
co
effi
ci
en
t
on
ea
ch
va
ria
bl
e
is
th
e
m
ea
n
of
th
e
ti
m
e
se
rie
s
di
st
rib
ut
io
n
of
co
effi
ci
en
ts
fo
r
th
at
va
ria
bl
e.
T
he
re
po
rt
ed
t-
st
at
is
ti
c
fo
r
th
e
ti
m
e
se
rie
s
di
st
rib
ut
io
n
of
a
co
effi
ci
en
t
is
th
e
m
ea
n
co
effi
ci
en
t
di
vi
de
d
by
it
s
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n
an
d
m
ul
ti
pl
ie
d
by
th
e
sq
ua
re
ro
ot
of
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
cr
os
s
se
ct
io
ns
.
T
he
re
po
rt
ed
R
-s
qu
ar
e
fo
r
th
e
po
ol
ed
re
gr
es
si
on
s
is
th
e
ad
ju
st
ed
R
-s
qu
ar
e
w
hi
le
th
e
m
od
el
R
-s
qu
ar
e
fo
r
th
e
ye
ar
ly
re
gr
es
si
on
s
is
th
e
m
ea
n
of
th
e
ti
m
e
se
rie
s
di
st
rib
ut
io
n
of
R
-s
qu
ar
es
.
**
*,
**
,
*
in
di
ca
te
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
1%
,
5%
,
an
d
10
%
le
ve
ls
,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
126
Ta
bl
e
3.
14
:E
ar
ni
ng
s
Q
ua
lit
y
an
d
V
al
ue
R
el
ev
an
ce
of
Ea
rn
in
gs
-
C
ha
ng
e
R
eg
re
ss
io
ns
P
an
el
A
:
P
oo
le
d
Sa
m
pl
e
P
an
el
B
:
Ye
ar
ly
C
ro
ss
-S
ec
ti
on
al
R
eg
re
ss
io
ns
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
ch
gN
I
0.
00
5*
**
0.
00
3*
*
0.
00
4*
*
0.
00
4*
**
0.
00
2
0.
09
9*
0.
06
8
0.
07
3*
0.
07
1*
0.
06
5*
(3
.0
3)
(2
.3
2)
(2
.0
2)
(2
.8
9)
(1
.2
9)
(2
.0
9)
(1
.5
4)
(1
.8
6)
(1
.8
1)
(1
.8
3)
E
Q
T
A
×c
hg
N
I
0.
00
5
0.
00
1
0.
00
4
-0
.0
06
0.
00
7
0.
01
5
0.
09
4
0.
00
9
-0
.0
12
-0
.0
25
(0
.5
9)
(0
.1
5)
(0
.5
1)
(-
0.
67
)
(0
.8
3)
(0
.2
3)
(1
.2
8)
(0
.1
3)
(-
0.
16
)
(-
0.
44
)
T
A
×c
hg
N
I
0.
00
0*
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
-0
.0
00
0.
00
0
0.
00
0
-0
.0
00
0.
00
0
0.
00
1
-0
.0
00
(1
.8
4)
(0
.9
6)
(1
.2
2)
(-
0.
26
)
(1
.2
2)
(1
.3
3)
(-
0.
07
)
(0
.2
4)
(0
.4
1)
(-
0.
62
)
G
R
O
W
T
H
×c
hg
N
I
-0
.0
12
**
*
-0
.0
12
**
*
-0
.0
11
**
*
-0
.0
08
**
*
-0
.0
09
**
*
-0
.0
29
-0
.0
24
-0
.0
32
-0
.0
18
-0
.0
36
(-
4.
08
)
(-
4.
09
)
(-
3.
79
)
(-
3.
05
)
(-
3.
45
)
(-
0.
26
)
(-
0.
27
)
(-
0.
34
)
(-
0.
18
)
(-
0.
39
)
E
VA
R
×c
hg
N
I
-0
.0
00
**
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
00
*
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
00
*
-0
.0
00
*
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
00
*
(-
2.
08
)
(-
1.
60
)
(-
1.
01
)
(-
1.
88
)
(-
1.
53
)
(-
2.
11
)
(-
2.
09
)
(-
0.
35
)
(-
0.
62
)
(-
1.
92
)
dP
E
R
SI
ST
×c
hg
N
I
-0
.0
02
**
-0
.0
31
(-
2.
16
)
(-
1.
51
)
dP
R
E
D
IC
T
×c
hg
N
I
0.
00
2*
*
0.
00
3
(2
.1
6)
(0
.1
9)
dS
M
O
O
T
H
×c
hg
N
I
0.
00
2
0.
02
5
(1
.6
0)
(0
.8
7)
dA
B
A
C
C
×c
hg
N
I
0.
00
6*
**
0.
04
6*
*
(3
.4
4)
(2
.6
4)
dE
Q
S×
ch
gN
I
0.
00
1
0.
06
3*
**
(1
.5
0)
(
3.
51
)
in
te
rc
ep
t
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
04
-0
.0
05
-0
.0
05
0.
00
5
0.
00
5
0.
00
5
0.
00
3
0.
00
4
(-
0.
84
)
(-
0.
90
)
(-
0.
86
)
(-
0.
90
)
(-
0.
91
)
(0
.0
9)
(0
.0
8)
(0
.0
9)
(0
.0
5)
(0
.0
6)
R
2
0.
31
0.
31
0.
30
0.
31
0.
30
0.
08
0.
09
0.
09
0.
09
0.
10
N
36
01
36
01
36
01
36
01
36
01
36
01
36
01
36
01
36
01
36
01
T
he
ta
bl
e
pr
es
en
ts
th
e
es
ti
m
at
es
of
co
effi
ci
en
ts
(a
bo
ve
)
an
d
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
(b
el
ow
)
of
pr
ic
e-
le
ve
lr
eg
re
ss
io
ns
.
C
H
G
N
Ii
s
th
e
ch
an
ge
in
ne
t
in
co
m
e
(C
om
pu
st
at
B
an
k-
ep
sp
x)
no
rm
al
is
ed
by
be
gi
nn
in
g
pr
ic
e
pe
r
sh
ar
e
(C
R
SP
-
ab
so
lu
te
va
lu
e
of
pr
c)
.
E
Q
T
A
is
th
e
th
e
ra
ti
o
of
eq
ui
ty
to
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
.
C
H
G
P
R
C
is
th
e
on
e-
ye
ar
ch
an
ge
in
pr
ic
e
pe
r
sh
ar
e
no
rm
al
is
ed
by
be
gi
nn
in
g
pr
ic
e
pe
r
sh
ar
e.
E
Q
T
A
is
th
e
th
e
ra
ti
o
of
eq
ui
ty
(C
om
pu
st
at
B
an
k-
se
q)
to
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
(C
om
pu
st
at
B
an
k-
at
).
G
R
O
W
T
H
is
th
e
fo
ur
-y
ea
r
an
nu
al
gr
ow
th
ra
te
of
bo
ok
va
lu
e
of
eq
ui
ty
(C
om
pu
st
at
B
an
k-
se
q)
.
E
V
A
R
is
th
e
va
ria
nc
e
of
th
e
pa
st
fiv
e
ye
ar
s’
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
ch
an
ge
in
ea
rn
in
gs
(C
om
pu
st
at
B
an
k-
ep
sp
x)
.
dE
Q
S
is
a
du
m
m
y
va
ria
bl
e
ea
rn
in
gs
qu
al
ity
,
w
hi
ch
eq
ua
ls
1
fo
r
ba
nk
-y
ea
r
w
it
h
ag
gr
eg
at
e
ea
rn
in
gs
qu
al
ity
gr
ea
te
r
th
an
th
e
m
ed
ia
n
ag
gr
eg
at
e
ea
rn
in
gs
qu
al
ity
fo
r
th
e
ye
ar
,
an
d
0
ot
he
rw
is
e.
T
A
is
th
e
to
ta
l
as
se
ts
.
dP
E
R
SI
ST
,
dP
R
E
D
IC
T
,
dA
B
A
C
C
,
an
d
dS
M
O
O
T
H
ar
e
co
m
pu
te
d
in
si
m
ila
r
m
an
ne
r
as
dE
Q
S.
Fo
r
th
e
ye
ar
ly
cr
os
s-
se
ct
io
na
lr
eg
re
ss
io
ns
,
th
e
re
po
rt
ed
co
effi
ci
en
t
on
ea
ch
va
ria
bl
e
is
th
e
m
ea
n
of
th
e
ti
m
e
se
rie
s
di
st
rib
ut
io
n
of
co
effi
ci
en
ts
fo
r
th
at
va
ria
bl
e.
T
he
re
po
rt
ed
t-
st
at
is
ti
cs
fo
r
th
e
ti
m
e
se
rie
s
di
st
rib
ut
io
n
of
a
co
effi
ci
en
t
is
ob
ta
in
ed
as
th
e
m
ea
n
co
effi
ci
en
t
di
vi
de
d
by
it
s
st
an
da
rd
de
vi
at
io
n
an
d
m
ul
ti
pl
ie
d
by
th
e
sq
ua
re
ro
ot
of
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
cr
os
s
se
ct
io
ns
.
T
he
re
po
rt
ed
R
-s
qu
ar
e
fo
r
th
e
po
ol
ed
re
gr
es
si
on
s
is
th
e
ad
ju
st
ed
R
-s
qu
ar
e
w
hi
le
th
e
m
od
el
R
-s
qu
ar
e
fo
r
th
e
ye
ar
ly
re
gr
es
si
on
s
is
th
e
m
ea
n
of
th
e
ti
m
e
se
rie
s
di
st
rib
ut
io
n
of
R
-s
qu
ar
es
.
**
*,
**
,
*
in
di
ca
te
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
at
th
e
1%
,
5%
,
an
d
10
%
le
ve
ls
,
re
sp
ec
ti
ve
ly
.
127
3.7 Conclusion
A number of analytical studies suggest a negative relation between the quality and quant-
ity of information available to investors and the cost of equity. This chapter presents the
results of the investigation of the implication of bank earnings quality for bank cost of
equity. We first construct five accounting based measures of implied cost of equity. Tests
of validity suggest that these measures are adequate measures of bank cost of equity.
Our results suggest that each of our cost of equity measures is increasing in beta, the
primary risk proxy, thus allowing us to combine these measures into an average cost of
equity measure to reduce the impact of potential measurement error. In addition, we
also construct a composite earnings quality measure that includes four accounting based
measures of earnings quality: persistence, smoothing, predictability and the quality of
loan loss provisions.
Our results show a statistically negative relation between earnings quality, as captured
by our composite earnings quality proxy and bank cost of equity. However, we also find
that the relation between earnings quality and the cost of equity is not unidirectional
neither is it generally statistically significant across all dimensions of earnings that form
our composite earnings quality measure. While we report a negative and significant
relation between the cost of equity and predictability and the quality of loan loss provi-
sions, the relation between the cost of equity and smoothing is insignificantly negative
at all conventional levels. Contrary to expectation, this study also reports a positive and
significant relation between persistence of earnings and bank cost of equity.
We draw further conclusion on the relationship between earnings quality and cost of
equity by drawing indirect evidence from the role of earnings quality in market valuation
of banks and the value relevance of bank earnings. Again, consistent with expectation,
we find significant positive relation between our composite measure of earnings quality
and bank valuation. This positive relationship continues to exist even after controlling
for the endogeneity of earnings quality using three “innovative” instrumental variables
for bank earnings quality. However, our results also show that the relation between
individual earnings quality attributes and bank valuation is not unidirectional as we find a
significantly positive relation between earnings persistence (and earnings smoothing) and
bank valuation while earnings predictability (quality of loan loss provisions) is significantly
(insignificantly) negatively related to bank valuation.
Finally, our study also shows that stocks of banks with higher earnings quality enjoy
higher price-earnings multiples compared to similar banks with lower earnings quality.
Overall, the results presented in this study suggest that markets seem to assess and
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incorporate different dimensions of bank earnings quality in placing a price on bank
stock.
In view of the importance of earnings as a primary metric in the CAMEL criteria for
assessing bank soundness and its role in investment decisions, our findings have practical
implications for bank regulators, management, and the investing public as we present
evidence that banks with better earnings quality enjoy lower cost of equity, higher bank
valuation, and higher price-earnings multiple. To this end, the argument by regulatory
authorities suggesting a negative relation between regulatory requirements (e.g. SOX
and FDCIA) and the cost of capital seems supported by bank data. However, we also
caution that not all desirable attributes of earnings exhibit the desired negative relation
with the cost of equity capital.
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4 Earnings Quality and Bank
Dividends
Abstract
We use our new country-specific index of bank earnings quality to exam-
ine the relation between earnings quality and bank dividends in 34 countries
around the world. Consistent with our first hypothesis, we find that banks in
countries with high earnings quality pay a greater proportion of their earnings,
revenue, equity, assets, and cash flows in dividends. This result is robust to a
number of institutional and bank-specific variables, and the potential endo-
geneity of earnings quality. In addition, while banks around the world seem to
follow the traditional dividend smoothing policy, consistent with our second
hypothesis, our result shows that the dividend-earnings link is stronger for
banks in countries with high earnings quality. This finding supports the idea
that earnings of banks in these countries are more sustainable and managers
are quicker in incorporating them into dividends.
4.1 Introduction
The information content hypothesis proposes that dividends convey information about
firms’ earnings prospects. Miller and Modigliani (1961, 430) state that ‘where a firm has
adopted a policy of dividend stabilisation with a long established and generally appreci-
ated “target payout ratio,” investors are likely (and have a good reason) to interpret a
change in dividend rate as a change in management’s view of future prospects for the
firm.’ Empirical studies, mainly in the US, provide contradictory evidence on the relation
between dividends and current/future earnings. The idea of a positive relation between
dividend changes and subsequent earnings changes receives support, however weak, from
Watts (1973), Gonedes (1978), and Penman (1983). However, the empirical evidence by
Benartzi et al. (1997) and Grullon et al. (2002), among others, casts doubt on the ability
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of dividends to signal information about future earnings changes. Contrary to the predic-
tion of the cash flow signalling hypothesis, both studies find that earnings increases are
associated with dividend decreases in the previous two years before dividend decreases.
However, stylised empirical evidence suggests that dividend decisions depend on man-
agement’s assessment of the firm’s long-run sustainable earnings and are, therefore, more
likely to be associated with earnings quality. For example, Lintner’s (1956) classic work
suggests that managers are reluctant to increase dividends unless they believe that the
new level of dividends is sustainable. An implication of this finding that has received little
attention in the literature is that the relation between management’s dividend policy, in-
cluding changes in the level of dividends, depends on the quality of earnings.
In view of the weak evidence on the suggested link between dividend changes and
earnings changes, a limited number of recent studies explore a potential link between
dividends and various indicators of earnings quality. However, these studies are restricted
to non-financial firms in the US. In addition, the studies draw conclusions from very
restrictive and somewhat indirect indicators of earnings quality. For example, Skinner
and Soltes (2011) find support for the idea that the relation between current earnings
and future earnings is stronger for dividend paying firms than non-paying firms. Thus,
their study only speaks to the differential persistence of earnings between dividend and
non-dividend paying firms. In addition, while Caskey and Hanlon (2011) link dividends to
earnings quality, their sample is restricted to US non-financial firms accused of committing
accounting fraud, an external and restrictive indicator of earnings quality. In view of the
multi-dimensional nature of the earnings quality construct, and the known possibility
that different dimensions of earnings quality may result in different consequences, (see,
for example, Dechow et al., 2010), these studies leave a gap in the literature.
Drawing motivation from accounting and banking literature on earnings management,
we first construct a country-specific index of bank earnings quality that mirrors the
country-specific earnings management measures by Leuz et al. (2003) and Bhattacharya
et al. (2003).1 Our composite earnings management index consists of individual ele-
ments that capture different dimensions of bank earnings quality: loss avoidance, income
smoothing, and magnitude of accruals. We show that our aggregate earnings manage-
ment index exhibits substantially high and correctly signed correlation with institutional
factors and measures of transparency and opacity that literature suggests should correlate
with earnings management. In the second part of the study, we use our validated index
1We use earnings management and earnings quality interchangeably in this paper. Therefore, low
earnings management translates as high earnings quality.
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to investigate two implications of earnings quality for bank dividend payout, measured in
relation to various bank characteristics.
We hypothesise that banks in countries characterised by high (low) level of earnings
quality (earnings management) pay higher dividends than banks in countries with low
(high) level of earnings quality (earnings management). Using the Lintner (1956) and
Fama and Babiak (1968) partial adjustment models, modified to include our measure
of earnings quality, we provide further evidence on the relation between dividends and
earnings quality by investigating the idea that the dividend-earnings relation is stronger for
banks in countries characterised by high earnings quality compared to banks in countries
with low earnings quality.
The findings reported in this chapter contribute to various strands of literature in
many ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that measures
various dimensions of bank earnings quality to generate a composite country-specific
earnings management score. While indexes of country-specific accounting quality exist
in the literature, many of these indexes incorporate only the expected practices and do
not measure actual earnings management behaviour of managers. However, while some
country-specific earnings management indexes (e.g. Leuz et al., 2003; Bhattacharya et al.,
2003) measure actual earnings management behaviour of managers, these indexes are
developed using non-banking data and, as our results suggest, may not map completely
with indexes generated from banking data. This may result because of the differences in
regulatory environment of banks in different countries that may exert positive or negative
influences on bank earnings management. Thus, our index complements bank regulatory
database developed by Barth et al. (2001; 2008) and could be used to investigate the link
between bank earnings quality and other important banking issues, such as cross-country
variation in bank regulations, compensation policies, the cost of equity, valuation, bank
ownership, capital investment efficiency, and bank governance, which are outside the
scope of this study.
Our study also contributes to the extant literature in accounting and corporate finance
exploring the implications of cross-country variation in institutional factors. For example,
studies link cross-country differences in information asymmetry and agency problems
to variation in dividend payout (La Porta et al., 2000) as well as market reactions to
dividend changes and earnings changes (Dewenter and Warther, 1998). In addition,
extant literature suggests a positive link between legal protection of minority shareholders
and development of stock markets (La Porta et al., 1998), higher valuation (La Porta
et al., 2002; Caprio et al., 2007), more active market for mergers and acquisition (Rossi
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and Volpin, 2004) and lower earnings management (Leuz et al., 2003; Shen and Chih,
2005). Our study suggests that cross-country differences in earnings quality play a role
in bank dividend payout and extends the influence of earnings quality beyond the cost
of equity (Bhattacharya et al., 2003), capital investment efficiency (Biddle and Hilary,
2006), and firm valuation (Gaio and Raposo, 2011). To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first cross-country study on the implications of bank earnings quality.
This chapter presents two key results relating to the objectives of the study. First,
consistent with our hypothesis, after controlling for potential institutional influences and
economic wide factors, such as legal system and investor protection, we find that better
earnings quality is significantly and positively associated with bank dividend payout. This
result is robust to different definitions of dividend payout and subsamples of the study.
We further address the potential endogeneity bias inherent in the relation between bank
dividends and earnings quality using two-stage least square (2SLS) method. Specifically,
we use the rating on international accounting and auditing trends produced by the Center
for International Financial Analysis and Research and a measure of market share of the
Big 4 auditing firms (Francis and Wang, 2008) as instrumental variables for earnings
quality. Our results support the primary finding of a positive relation between earnings
quality and dividend payout, even after taking account of the possibility that earnings
quality is endogenous.
Our second core finding supports the idea that the relation between bank dividends and
earnings depends on the quality of earnings. Using the aggregate earnings quality index
constructed in the first part of the study, we classify countries into two groups according
to their earnings quality status relative to the median country earnings management.
Using different specifications of the partial adjustment model (Lintner, 1956; Fama and
Babiak, 1968) that incorporate interaction terms between earnings quality and dividend
(and earnings) variables, we find evidence in support of the idea that earnings of banks
in high earning quality countries (HEQCs) exhibit greater significant relation with lagged
dividends (current earnings) variable. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis
that earnings of banks in HEQCs are more sustainable than earnings of banks in LEQCs,
or that managers in the HEQCs are quicker in incorporating them into dividends.
While our results are important in better understanding the age-old question on the
determinants of firms’ dividend policy, it speaks to the more recent issue relating to
the consequences of earnings quality.2 In addition, it provides empirical support for the
2 See Dechow et al. (2010) for a comprehensive review of the determinants and consequences of
earnings quality.
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suggestion by professionals, investors, and regulatory authorities on the governance role
of dividends in mitigating problems associated with poor earnings quality. For example,
Richard Breeden, the Worldcom’s court appointed monitor states in the 2003 report on
the corporate crisis that engulfed the company that “dividends are another method of
gauging the reality of reported earnings. The ability to pay dividends is dependent on the
availability of cash, and significant difference between the level of reported earnings and
cash available for dividends would eventually be a red flag for potential problems.” Thus,
Breeden seems to suggest that strong relation between dividends and earnings quality.
Our cross-country study suggests that the link between dividends and earnings quality is
strongly supported by banking data.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 4.2, we discuss and present
the main hypotheses of the study. Section 4.3 discusses the methodology adopted in the
study, including the construction of earnings management index, data sources, sample
construction, and definitions of research variables. Section 4.4 discusses the main empir-
ical tests and results of the study while Section 4.5 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Relevant Research and Development of Hypotheses
A large volume of empirical studies investigates the information content of dividends in
which managers use their dividend decisions to signal the future prospects of their firms.
These studies rely on Miller and Modigliani (1961), who link the observed market reac-
tions to dividend change announcements to the information contained in such dividends.
Building on Miller and Modigliani (1961), a number of theoretical (signalling) models
suggest specific dividend signals. The two leading candidates are cash flow changes and
changes in investment policy. For example, Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock
(1985) present different models supporting the idea that markets react favourably (unfa-
vourably) to dividend increase (decrease) announcements because such announcements
convey information about future cash flows. Asquith and Mullins Jr (1983) and Healy
and Palepu (1988) find that significantly positive (negative) excess returns follow dividend
increases (decreases). However, Benartzi et al. (1997) and Grullon et al. (2002) find no
support for a positive relation between dividend changes and future earnings changes.
Their results show that contrary to the prediction of the cash flow signalling hypothesis
earnings increases do not follow dividend increases. Instead, dividend decreasing firms
experience earnings increases in the two years following dividend decreases.
The weak evidence regarding the relation between dividend changes and earnings
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changes is, however, not conclusive evidence against the signalling hypothesis. More
recently, academics suggest new ways through which dividends may signal information
about the quality of firms. In this regard, Grullon et al. (2002) suggest that dividend
increasing firms experience subsequent reduction in profitability (and risk) because such
firms are those in the maturity stage of their life cycle and are characterised by diminish-
ing investment opportunity set. They find that firms increasing (decreasing) dividends
experience reductions (increases) in market, size, and book to market betas consistent
with the idea that dividends signal maturity of firms and the resulting change in their risk
profile. The authors conclude that dividend increase (decrease) signal a significant de-
cline (increase) in systematic risk of firms. Thus, while dividends may not signal changes
in cash flows, Grullon et al. (2002) suggest that changes in dividends relate to changes
in the riskiness and variability of cash flows.3
An evolving strand in the accounting literature seeks to link the quality of financial
reporting to dividends. The study by Mikhail et al. (2003) appears to be the first but in-
direct evidence in this regard. The authors examine whether market reactions to dividend
changes are associated with earnings quality, which they define as the extent to which
past earnings are associated with future cash flows. They argue that while earnings and
dividends are informative of future cash flows, dividend changes are a substitute source
of information regarding future cash flows when earnings quality is low but relatively
less informative when earnings quality is high. Thus, their study suggests that dividend
changes are a credible proxy for earnings quality for firms with poor earnings quality.
Consistent with analytical evidence predicting a negative relation between reactions to
new information and the precision of previously released information, they document a
negative relation between market reactions to dividend increases and earnings quality.
However, they find no support for the subsample of dividend decreases. It is difficult to
reconcile why dividend increases serve proxy for earnings quality while dividend decreases
fail to perform such a role. In addition, as noted by Nissim (2003), their study fails to
consider the multi-dimensional nature of the earnings quality construct. We argue that
their market reactions study provides only necessary but insufficient evidence on the link
between dividends and earnings quality, as it draws conclusion only from the demand side
of the question (market reactions) and not the supply side (what determines changes in
dividends).
Chen et al. (2007), provides further evidence on the role of financial accounting qual-
3Given that variability of cash flows is an instrument of earnings quality (Francis et al., 2004), even
though not specifically stated by the authors, their study provides an indirect support for the link
between dividends and earnings quality
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ity around dividend change announcement. Using a modified Fama-French three-factor
model that includes an accruals quality based information risk factor, the authors find
evidence of market pricing of information risk around dividend change announcements.
They find that dividend initiations (increases) are associated with a significant decrease
(increase) in the pricing of information. In addition, consistent with Grullon et al. (2002),
they find that dividend changes exhibit significant association with changes in the Fama
and French systematic risk factors. However, Core et al. (2008) question the idea that
accruals quality is a priced risk factor, the basic assumption of the study by Chen et al.
(2007) that draws motivation from Francis et al. (2005).
Hanlon et al. (2007), Caskey and Hanlon (2011), and Skinner and Soltes (2011) provide
some direct evidence on the relation between dividends and earnings quality. Hanlon et al.
(2007) examine whether current returns reflect more information about future earnings
for dividend paying firms versus non-paying firms.4 They find evidence consistent with
the fact that dividend-paying firms have significantly higher earnings response coefficients
than non-dividend paying firms. They conclude that dividends play a signalling role other
than serving as proxy for profitability. Caskey and Hanlon (2011) look at the relation
between firms’ dividend policy and earnings quality using an external indicator of earnings
quality - firms accused of accounting fraud. They find that, relative to a matched group
of firms not accused of accounting fraud, fraud-firms are less likely to pay dividends
immediately prior to the alleged fraud years and less likely to increase dividends during
the fraud period. In addition, they find that the dividend-earnings relation is weaker for
fraud-firms relative to the non-fraud firms during the fraud period. They conclude that
dividends signal information about earnings quality of firms.
Skinner and Soltes (2011) explore a number of stylised facts about the relation between
dividends and earnings and the behaviour of managers towards dividend changes. They
argue that the ‘‘persistence parameter’’ from Miller and Rock (1985) suggests that di-
vidends should provide information about the extent to which current period changes in
reported earnings are permanent. Thus, managers are motivated to increase dividends if
they consider increases in earnings to be permanent (persistent or sustainable). Moreover,
they argue that because management exhibit reluctance to cut dividends and are conser-
vative with regard to increasing dividends, management’s assessments of the sustainability
of earnings (an attribute of earnings) should play a role in dividend decisions. Finally,
combining ideas from the signalling theory and Lintner’s (1956) observation of managers’
inertia to reduce dividends, the authors argue that while income-increasing earnings ma-
4Thus, these authors relate value relevance attribute of earnings to dividends.
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nipulation is attractive to managers, such a policy is potentially more costly as managers
would later have to cut dividends, resulting in negative market reactions and loss of share-
holder value at a future date. Consistent with this argument and the idea that dividends
provide information about the quality of reported earnings, they find that the relation
between current earnings and future earnings is stronger for dividend-paying firms. How-
ever, Dechow and Schrand (2004) note that while persistence is a desirable attribute of
earnings quality, it fails to capture enough dimensions of this multi-dimensional construct.
They argue that a firm that experiences a transitory shock to earnings would have low
earnings persistence but could still have earnings that accurately reflect the company’s
current operating performance.
Apart from the limitations of the individual studies discussed above, at least two
additional common denominators make the results that they present restrictive. First,
because these studies draw evidence from the US, the question remains whether earnings
quality plays a role in dividend policy around the world. Second, as usual in finance
studies, none of the studies considers whether earnings quality plays a role in banks
dividend decision, especially given the fact that regulatory and supervisory environment
of banks may subsume any potential role that earnings quality may play in dividend
decision. We examine whether earnings quality explains the variation in the magnitude
of dividend payments (rather than the decision to pay) by banks in 34 countries across
the world. Specifically, we test the following hypothesis, stated in its alternative form:
H1: Banks in countries with high earnings quality (low earnings management) pay
higher dividends than banks in countries with low earnings quality (high earnings man-
agement)
While the various studies discussed above support the direction of the relation between
earnings quality and magnitude of dividends payments, at least, three additional argu-
ments support this positive relationship. First, in perfect financial markets where there
is no agency problem, managers should return excess capital requirements to the capital
suppliers, through dividend payments or similar other payout channel like share repur-
chase. However, contrary to expectation, Blanchard et al. (1994) find that managers
tend to invest in unrelated projects that typically fail. Biddle and Hilary (2006) argue
that if higher quality accounting permitted perfect monitoring, then no agency problem
would arise. We argue that such perfect monitoring should reveal better mapping of
dividends and earnings. Therefore, while earnings and dividends may exhibit weak and
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perhaps negative relation because of agency problem, a reduction in agency problem
through higher earnings quality should mitigate the expropriation of cash culminating
in higher dividends. Secondly, the high regulation of banks also supports the predicted
positive relation between the magnitude of dividends and earnings quality. We argue that
banks in countries with high level of earnings management (low earnings quality) should
face higher regulatory and supervisory constraints, ceteris paribus. The high regulation
and supervision requirements constrain investment opportunity set of banks and reduce
their financial flexibility resulting in lower dividends. Finally, the positive relation between
earnings quality and ratio of cash flows to earnings suggests a positive relation between
earnings quality and dividends as, given the same level of earnings, a higher earnings
quality suggests lower accruals and higher cash flows, from which dividends are paid. It
is for this reason that academics and professionals, such as Breeden (2003) and Malkiel
(2003), consider dividends as proxy for earnings quality.5
Lintner (1956) provides evidence supporting a link between dividends and current earn-
ings. Fama and Babiak (1968) extend the relation to include lagged earnings. In line
with these studies, Sibley and Hobson (1979) indicate that the partial adjustment model
explains a higher variation of bank dividend changes than do several other forecasting
models. While we are not aware of any cross-country study that uses this model, we are
aware of its use outside the US (e.g. Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2003) and, in particular, in the
analysis of bank dividend behaviour (e.g. Morgan and Saint-Pierre, 1978; Foerster and
Sapp, 2006). Therefore, we assume that the Lintner (1956) and Fama and Babiak (1968)
models are adequate characterisations of bank dividend behaviour. Because manipula-
tion of earnings is more likely in countries characterised by low earnings quality, we argue
that, if earnings quality plays a role in bank dividend policy, there should be a significant
difference in the dividend-earnings link between banks operating in high earnings quality
countries and banks operating in low earnings quality countries. Specifically, earnings of
banks operating in countries with high earnings quality should exhibit a stronger rela-
tion with dividends as management private knowledge and assessment about their firm’s
earnings quality influence their dividend decision, especially the decision to change the
level of dividends. This suggests our second hypothesis stated in its alternative form:
H2: The relation between dividends and earnings (dividend-earnings link) is stronger
5We acknowledge that different dimensions of earnings quality may exhibit different relations with
the variable of interest (see, for example, Dechow et al., 2010). For example, a more conservative
accounting that is associated with greater earnings quality and lower earnings may exhibit a negative
relation with dividends payout.
138
for banks in countries with high earnings quality than for banks in countries with low
earnings quality.
4.3 Methodology
4.3.1 Earnings Quality and Dividend Link: Model Specification
Hypothesis 1 (H1) suggests a link between bank dividend payout and earnings quality.
We provide evidence on this link using the following baseline model:
DIVj = α0+α1AEQ j+α2LAWj+α3PROTECTj+α4LnGDPj+α5SIZE j+ ε j (4.3.1)
where j is the country subscript, DIV is dividend payout, measured as the average
dividend payout over the period of the study; AEQ is the aggregate earnings quality score.
LAW and PROTECT are the control variables for legal system and investor protection,
respectively. LnGDP and SIZE are control variables for economic wide factors that may
explain cross-country variation in dividend payout. We provide further justifications for
the inclusion and measurement of these variables in Section 4.3.4 below.
4.3.2 Dividend-Earnings Relation: Model Specifications
We use the Lintner (1956) and Fama-Babiak (1968) models to test the hypothesis (H2)
that banks operating in high earnings quality countries (HEQCs) have a stronger dividend-
earnings relation than banks operating in low earnings quality countries (LEQCs).
The Lintner model which is widely adopted in studying the relation between dividends
and earnings (e.g. Watts, 1973; Choe, 1990; Brav et al., 2005) characterises dividend
policy by a target payout ratio and the percentage adjustment to that target rate in
each period. It builds on the empirical observation that a firm’s desired current period
dividends,D∗t , is equal to the target payout ratio, k, times the current earnings (Et).
That is, D∗t = kEt . In addition, the model assumes that current period dividends partially
adjust to the desired payout level. Although firms have a long-run payout ratio, if firms are
conservative in their dividend decisions, they make only a partial adjustment to dividends
as earnings increase. In summary, Lintner (1956) suggests that the change in dividends
for firm i in year t (4Di,t) is proportional to the difference between target dividends (D∗i,t)
and the previous period dividends (Di,t−1). That is,
4Di,t = Di,t −Di,t−1 = a+ ckE i,t − cDi,t−1+ εi,t (4.3.2)
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where i and t are the bank and time subscripts, respectively. D is the dividends per
share, E is the earnings per share, k is the payout ratio, and c is the adjustment factor.
Following the usual empirical method, we first estimate the empirical version of Model
4.3.2
4Di,t = α0+α1E i,t +α2Di,t−1+ εi,t (4.3.3)
The partial adjustment model predicts a positive and negative coefficient on the earn-
ings and dividend variables, respectively. Foerster and Sapp (2006) note that α2, the
‘speed of adjustment,’ will be more negative if the changes in current earnings are, by
management’s assessment, a good reflection of the firm’s long-run sustainable earnings
or managers more rapidly incorporate them into dividends. Therefore, we expect that
banks operating in countries with better earnings quality will have more negative α2 than
banks operating in countries with low quality of earnings.
Therefore, to test the hypothesis that banks in countries with higher earnings quality
exhibit a stronger dividend-earnings relation we modify Model 4.3.3 by including various
interaction effects. Specifically, we test the following model:6
4Di,t = α0+α1EPSi,t +α2Di,t−1+α3EQ j+α4EPSi,t ×EQ j+α5Di,t−1×EQ j+ εi,t (4.3.4)
where EQ j is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the aggregate earnings
management score for the country in which the bank is incorporated is less than the
median aggregate earnings management score and 0, otherwise. The interaction variables,
EPSi,t ×EQ j and Di,t−1×EQ j, capture the interaction effect of earnings quality on the
relation between dividend changes and earnings and the relation between dividend changes
and lagged dividends, respectively. Hypothesis 2 predicts a significant positive value for
α4, consistent with the idea that earnings of banks in HEQCs have a stronger positive
relation with dividend changes than earnings of banks in LEQCs. In addition, we expect
a significant and negative coefficient for α5, consistent with the idea that earnings in
HEQCs better reflect earnings quality and are more rapidly incorporated into dividends.
Fama and Babiak (1968) suggest modifications to the original Lintner’s partial ad-
justment model. They provide simulation results supporting a model that excludes the
intercept term and includes the lagged value of earnings variable (EPSi,t−1) as follows:
6Caskey and Hanlon (2005) adopt a similar model to study the differences in the earnings-dividend link
between US firms alleged to have committed fraud, an external indicator of earnings quality, and a
matched sample of non-fraud companies
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4Di,t = α1EPSi,t +α2EPSi,t−1+α3Di,t−1+ εi,t (4.3.5)
In line with these modifications, we also test the following alternative partial adjustment
model that includes interaction terms:
4Di,t = α0+α1EPSi,t +α2EPSi,t−1+α3Di,t−1+α4EQ j+α5EPSi,t ×EQ j
+α6EPSi,t−1×EQ j+α7Di,t−1×EQ j+ εi,t
(4.3.6)
All variables are as defined earlier. As with Equation 4.3.4, Equation 4.3.6 tests the
differential effect of earnings quality on the dividend-earnings relation for banks in HEQCs
compared to banks in LEQCs. Thus, we include an intercept term in the specification.
In line with Hypothesis 2, we expect a significant positive coefficients for α5 and α6,
consistent with the idea of a stronger dividend-earnings relation for banks in HEQCs than
for banks in LEQCs. In addition, we also expect a significant and negative coefficient
for α7, consistent with the idea that earnings in HEQCs are better reflection of earnings
quality and are more rapidly incorporated into dividends. Thus, in Equations 4.3.4 and
4.3.6, we allow the coefficients on the lagged dividends and earnings variables to vary
depending on whether banks belong in countries with high earnings quality or countries
with low earnings quality. We estimate the equations over the pooled sample of banks and
provide robustness checks using annual cross-sectional regressions (Fama and MacBeth,
1973).
4.3.3 An Earnings Quality Index
We first describe the measures of earnings quality dimensions used in constructing our
country-specific index. While our formal conceptualisation of aggregate earnings quality
index and its components draw largely from the literature on industrial firms, we address
the differences in accounting between banks and industrial firms in operationalising the
elements of this construct. Therefore, our index of country-specific earnings quality is
bank-specific and may not be adequate outside the banking industry. Consistent with the
objective of this study, our earnings quality index attempts to indicate relative ranking
of countries that mirrors the widespread perception of country ranking on transparency
and opacity.
Following Bhattacharya et al. (2003) and Leuz et al. (2003), we consider three di-
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mensions of country-specific earnings quality measures that capture management’s dis-
cretions. In particular, we consider loss avoidance, income smoothing, and magnitude of
accruals. These measures reflect different dimensions along which insiders can exercise
their discretion to manage reported earnings. As Leuz et al. (2003) argue, these measures
capture outcomes of insiders’ earnings management activities thus avoiding the problem
of drawing empirical evidence based on stated accounting standards, which could be
circumvented by insiders.
4.3.3.1 Loss Avoidance
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge et al. (1999) provide evidence supporting
the proposition that US firms engage in earnings management through benchmark beating
- avoiding loss and/or just beating prior year’s earnings. According to Bhattacharya et al.
(2003), such loss avoidance behaviour obscures the mapping of earnings and economic
performance, resulting in less transparent earnings. Evidence also suggests that the high
regulation of banks may not fully mitigate the incidence of earnings management through
loss avoidance. For example, Beatty et al. (2002) and Altamuro and Beatty (2010) argue
that bank managers have incentives to manage earnings through benchmark beating.
They find that relative to private banks, public banks are more likely to use loan loss
provisions (and realised securities gains and losses) to eliminate small earnings decreases.
Even though the incidence of benchmark beating seems to have reduced in the US after
the introduction of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA),
the study by Altamuro and Beatty (2010) fails to rule out the existence of benchmark
beating. In addition, a cross-country study by Shen and Chih (2005), which employs
thresholds of zero earnings and zero earnings change, examines whether evidence of
earnings management exists across 48 countries. They find that banks in more than two-
third of the 48 countries exhibit earnings management through loss avoidance. Thus,
benchmark beating by banking and non-banking firms appears to be an international
phenomenon.
Following Bhattacharya et al. (2003) and Biddle and Hilary (2006), we measure loss
avoidance (LOSS) as the number of banks with small positive earnings minus the number
banks with small negative earnings d ivided by the sum of the two. Burgstahler and Dichev
(1997) suggest a cut-off range of [0.00, 0.01] and [-0.01, 0.00] for small positive earnings
and small negative earnings, respectively (see, also, Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Leuz et al.,
2003). However, applying this cut-off to our bank data results in the classification of
about 46% of our data as either small positive earnings or small negative earnings, which
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is inconsistent with the population that we intend to capture. Therefore, we follow
Kanagaretham et al. (2010) and use a cut-off of 0.2% at each end of the distribution.
Thus, we define small positive earnings as earnings after tax normalised by total assets
in the range [0.000, 0.002] and small negative earnings as earnings after tax normalised
by total assets in the range of [-0.002, 0.000]. Only 14% of our sampled banks meet
this criterion. A higher value of LOSS indicates a higher incidence of loss avoidance,
consistent with higher level of earnings management and lower earnings quality.
4.3.3.2 Income Smoothing
Income smoothing refers to the deliberate reduction in the fluctuation of earnings with
respect to some normal levels. Insiders can use accounting discretion to conceal economic
shocks to operating cash flows by accelerating the reporting of future revenues or delaying
the reporting of current cost to obscure poor current performance. Conversely, insiders
may misreport strong current performance to create reserves for the future. In either
case, accounting accruals provide a “handy tool” to hide cash flow shock.
While evidence of income smoothing is pervasive in the accounting literature, the argu-
ment is whether such income smoothing behaviour improves the information content of
earnings by revealing innate fundamentals or whether it obscures these fundamentals and
thus reduces the informational quality of earnings. For example, Sankar and Subraman-
yam (2001) and Arya et al. (2003) argue that income smoothing reveals information
about the fundamental earnings process of a firm. On the other hand, Lang et al. (2003)
argue that income smoothing distorts information and results in less transparent earnings
(see, also, Leuz et al., 2003).
The controversy surrounding the desirability or otherwise of income smoothing also res-
onates in the banking literature. Some authors argue that the increase in risk during good
economic times makes it a desirable policy for banks to increase loan loss reserves in good
economic times to mitigate credit crunches in bad times (see, for example, Borio et al.,
2001). They argue that to the extent that such provisioning leads to smoother earnings,
income smoothing is desirable as it increases the informational quality of earnings by
signalling the risk attached to a bank’s loan portfolio. However, in the absence of any
empirical evidence, it is difficult to associate any observed income smoothing behaviour to
management’s assessment of current and future risk profile of the loan portfolios as this
may, in fact, reflect an attempt by management to obscure their risk-taking behaviour
(see, Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005). Overall, Bushman and
Williams (2009) show that earnings smoothing by banks leads to less informative earnings
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and produces accounting information that appears to be less effective in facilitating the
ability of outside investors and regulators to monitor and discipline bank risk-taking. This
violates the decision usefulness of accounting information and runs contrary to a stated
objective of International Financial Reporting Standards.
Many studies relating to non-financial firms use the correlation between (change in)
accruals and (change in) operating cash flow as a measure of income smoothing behaviour
of firms. However, measuring accruals for banks is an empirical challenge in view of the
largely unavailable bank data required to estimate extant accrual models. We measure
accruals (ACC) using the Yasuda et al.’s (2004) bank-specific accrual model:
ACCi,t = EXPLi,t +GLSSi,t +NCREVi,t −NCEXi,t (4.3.7)
where i and t are the bank and time subscripts, respectively. EXPL are extraordinary
profits and losses, GLSS are gains and losses on sales of securities, NCREV are non-cash
revenues and NCEX are non-cash expenses. We measure NCEX as the addition of loan
loss provisions, gross charge-off, and other operating expenses and set NCREV to zero for
all bank-year observations due to their non-availability in the BankScope database that
we use. We calculate operating cash flows (OCF) as the difference between operating
income and ACC. We obtain income smoothing (SMOOTH) as the spearman correlation
between change in operating cash flows and change in accruals, both normalised by
beginning total assets. We use the pooled sample of banks in each country over the period
of the study. While a negative correlation between accruals and operating cash flows is
a natural consequence of the accrual accounting process, a more negative correlation
indicates a greater likelihood that managers engage in earnings management through
income smoothing.
4.3.3.3 Magnitude of Accruals - Loan Loss Provisions
While, in principle, the objective of loan loss provisions is to adjust loan loss reserves to
reflect expected future losses on loan portfolios, evidence exists that bank management
also have incentives to use and seem to use loan loss provisions to manage earnings.
Wahlen (1994) shows that managers increase discretionary loan loss provisions when they
expect an increase in future cash flows. Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) argue that the
moral hazard problem associated with the incentive for banks to shift-risk also suggests
greater incentive for management to hide their risk shifting through their discretionary
loan loss provisioning. Thus, loan loss provisions reflect both an element of management’s
judgment with respect to the level of bad loans (non-discretionary) and a discretionary
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element that management may use as a smoothing vehicle. Similar in spirit with Beatty
et al. (2002) and Cornett et al. (2009), we use the pooled set of banks in each country
and estimate the following non-discretionary loan loss provisions model.
LLPi,t = α0+α1EBTPi,t +α2CHGLOANi,t +α3LOANi,t +α4LLRi,t
+α5LCOi,t +α6NPLi,t +α7
2006
∑
t=1996
YEARt + εi,t (4.3.8)
where i and t are the bank and time subscripts, respectively. LLP is the loan loss
provisions; LOAN (CHGLOAN) is the (change in) total loans; LLR is the loan loss allow-
ance; EBTP is the earnings before tax and loan loss provisions; LCO is the net charge-off
and NPL is the non-performing loans. We include loan loss reserves to control for non-
discretionary components of LLP. We scale all variables by the beginning period total
assets. We measure discretional accruals (ABSLLP) as the country median of the abso-
lute value of the error term of the non-discretionary LLP model in Equation 4.3.8 above.
We use the absolute value of accruals to capture the effect of both income increasing
and income decreasing earnings management through accruals. The higher the value of
ABSLLP the higher the extent of earnings management in a country.
As loan loss provisioning represents only one, though substantially important, vehicle
for bank earnings management through accruals, we also measure accruals using the
country median of the absolute value of accruals using Equation 4.3.7 above. We argue
that a high level of accruals is predictive of high earnings management (low earnings
quality) and suggestive of earnings that are more likely to reverse, resulting in future
restatement.7 We call this variable MACC. Higher values of MACC indicate higher
values of total accruals and lower earnings quality.
4.3.3.4 Overall Earnings Management Measure
Because we are unsure which dimension of earnings management is (more) significant in
capturing the quality of earnings, to mitigate the potential measurement error associated
with our individual measures, we aggregate the four earnings management measures into
a summary score. We construct the summary measure as the average of the individual
ranks on LOSS, SMOOTH, ABSLLP, and MACC. That is, we rank all the values of LOSS
of all countries with ranks taking a value between 1 and 34. We do the same for values of
7Our index produces a similar ranking when we used growth in accruals rather than the level of accruals.
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SMOOTH, ABSLLP, and MACC.8 The country-specific index of earnings management is
the sum of the ranks for country i divided by 4. Higher ranks on individual measures and
resulting summary scores indicate higher level of earnings management and lower earnings
quality. Formally, aggregate earnings management for country j (AEM j) is given by:
AEM j = [Rank(MACC j)+Rank(LOSS j)+Rank(SMOOTH j)+Rank(ABSLLPj)]/4 (4.3.9)
Thus, we define aggregate earnings quality (AEQ) as the negative of aggregate earnings
management score (AEM).
4.3.4 Definitions of Other Variables
4.3.4.1 Dividend Payout
Traditionally, a firm’s dividend payout represents the proportion of current earnings paid
out in dividends. However, since we are dealing with accounting data of banks in countries
with different accounting practices and standards, to mitigate the potential bias in the
measurement of earnings that may result from differences in accounting, we consider
alternative definitions of dividend payout. We consider two measures of dividend payout
(dividend-to-earnings ratio - DTE and dividend-to-cash-flow ratio - DTCF) from La Porta
et al. (2000). These authors argue in favour of the use of dividend-to-cash-flow measure
since it has a natural economic meaning being the ratio of cash distributed to cash
generated during a given period. The use of dividend-to-earnings and dividend-to-cash-
flow ratios suggests that, as expected, bank managers rationally consider both the level of
current earnings and cash flows in setting the dividend policy. However, the dividend-to-
cash-flow measure also presents a challenge for cross-country studies as it depends on a
country’s accounting conventions that may affect the determination of accruals and cash
flows, thus making cross-country comparison less precise. In addition, managers may
easily manipulate earnings and cash flows and diversion of resources may occur before
reporting earnings or cash flows. If this is the case, these two ratios may overestimate
the share of true earnings or cash flows paid out as dividends. Because of this, we also
present results based on three additional measures of dividend payout.
The use of dividend-to-equity ratio is intuitively appealing and underlines the import-
ance of equity capital in banking. Although it does not lend itself to easy interpretation,
8Since more negative SMOOTH variable indicates more smoothing, in ranking SMOOTH, we take the
negative values such that high values of SMOOTH indicate higher earnings management.
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we use revenue as a deflator of dividends as revenue is more difficult to manipulate
through accounting practices. We define revenue as the sum of a bank’s interest and
dividend income. The use of dividend-to-asset ratio is motivated by Allen and Michaely
(2003) and Li and Zhao (2008) and ensures that results are not affected by dividend pay-
ing banks with negative earnings. Like the equity based measure, the dividend-to-asset
ratio is also appealing in banking as regulatory authorities are interested in the level of
bank assets for capital regulatory purpose, which may involve restriction of dividends.
We use the average of these measures over the period of the study for our country-level
(bank-level) regressions.
4.3.4.2 Control Variables
While our primary interest is in the proposed earnings quality variable, empirical evidence
suggests additional institutional, economic wide, and firm-level factors that may exert
significant influence on dividend payments and/or earnings quality. We consider the
influence of the following factors on bank dividend payout:
Legal System: Evidence suggests that the legal environment of firms’ country of incor-
poration determines their corporate policy behaviour. For example, La Porta et al. (2000)
provide evidence that firms incorporated in common law countries pay higher dividends
compared to firms incorporated in civil law countries. Ferris et al. (2009) find evidence
of international presence of dividend catering across a sample of common law countries
but not for those in civil law countries. We measure legal system (LAW) using a binary
variable that takes the value of 1 for common law countries and 0 for civil law countries.
We obtain this measure from La Porta et al. (2000), and in line with their study, we
expect a positive relation between dividend payout and LAW.9
Investor Protection: Investor protection mitigates the tendency to expropriate minor-
ity shareholders and creditors within the constraints imposed by law. Even though their
sample excludes financial institutions, La Porta et al. (2000) argue and show that consist-
ent with the “outcome” agency model of dividends, firms in countries with high investor
protection, including stronger minority shareholder rights, pay higher dividends com-
pared to firms in countries with low investor protection. We measure investor protection
(PROTECT) as the sum of three variables from La Porta et al. (1998): rights of minor-
ity shareholders (antidirector), creditors’ rights, and legal enforcement. Higher values of
these variables indicate stronger protection of shareholders, creditors, and stronger legal
9While we appreciate the differences even among civil law countries, because of the limitation in the
availability of data for some of these countries, we do not consider the variation within this subgroup.
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enforcement. We expect a positive relation between dividend payout and PROTECT.
Per capita GDP: We control for the potential influence of economic wide factor on bank
dividend payout using the log of the average per capita GDP (LnGDP) over the period
of the study. We obtain the data on per capita GDP from the World Bank database.10
We predict a positive relation between dividend payout and LnGDP as banks in countries
with greater national output are likely to pay higher dividends.
Profitability: Using a cross-country sample of firms, Denis and Osobov (2008) find
evidence of a positive relation between firm profitability and propensity to pay dividend.
We measure profitability (ROE) as the average of ratio of earnings after tax to book
value of total equity over the period of the study. Consistent with literature, we predict
a positive relation between dividend payout and ROE.
Investment Opportunities: While not perfect, it is traditional to measure firm’s growth
prospect using Tobin’s Q or the market to book ratio. However, because our sample
consists of private and public banks, we are unable to use either of these variables.
As retention of earnings and issue of new equity are likely to rank high in financing
investment opportunities, we measure growth opportunities (GROWTH) as the average
annual change in book value of equity over the period of the study. Consistent with
prior studies (e.g. Denis and Osobov, 2008), we expect a negative relation between bank
dividend payout and GROWTH.
Capital Adequacy: Empirical evidence suggests that bank earnings quality is a function
of bank capital adequacy. For example, Ahmed et al. (1999) provide evidence in support
that banks use of loan loss provisions, an important element of bank accruals, in earnings
management. In addition, the high regulatory environment of banks impact greatly on
the level of dividend payout as regulators may exercise their oversight powers by curtailing
dividend payments by banks with low capital ratio. We control for the regulation and
bank capital adequacy using the ratio of book value of capital to total assets (CAPR). As
we expect banks with more capital relative to the value of their assets to be under less
pressure from regulatory authorities to reduce dividends, we predict a positive relation
between bank dividend payout and CAPR.11
Dividend Tax Advantage: Using the dividend tax advantage (DTA) variable in La Porta
et al. (2000), we also control for the possibility that differences in the treatment of
dividend tax in different jurisdictions may explain the differences in dividend payout across
countries. However, as noted by La Porta et al. (2000) the question regarding the role of
10Available from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/countries/1W?display=default
11As this measure also reliably captures the risk profile of banks we do not include a separate risk variable
in our regressions.
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dividend tax on dividend payment is unsettled. While the traditional view suggests that
the double taxation regime (for example, in the US) deter dividend payment by firms,
more recent studies suggest that taxes do not deter dividend payments as shareholders
have no preference for the timing of dividends (see, for example, Harris et al., 2001). In
view of this controversy, we are agnostic regarding the direction of the relation between
dividend payout and DTA.
4.3.5 Sample Selection and Data Sources
Our initial sampling frame consists of the 48 countries listed in La Porta et al. (1998).
However, data requirements on institutional variables restrict the number of countries
included in the final sample to 34 countries, which include developed and emerging
economies around the world. We obtain financial data for the sample of private and public
banks incorporated in these countries for the period 1996-2006 from the commercially
available and widely used BankScope database (see, for example, Lepetit et al., 2008;
Kanagaretham et al., 2010).
One difficulty with the use of BankScope database, however, is that it does not provide
a single unique financial statement per bank over the entire sample period; it provides
new separate time series data for a bank following a change in the accounting or con-
solidation rules. Therefore, for many banks, several different financial statements are
available for a given reporting period. In addition, while it provides both consolidated
and unconsolidated accounts for some banks, it provides either consolidated or unconsol-
idated accounts for others. Even though we believe that consolidated accounts are more
informative, our attempt to use either the consolidated accounts or the unconsolidated
accounts results in great loss of data. This is of particular concern since the reliability
of earnings quality measures increases with the number of data points. Because of these
and other special features of the data, we follow the procedure below to build the data
set that we use in the study:
1. To make the data more comparable across countries we obtain data from the “Uni-
versal Bank Model” provided by BankScope. Unlike the raw data, this model places
different accounting systems on a similar and comparable basis. Even though most
of the variables that we use in this study are ratios, since the dataset consists of
various currency areas, to mitigate potential currency effect we convert all variables
to US dollar using the facility provided within BankScope. For the purpose of this
conversion, we use the closing rate for the fiscal year corresponding to the bank’s
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fiscal year end.12
2. To avoid duplication that may arise from the use of unconsolidated accounts pre-
pared separately for each parent bank without regard to its subsidiaries, for each
bank-year, we first select an accounting report if it is described as ‘consolidated
statements.’ These are the consolidation codes C1 and C2 labelled “Institution” by
BankScope. We do not use additional consolidated accounts which are available
under the label C* as these are mainly restatements to original accounts some-
times resulting from a change in accounting standards, errors, or accounting frauds.
Our preference for consolidated data helps to mitigate the effect of the possible
distortion from off-balance-sheet operations that are inherent in some countries.
However, where consolidated statements are unavailable we use unconsolidated
statements.
3. We delete bank-year observations relating to banks other than those described
as commercial bank, bank holding company, cooperative bank, savings bank, or
investment bank.
4. Finally, for the sample used in constructing the earnings quality measures, we de-
lete all bank-year observations for which there are missing values for a number of
financial data, such as net income, loan loss provisions, loans, and loan loss reserves
required in constructing the country-specific earnings quality measures. However,
we do not exclude these banks in calculating other country-specific measures such
as dividend payout. For this reason, the earnings quality sample used in the con-
struction of the earnings quality measures varies from the dividend sample that we
use to test our hypothesis.
The sampling procedure above results in over 20000 banks and 140000 bank-year obser-
vations that we use to construct an index of earnings quality for 34 countries. Columns
3 and 4 of Table 4.2 provides a breakdown of the number of banks and bank-year obser-
vations per country as well as other descriptive statistics classified, initially, according to
legal system of countries. As evident in this table, US banks make up about 58% (62%)
of our bank (bank-year) observations, while Finland has the least number of banks (25)
and bank-year (130) observations. We address the empirical implication of the dispropor-
tionately large number of US bank (bank-year) observations in the appropriate section of
this study.
12Our results were qualitatively similar when we use real data instead of nominal data.
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4.3.6 Earnings Management Measures: Empirical Validity
As the reliability of our tests depends on the validity of our bank earnings management
measures, we begin our analysis by assessing the validity of these measures. While
some elements of our index enjoy patronage in recent cross-country studies on earnings
management, in view of the differences in data sources, the possible differences in earnings
generating process of banks, and the inclusion of other bank-specific measures, we subject
our measures to empirical validity. We examine the relation between our individual
measures and composite measure of earnings management and existing country-specific
indicators of transparency and opacity. We expect that a good measure of earnings
management should be negatively related to measures of transparency and positively
related to other measures of opacity.
Wysocki (2009) argues that earnings quality should exhibit a positive relation with
accounting standards, disclosure level, investor rights, and legal enforcement as these
factors limit the incentive and the ability of firms to distort reported earnings. In addition,
Leuz et al. (2003) find that firms in countries with developed equity markets, dispersed
ownership structures, strong investor rights, and legal enforcement engage in less earnings
management. However, while Bhattacharya et al. (2003) also argue that legal origin of
firms, disclosure level, adoption of international accounting standards, and auditors per
capita should exhibit negative and significant relation with a valid measure of earnings
management, none of their earnings management variables exhibits a consistent relation
with these institutional variables.
With regard to banks, Fonseca and Gonzalez (2008) show that earnings management,
through income smoothing, is a function of bank regulation and supervision, investor
protection, transparency in accounting, disclosure level, financial structure, and financial
development (see, also, Kanagaretham et al., 2010). Thus, these studies suggest an
overlap among the drivers of earnings quality for banking and non-banking firms.
Following these studies, we assess our measures of earnings management against legal
origin (LAW) and disclosure level (DISC) of sampled countries. We expect a negative
relation between individual (and aggregate) measures of earnings management and LAW
and DISC, consistent with the argument that common law system and greater level of
disclosure increase transparency, thus reducing earnings management.
In addition, we also benchmark our measures against the 2004 edition of Pricewater-
houseCoopers (Kurtzman Group) Opacity Index. The proprietors of this index, which we
name (OPA), argue that it measures the degree to which countries lack clear, accurate,
easily discernible and widely accepted practices governing the relationships among busi-
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ness, investors and governments. Finally, we also use the percentage of market share
by the Big 4 accounting firms, which we obtain from Francis and Wang (2008). These
authors argue that Big 4 auditors are more sensitive to the cost of client misreporting
and its effect on auditor reputation and are more likely to enforce higher earnings quality.
We expect our earnings management variables to correlate positively with opacity (OPA)
and negatively with the market share of Big 4 auditors (BIG4).13
Table 4.1 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for earnings management, trans-
parency, and opacity measures. As expected, ABSLLP is positively and significantly
associated with MACC. However, the low correlation between these variables also sug-
gests that they capture different dimensions of earnings management through accruals.
The SMOOTH variable exhibits the expected negative relation with LOSS and MACC.
However, none of these relations is statistically significant at the conventional levels.
SMOOTH is positively but insignificantly correlated with ABSLLP. The LOSS variable
also fails to exhibit consistently significant relation with other measures of earnings man-
agement, even though it exhibits a correctly signed positive relation with MACC. While
the incorrectly signed and weak relation between some of the pairs of earnings manage-
ment measures are a potential cause for concern, these results are not entirely surprising
as Dechow et al. (2010) note the possibility of a negative correlation between pairs of
earnings quality measures in view of the fact that they measure different dimensions of
earnings. However, these incorrectly signed and weak correlations may also be due to
measurement error. For example, only the US provides a relatively large sample for a
more reliable measurement of the variables, especially the LOSS variable. If measure-
ment error explains the weak correlations among the earnings management measures,
then their direct use in our regressions would bias our coefficients towards zero. In the
light of this evidence, we place more importance on the aggregate earnings management
measure, which exhibits consistently significant and positive relation with individual meas-
ures of earnings quality and, most importantly, the expected strong negative (positive)
correlation with our measures of transparency (opacity).
The results presented in this table are important for at least two reasons. First, the
results give credibility to our measures of country-specific earnings management especially
the MACC variable. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that uses this
specific measure to capture country-specific accruals. Second, the significant relation
between legal origin of countries and the level of earnings management also suggests the
13See, also, Kanagaretham et al. (2010) on the role of auditor reputation in constraining earnings
management in a sample of 21 countries.
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need to control for this variable in our dividend payout regressions as previous evidence
also suggests a significant role for legal system in dividend policy (e.g. La Porta et al.,
2000)
4.4 Empirical Results
4.4.1 Dividend Payout and Earnings Quality: Descriptive Statistics
Figure 4.1 depicts the pattern of yearly dividend payout by banks in high earnings quality
countries (HEQCs) versus banks in low earnings quality countries (LEQCs), so defined
according their level of earnings management relative to the median level of earnings
management. As shown in the figure, in general, for each year of the study, banks in
HEQCs pay a higher proportion of their earnings, equity, revenue, cash flows, and assets
in dividends than banks in LEQCs. This conclusion holds for both the mean and median
dividend payout ratios, except in 1997 when the median dividend-to-earnings ratio is
higher for banks in LEQCs than for banks in HEQCs.
Table 4.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the individual and aggregate earnings
management measures and Table 4.3 presents the ranking of countries based on the
level of earnings management by banks. Contrary to the ranking by Bhattacharya et
al. (2003), our result shows that Hong Kong exhibits the least evidence of earnings
management by banks followed by Singapore and Sweden. However, consistent with
Bhattacharya et al. (2003), the table shows that Greece exhibits the highest evidence of
earnings management. This result is also consistent with Francis and Wang (2008) who
report that only 36% of the Greek firms use one of the Big 4 auditors, a percentage greater
only to that of Philippines (25%) among the 42 countries that they study. While the
overall ranking seems to be slightly at variance with that of Bhattacharya et al. (2003) for
non-industrial firms, our ranking is consistent with the positive role of legal origin of banks
in earnings quality. As reported in the table, 53% of countries with earnings management
lower than the median earnings management (EQ=1) are common law countries while
47% are of civil law origin.
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Table 4.3: Country Ranking on Earnings Management
ABSLLP MACC SMOOTH LOSS AEM
SWITZERLAND IRELAND SINGAPORE CHILE HONG KONG
SWEDEN HONG KONG THAILAND SOUTH AFRICA SINGAPORE
BELGIUM SINGAPORE TURKEY FINLAND SWEDEN
FRANCE NORWAY INDIA TURKEY FINLAND
FINLAND SWEDEN PAKISTAN BRAZIL BELGIUM
HONG KONG FINLAND HONG KONG HONG KONG CHILE
NETHERLANDS SPAIN MALAYSIA ITALY USA
USA INDIA SWEDEN SINGAPORE TURKEY
AUSTRALIA CHILE KOREA (REP. OF) AUSTRALIA DENMARK
IRELAND DENMARK INDONESIA CANADA CANADA
CANADA NETHERLANDS JAPAN UNITED KINGDOM NETHERLANDS
GERMANY MALAYSIA CHILE USA UNITED KINGDOM
DENMARK BELGIUM BELGIUM KOREA (REP. OF) PAKISTAN
NORWAY USA TAIWAN DENMARK IRELAND
SPAIN UNITED KINGDOM CANADA MALAYSIA MALAYSIA
UNITED KINGDOM SOUTH AFRICA DENMARK MEXICO AUSTRALIA
ITALY AUSTRALIA PORTUGAL PAKISTAN ITALY
KOREA (REP. OF) PAKISTAN USA NETHERLANDS KOREA (REP. OF)
AUSTRIA PORTUGAL ITALY BELGIUM INDIA
PORTUGAL SWITZERLAND UNITED KINGDOM SWEDEN SOUTH AFRICA
SINGAPORE INDONESIA MEXICO FRANCE NORWAY
JAPAN TURKEY BRAZIL INDONESIA SWITZERLAND
PAKISTAN CANADA FINLAND JAPAN SPAIN
TURKEY THAILAND SOUTH AFRICA IRELAND THAILAND
GREECE FRANCE SWITZERLAND GREECE FRANCE
TAIWAN ITALY NETHERLANDS GERMANY INDONESIA
THAILAND GREECE AUSTRIA INDIA PORTUGAL
CHILE BRAZIL NORWAY THAILAND BRAZIL
INDONESIA AUSTRIA IRELAND SPAIN JAPAN
MALAYSIA KOREA (REP. OF) SPAIN PORTUGAL MEXICO
SOUTH AFRICA MEXICO GREECE NORWAY TAIWAN
INDIA TAIWAN FRANCE AUSTRIA GERMANY
MEXICO GERMANY AUSTRALIA TAIWAN AUSTRIA
BRAZIL JAPAN GERMANY SWITZERLAND GREECE
The table presents the country ranks of individual earnings management and aggregate earnings management scores.
The first (last) country in each ranking exhibits the best (worst) level of earnings management. LOSS is the loss
avoidance variable; ABSLLP measures the magnitude of discretionary loan loss provisions; MACC is the magnitude of
total accruals. SMOOTH is the measure of income smoothing. AEM is the aggregate earnings management score
obtained by taking the average of the ranks of LOSS, ABSLLP, MACC and SMOOTH for each country. See Table 4.1
above for definitions of variables.
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Table 4.2 also presents the tests of difference on mean and median earnings manage-
ment variables between common and civil law countries. Our results show that the mean
and median values of income smoothing (SMOOTH) and magnitude of accruals (MACC)
are significantly lower in common law countries than in civil law countries. However, we
find no significant difference on mean and median values of abnormal loan loss provisions
(ABSLLP) and loss avoidance (LOSS) between these two groups of countries. Overall,
the table shows that legal origin of countries significantly mitigates aggregate earnings
management: we find positive and significant difference on mean and median aggregate
earnings management scores between civil law and common law countries.
Table 4.4 presents some basic statistics on dividend payout for each country as well
as the two groups of countries. This table speaks to the question concerning the role
of earnings quality in bank dividend payout and, in addition to Figure 4.1, provides the
first evidence supporting a positive relation between dividend payout and bank earnings
quality. Consistent with the idea that banks in HEQCs pay larger dividends than banks in
LEQCs, Table 4.4 shows that banks in HEQCs pay an average of about 50% of their earn-
ings in dividends between 1996 and 2006 while banks in LEQCs pay an average of about
41% of their earnings in dividends during similar period. We replicate this higher payout
ratio for banks in HEQCs for payout defined with respect to equity (DTE), bank revenue
(DTR), cash flow (DTCF), and assets (DTTA). The tests of difference on means (medi-
ans) dividend payout between banks in HEQCs and LEQCs suggest that this difference
is generally statistically significant across various definitions of dividend payout. For ex-
ample, the t-statistic (z-statistic) on difference on means (medians) dividend-to-earnings
ratio is 2.94 (2.67).14 This result is consistent with the view that higher accounting
quality permits greater monitoring and reduces agency problem (see, for example, Antle
and Eppen, 1985; Biddle and Hilary, 2006). In the light of the potential double whammy
of dividend taxation and dividend restricting regulations that banks face, one would or-
dinarily expect a relatively low dividend payout by banks. The high dividend payout ratios
reported in the table for banks in both HEQCs and LEQCs suggest that bank dividend
payout is an issue that deserves greater attention than it currently enjoys in theoretical
and empirical literature.
14In unreported results we find similar evidence for difference on means and median using industry-
adjusted dividend payout measures.
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Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics - Dividend Payout by Countries and Earnings Quality
Panel A: Low Earnings Quality Countries (LEQCs)
Country EQ DTE DTR DTCF DTTA DTEQ
AUSTRIA 0 0.3967 0.0681 0.1275 0.0029 0.0409
BRAZIL 0 0.4522 0.0737 0.1691 0.0146 0.0903
FRANCE 0 0.5036 0.1283 0.2299 0.0088 0.0785
GERMANY 0 0.4347 0.0190 0.0630 0.0010 0.0203
GREECE 0 0.4370 0.1112 0.2388 0.0046 0.0615
INDIA 0 0.2542 0.0573 0.1478 0.0037 0.0405
INDONESIA 0 0.4908 0.1023 0.2296 0.0117 0.0908
JAPAN 0 0.2928 0.0486 0.0363 0.0012 0.0122
KOREA (REP. OF) 0 0.3073 0.0782 0.1000 0.0033 0.0288
MALAYSIA 0 0.3898 0.0796 0.1150 0.0098 0.0571
MEXICO 0 0.4329 0.1148 0.2083 0.0063 0.0580
NORWAY 0 0.4065 0.0912 0.1976 0.0046 0.0634
PORTUGAL 0 0.3742 0.1414 0.1873 0.0106 0.0682
SOUTH AFRICA 0 0.3149 0.0536 0.1580 0.0026 0.0402
SPAIN 0 0.4997 0.2175 0.2661 0.0091 0.0596
SWITZERLAND 0 0.4365 0.2803 0.1957 0.0059 0.0280
TAIWAN 0 0.4869 0.3228 0.2378 0.0210 0.0658
Mean 0.4065 0.1169 0.1710 0.0072 0.0532
Median 0.4329 0.0912 0.1873 0.0059 0.0580
Table 4.4 continues next page
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Table 4.4 continued
Panel B: High Earnings Quality Countries (HEQCs)
COUNTRY EQ DTE DTR DTCF DTTA DTEQ
AUSTRALIA 1 0.5629 0.1476 0.2529 0.0144 0.1444
BELGIUM 1 0.6025 0.1673 0.3293 0.0074 0.0798
CANADA 1 0.3875 0.0961 0.1516 0.0073 0.0621
CHILE 1 0.5149 0.0968 0.2464 0.0081 0.1038
DENMARK 1 0.3414 0.1045 0.1605 0.0076 0.0622
FINLAND 1 0.5182 0.2553 0.2905 0.0074 0.0743
HONG KONG 1 0.5907 0.2456 0.3627 0.0142 0.1061
IRELAND 1 0.6780 0.1472 0.403 0.0065 0.0870
ITALY 1 0.5573 0.1266 0.1942 0.0076 0.0622
MALAYSIA 1 0.3410 0.1235 0.1821 0.0062 0.0465
NETHERLANDS 1 0.4930 0.1630 0.2956 0.0054 0.0837
PAKISTAN 1 0.4514 0.2400 0.2446 0.0167 0.0881
SINGAPORE 1 0.4126 0.2719 0.2065 0.0192 0.0549
SWEDEN 1 0.5447 0.2337 0.3249 0.0157 0.1486
TURKEY 1 0.3377 0.0563 0.1795 0.0078 0.0592
UNITED KINGDOM 1 0.6200 0.2739 0.3129 0.024 0.1238
USA 1 0.5232 0.1228 0.2415 0.0087 0.0765
Mean 0.4986 0.1690 0.2576 0.0108 0.0861
Median 0.5182 0.1476 0.2464 0.0078 0.0798
Panel C: Test for Difference
Test of Means (t-statistic)
HEQCs vs. LEQCs 2.94*** 1.98** 3.61*** 2.00** 3.55***
Test of Medians (z-statistic)
HEQCs vs. LEQCs 2.67*** 2.38** 3.01*** 1.98** 2.91***
The table represents the descriptive statistics for dividend payout for 34 countries in our sample. Countries are
classified according to their earnings quality status, where EQ is an earnings quality dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if the country’s aggregate earnings management score is less than the median aggregate earnings
management score, otherwise 0. DTE is the ratio of dividends to earnings; DTR is the ratio of dividends to
bank revenue - the sum of interest and non-interest income; DTCR is the ratio of dividends to cash flows -
operating income minus accruals. DTTA is the ratio of dividends to total assets. DTEQ is the ratio of dividends
to common equity. All data used in measuring the variables are from BankScope and cover the period 1996 to
2006. Panel C presents the test of difference on mean (median) dividend payout between countries with high
earnings quality (HECQs) and countries with low earnings quality (LECQs). *** and ** indicate significant at
1% and 5%, respectively.
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4.4.2 Regression Analysis
Table 4.5 presents estimates from the tests of H1 by regressing measures of bank dividend
payout on aggregate earnings quality (AEQ) and other control variables proposed in the
methodology section of this chapter. We estimate the models cross-sectionally using the
average dividend payout for all banks in each country over the period of the study. One
advantage of the cross-sectional regressions is that they give equal weights to countries
included in the study, regardless of the number of banks in each country. This ensures
that our results are not sensitive to the influence of a dominant country, such as the US
that is disproportionately represented in the sample. Each panel of Table 4.5 presents
the estimates of three regression specifications. In the first specification, we enter only
the AEQ variable. In the second specification, we include two institutional variables -
legal origin (LAW) and investor protection (PROTECT). In the third specification, we
include the log of GDP per capita and average bank size (SIZE), two proxy variables
for economic wide factors that may explain differences in bank dividend payout. The
results presented in this table are consistent with our prediction of a positive relation
between bank dividend payout and earnings quality. This positive relation holds even
after controlling for the potential impact of institutional factors (LAW and PROTECT),
as well as economic factors (LnGDP and SIZE). In addition, the results also suggest an
economically significant relation between earnings quality and dividend payout.
Table 4.5 reports that AEQ explains between 12 percent and 37 percent of the cross-
country variation in bank dividend payout. The coefficient on this variable is also positive
and statistically significant at conventional level regardless of the definition of dividend
payout adopted. With some marginal increases in R-square over the baseline model, the
second and third model specifications also give some support to the economic significance
of the included institutional and economic factors. However, unlike the AEQ variable,
which continues to maintain its significance and correct sign, none of the institutional
and economic factors is consistently statistically significant in our models. While this
may be due to the lack of power due to the limited number of countries included in the
regressions, these results are not surprising. For example, Biddle and Hilary (2006) find
no role for legal origin and elements of investor protection on firm-level capital investment
efficiency. In addition, Defond and Hung (2004) find that investor protection laws are
not associated with improved CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, even though strong
law enforcement institutions significantly improve the association between CEO turnover
and poor performance. Bushman et al. (2004), who find no relation between legal origin
of firms and financial transparency, reported similar results.
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Table 4.5: Dividend Payout and Earnings Quality - Country-Level Regressions
AEQ LAW PROTECT LnGDP SIZE Intercept Adjusted R2 N
Panel A: Dependent Variable - Dividend-to-Earnings (DTE)
0.006*** 0.557*** 0.12 34
(3.09) (13.24)
0.005** 0.022 0.012* 0.431*** 0.19 34
(2.33) (0.53) (1.80) (5.39)
0.005** 0.035 0.005 0.022 0.000** 0.268 0.24 34
(2.05) (0.84) (0.65) (1.13) (2.14) (1.40)
Panel B: Dependent Variable - Dividend-to-Revenue (DTR)
0.006** 0.245*** 0.19 34
(2.61) (6.83)
0.005* 0.045 0.001 0.300*** 0.25 34
(1.89) (1.56) (0.22) (3.15)
0.006*** 0.051* -0.000 0.001 0.000*** 0.211* 0.48 34
(3.63) (1.79) (-0.09) (0.10) (13.21) (1.69)
Panel C: Dependent Variable - Dividend-to-Cash-Flow (DTCF)
0.008*** 0.361*** 0.37 34
(4.65) (10.32)
0.008*** 0.023 0.004 0.304*** 0.40 34
(4.26) (0.92) (1.03) (5.85)
0.008*** 0.028 0.003 0.004 0.000*** 0.278** 0.43 34
(4.35) (0.98) (0.58) (0.39) (3.79) (2.44)
Panel D: Dependent Variable - Dividend-to-Assets (DTTA)
0.000** 0.015*** 0.12 34
(2.45) (6.00)
0.000 0.005** 0.000 0.010* 0.29 34
(1.51) (2.26) (0.16) (1.98)
0.000* 0.004* 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.020* 0.33 34
(1.78) (1.75) (1.09) (-1.06) (0.51) (1.83)
Panel E: Dependent Variable - Dividend-to-Equity (DTEQ)
0.003*** 0.115*** 0.24 34
(3.20) (7.25)
0.002** 0.010 0.002 0.086*** 0.28 34
(2.39) (0.82) (1.07) (3.03)
0.002** 0.007 0.004** -0.005 -0.000* 0.121** 0.31 34
(2.25) (0.49) (2.65) (-0.95) (-1.83) (2.13)
This table reports the coefficients (above) and t-statistics (below) of the regression of dividend payout on aggregate
earnings quality variable. DTE is the ratio of dividend to earnings; DTR is the ratio of dividend to bank revenue;
DTCR is the ratio of dividend to cash flows; DTTA is the ratio of dividends to total assets; DTEQ is the ratio of
dividend to common equity. AEQ is the aggregate earnings quality score. LAW is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 for common law countries and the value of 0 for civil law countries. PROTECT is a measure of
investor protection and is the sum of three variables from La Porta et al. (2000): rights of minority shareholders
(antidirector), creditor rights, and legal enforcement. LnGDP is the log of gross domestic product per capita.
SIZE is the average book value of total assets in the country over the study period. The reported t-statistics are
based on standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively. N is the number of countries included in the regressions.
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4.4.3 Additional Analysis
The regression results discussed so far support a positive relation between dividend payout
and bank earnings quality. However, in reaching this conclusion, we have assumed that
earnings quality is exogenous. One concern is that the relation may be endogenous,
potentially biasing our results. In addition, our H1 suggests that causality runs from
earnings quality to dividend payout but it could be that large (institutional) investors are
attracted to banks with high dividend payout and these investors use their monitoring
power to mitigate agency problems and extract higher earnings quality from banks. If
this is true, then causality also runs from dividends to earnings quality resulting in a
simultaneity problem. We provide further robustness checks of our primary result that
address the endogeneity concern and consider additional control variables.
Table 4.6 presents the results of the estimations of our dividend-earnings quality re-
gressions using bank-level observations and a two-stage least square (2SLS) procedure.
While the two-least square (2SLS) procedure allows for endogeneity of earnings quality,
we need to identify some exogenous parameters that affect only earnings quality but not
bank dividend payout, except indirectly through other independent variables. However, it
is difficult to construct instruments that both explain earnings quality but are unrelated
to bank dividend payout. For this reason, we advocate caution in interpreting our results.
We use two country-level variables as instruments for earnings quality. However, as
the relations among the institutional factors are difficult to model, again readers must
exercise additional caution in interpreting our results. The first instrument that we use
is the quality of accounting standards. We conjecture that better accounting standards
should influence positively on earnings quality. We avoid the controversy surrounding
the superiority or otherwise of national accounting standards, such as US GAAP, over
international accounting standards (IAS/IFRS). We use the disclosure index from the
Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). The disclosure index
with values, potentially, between 0 and 100 captures the inclusion of 90 items as required
disclosures in annual reports for each country. Higher scores are associated with greater
required disclosure. Biddle and Hilary (2006) show that this variable is strongly and
positively correlated with their country-specific measure of accounting quality, which in
many respects is similar to the earnings quality variable that we use in this study. The
correlation coefficient between this variable and our earnings quality variable is 0.43,
significant at 5% (untabulated).
In addition, we also use a measure of the proportion of the market share of Big
4 auditing firms in each country as an instrument for earnings quality. We use this
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measure for at least two reasons. First, an effective system of accounting and auditing
that promotes better earnings quality is costly to maintain. While unobservable, we
conjecture that the wealth of the nation devoted to ensuring better earnings quality
should be positively associated with the market share of Big 4 firms. In addition, as
Francis and Wang (2008) argue, Big 4 auditors are more likely to enforce higher earnings
quality because they are more sensitive to cost implications of client’s misreporting and
the potential auditors’ liability).15 Our measure of market share of Big 4 firms (BIG4)
is from Francis and Wang (2008). We have no reason to believe that this variable has
a direct impact on dividend payout. As shown in Table 4.1, the correlation coefficient
between this variable and our aggregate earnings management variable is -0.52, significant
at 1% level of significant.
Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 present the results of additional analysis based on the discussion
above. Each panel of the tables presents three regression specifications, estimated cross-
sectionally using bank-level data. In the first specification, we enter only the AEQ variable.
In the second specification, we include institutional and bank-level control variables.
Specifically, we include additional bank-level variable (CAPR) that controls for capital
adequacy. As banks with low capital to assets ratio may be constrained by regulatory
authorities from paying dividends, we expect a positive relation between dividend payout
and CAPR. We also include additional institutional variable (DTA) that controls for
the differential treatment of dividend tax in various countries. The third regression
specification uses the predicted value of AEQ from the first stage regression of AEQ on
CAPR, BIG4, and other control variables. Thus, the specification is similar to second
specification except for the AEQ variable. One advantage of estimating our model using
bank-level observations is that it gives greater weight to countries with larger economies.
For this reason, we do not include the GDP variable. The downside, however, is that
our results may be driven by the inclusion of disproportionately large number of banks
from a single country. To address this concern, Table 4.7 presents the estimated results
excluding US sample banks.
The results reported in Table 4.6 and 4.7 support our primary finding that earnings
quality is positively related to bank dividends, even after controlling for additional bank-
level variables and accounting for the possibility that earnings quality is endogenous.
In addition, this finding consistently holds, whether or not we include US banks in our
15However, these authors suggest that a strong investor protection may be required for this potential
outcome to materialise. They note that without a strong investor protection, it is possible that
auditors, in order maintain the patronage of their clients, may connive with managers in their earnings
management behaviour (auditors conflict of interest).
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regressions.
4.4.4 Earnings Quality and Dividend-Earnings Relation
In line with the second hypothesis (H2) of this chapter, we investigate the idea that
dividend-earnings relation is stronger for banks in countries characterised by high earnings
quality (HEQCs) compared to banks in countries with low earnings quality (LEQCs) -
that is, earnings are more predictive of dividend changes for banks operating in high
earnings quality countries.
Table 4.8 presents the results of the tests of this hypothesis using both Lintner (1956)
and Fama-Babiak (1968) partial adjustment models, estimated for pooled sample of
banks with consecutive dividends and earnings observations over the study period. We
first estimate Equation 4.3.4 and Equation 4.3.6 using ordinary least squares. The un-
tabulated results suggest that lagged dividend and current earnings (and lagged earnings)
variables play a statistically significant role in bank dividend decision. Their signs are also
as expected. However, results from such estimation procedure have two econometric
weaknesses for panel data: they do not adjust for any possible dependence of firm-year
observations within a group or for any possible autocorrelation across time, resulting in
estimators that are biased and inconsistent (see, for example, Aivazian et al., 2006). To
address this concern, all presented results relate to models that account for individual
firm effect (firm fixed effect) and allow for constant autocorrelation across the individual
firm observations.
Results in columns for Models 1-3 of Panel A of Table 4.8 show that the baseline
Lintner model does a good job in explaining dividend change for the pooled sample of
banks in all countries, for the subsample of banks in HEQCs and LEQCs, respectively.
We draw similar conclusions from columns of Models 1-3 of Panel B, which present the
estimates of the Fama and Babiak’s modified partial adjustment model. The results
reported in these columns are consistent with current and prior earnings levels being
significant predictors of current dividend changes as demonstrated by Lintner (1956) and
Fama and Babiak (1968). In addition, the significant negative coefficient on the lagged
dividend variable indicates that banks follow a conservative dividend policy reflected in
partial adjustment to the target payout ratio, consistent with Lintner’s interpretation.
Most importantly, consistent with H2, the absolute value of the ‘speed of adjustment’
(coefficient on lagged dividends) is greater for banks in HEQCs than for banks in LEQCs,
suggesting that the changes in current earnings are more sustainable or managers more
rapidly incorporate them into dividends (Foerster and Sapp, 2006).
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In general, the table also projects an interesting result supporting the overall theme
of this chapter as expressed in H1: banks in HEQCs pay larger dividends than banks in
LEQCs. For example, while the implied payout ratio for the sample of all banks during
the period of the study represents 48% of earnings using the Lintner model (column of
Model 1), the implied payout ratio for banks in HEQCs represents 53% of earnings as
against 31% for LEQCs.16 Thus, while the actual mean dividends to earnings ratio of
50% (see, Table 4.4, above) by banks in HEQCs is closer to the implied dividend payout
suggested by the Lintner model, the actual mean dividend payout of 40% for LEQCs
(see, Table 4.4, above) exhibits greater deviation from the implied dividend payout (see,
Table 4.4, above). This result suggests that in addition to banks in HEQCs paying larger
dividends than banks in LEQCs, as predicted by H1, their dividend payout ratio also
exhibits greater conformity with the optimal payout ratio implied by the Lintner model.
Interestingly, we note that while the ‘speed of adjustment’ for banks seems to be
substantially higher than those for previous studies, the implied payout ratio reported by
our study is consistent with the payout ratio of 50% reported by Lintner (1956). It is also
within the range (40%-82%) reported by Fama and Babiak (1968) but greater than the
upper limit of 35% reported by Brav et al. (2005).17 However, these studies are restricted
to the US. This result is consistent with the anecdotal evidence that banks follow a more
aggressive dividend policy and pay high proportion of their earnings in dividends. Finally,
with adjusted R-squares ranging between 14% and 27% for each of the baseline models
in Table 4.8, we have cumulative evidence to believe that the Lintner and Fama-Babiak
models perform fairly well in explaining the variability of bank dividends and thus suitable
for our purpose.
Columns of Models 4-8 of Panel A and Panel B of Table 4.8 report the results of
the estimation of the modified Lintner (1956) and Fama and Babiak (1968) models
that incorporate an interaction variable (lagged DPS×EQ), which tests the difference in
the ‘speed of adjustment’ of dividends to the “target payout” ratio. Column of Model
4 is equivalent to the estimated separate regression Models 2 and 3, but pools the
observations to maximise the power of the tests and forcing a common intercept. An
unstated null hypothesis is that the dividend-earnings-quality indicator variable for HEQCs
is insignificant and that banks in these countries smooth their dividends to the same
16We “back-out” the implied payout ratio, using the negative of ratio of the coefficient on earnings
variable to the coefficient on the lagged dividend variable (e.g. Fama and Babiak, 1968). For example,
with coefficients of 0.243 on earnings and -0.459 on lagged dividend variable for banks in HEQCs,
we can back-out the implied payout ratio of 53% reported above.
17See Andres et al. (2009) for a summary of estimates from various studies.
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degree as banks in LEQCs. If this is true, the coefficient on the interaction variable
should be insignificantly different from zero. The significant negative loading on this
variable shown in the table suggests that the coefficient is more negative for HEQCs versus
LEQCs consistent with the idea that changes in current earnings are more sustainable or
managers more rapidly incorporate them into dividends. More sustainable earnings are
usually associated with higher earnings quality. As reported in column of Model 2 and
3, it will take almost double the number of years it takes banks in HEQCs for banks
in LEQCs to adjust their dividends to the target payout ratio. This result extends the
findings by Aivazian et al. (2006), Leary and Michaely (2011) and Michaely and Robert
(2011) on the determinants of dividend smoothing by firms. While these authors find
support for the role of capital markets, corporate governance, and institutional holdings
on dividend smoothing, our study suggests that, at least for banks, the propensity to
smooth dividend depends on earnings quality. As reported in column of Model 4, the
interaction term is highly significant at -0.198 and the coefficient on the lagged dividends
drops from -0.434 in Model 1 to -0.273 in Model 4. Overall, the results in columns
for Models 2-4 indicate that banks in both HEQCs and LEQCs smooth their dividends.
However, this evidence also suggests that banks in LEQCs do not quickly adjust their
dividends to the target payout ratio (they engage in greater dividend smoothing).
Most relevant to H2, columns of Models 4-8 of Panel A and Panel B of Table 4.8 also
include either or both the interaction variables (lagged EPS×EQ and EPS× EQ) that
test whether the dividend-earnings relation is significantly different for banks in HEQCs
versus banks in LEQCs. The results show that the dividend-earnings link is significantly
different for banks in the two groups of countries - the coefficients of the interaction term
between current earnings and earnings quality are positive and highly significant, whatever
the model of dividends that we use. The generally positive and significant interaction
term of current earnings with earnings quality in columns of Model 4 suggests that banks
operating in HEQCs are more likely to increase (reduce) their dividends following an
increase (decrease) in current earnings. This result is consistent with current earnings in
HEQCs being a better a predictor of dividend policy (change) than current earnings in
LEQCs. Specifically, banks in HEQCs adjust their dividends more quickly in response to
increases earnings.
We further divide our sample according to the direction of dividend and earnings
changes as dividend increases are a less likely option for banks with reducing earnings.
As presented in columns of Model 5-8, our findings of a stronger dividend-earnings link
and faster ‘speed of adjustment’ for banks in HEQCs remains unchanged even for these
172
subsamples. However, contrary to expectation, we find no consistent evidence of a
stronger significant positive link between dividends and lagged earnings for banks oper-
ating in HEQCs relative to banks operating in LEQCs. For example, for the full sample
reported in Column of Model 4, the coefficient on the interaction term between lagged
earnings and earnings quality (lagged EPS×EQ) is significantly lower at -0.020 for banks
in HEQCs compared to banks in LEQCs. This, however, is significantly positive at 0.029
for the subsample of banks with earnings increases.
How robust are our results? As a robustness check of our results we re-estimate
Equation 4.3.4 and Equation 4.3.6 using a data set that excludes US banks. As presented
in Table 4.9 our results are generally consistent with those reported under the full sample.
Thus, the disproportionate representation of US banks in the full sample does not drive
the results. In addition, we also estimate a model consisting of country effect and
year dummies (untabulated). Our conclusions are generally consistent with the idea of a
stronger dividend-earnings link in HEQCs than in LEQCs, at least for the current earnings
variable.
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4.5 Conclusion
This chapter presents the results of the study investigating the relation between bank
dividend policy and earnings quality. We construct an aggregate measure of country-
specific bank earnings quality that incorporates different dimensions of earnings manage-
ment - loss avoidance, earnings smoothing, and magnitude of accruals. We document
that this measure exhibits consistent and correctly signed correlations with measures of
transparency and opacity that exist in the literature. Using the index of bank earnings
quality, we then investigate whether banks in countries with high earnings quality pay
higher dividends than banks in countries with low earnings quality. Our evidence suggests
that this is the case: we document a link between earnings quality and the proportion of
earnings, revenue, equity, cash flows, and assets paid in dividends by banks around the
world. This result is consistent with the stylised findings of the reluctance by managers
to reduce dividends, the known conservatism towards dividend increases, and the costly
nature of dividends.
Even though we attempt to mitigate the potential measurement error by using the
aggregate earnings quality measure, the link between dividend payout and earnings quality
may still be spurious given the potential endogeneity of earnings quality and the difficulty
in modelling the relationship among institutional factors. We address this endogeneity
concern using a two-stage least square (2SLS) regression. We use quality of accounting
standards and the market share of Big 4 auditing firms as instruments for earnings quality.
Our primary result of a positive relation between dividends and earnings quality continues
to hold, even after controlling for a number of institutional variables and bank-specific
factors, and accounting for the endogeneity of earnings quality.
We extend the study and investigate the possibility of a differential dividend-earnings
link between banks in high earnings quality countries and banks in countries with low
earnings quality. If earnings quality plays a role in bank dividend policy, we conjecture
that this role should reflect in the relation between banks earnings and dividends. Us-
ing different specifications of the partial adjustment model, we find consistent evidence
suggesting that banks around the world follow a dividend smoothing policy in which man-
agers gradually adjust dividends to meet target earnings. Most importantly, our results
show that earnings quality moderates the relation between dividends and earnings. We
show that current earnings (lagged dividends) of banks in countries with high earnings
quality are more positively (negatively) related to dividends than current earnings (lagged
dividends) of banks in countries with low earnings quality. This result is consistent with
the idea that earnings of banks in countries with high earnings quality are more sustain-
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able than earnings of banks in countries with low earnings quality, and that managers
are quicker in incorporating them into dividends. We conclude that earnings of banks in
high earnings quality countries are better predictors of dividends. However, contrary to
expectation, we find that lagged earnings of banks in countries with high earnings quality
have a weaker link with dividends than lagged earnings of banks in countries with low
earnings quality. In all cases, we find that our results are robust to the disproportionate
representation of US banks in the sample.
Notwithstanding the limitations of the study, as discussed above, our study highlights
findings that have important implications for investors, policy-makers, bank regulators,
and academics. Consistent with the suggestion in some quarters for the use of dividends
as certification of earnings quality, our finding establishing a positive relation between
dividend payout and earnings quality suggests that there may be some information in
dividends that is related to bank earnings quality. Thus, while dividend payout has
implications for capital adequacy requirement of banks for which retention of earnings
may sometimes be preferred, our results suggest that disgorging dividends may proxy
not only for the adequacy of bank capital, the level of its earnings, but also the quality
of these earnings. Perhaps, a policy of compulsory dividend payment mooted in some
quarters is one way of confirming the quality of bank earnings and distinguishing between
“good” banks (with high earnings quality) and “bad” banks (with low earnings quality).
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5 Conclusion
This thesis draws on theoretical and empirical studies in the fields of finance and ac-
counting on dividends and market pricing of information risk to investigate broad issues
relating to banks. Specifically, relying on the agency-based theory of dividends, our first
study investigates the relation between bank dividends and bank efficiency. Unlike other
studies in the literature, we operationalise bank agency problem using efficiency scores,
obtained from data envelopment analysis (DEA). We present the results of this study in
Chapter 2 of the thesis. Chapter 3 presents the results of the second study that exam-
ines a number of market consequences of bank earnings quality. Finally, the third study
develops an index of country-specific bank earnings management that forms the basis of
the investigation of the relation between bank earnings quality and dividend payout in
34 countries around the world. Chapter 4 of this thesis presents the results of the study.
This chapter presents the main conclusions of the thesis.
5.1 Main Conclusions
In line with previous studies, our study confirms a positive relation between the direction
of dividends change and market reactions to dividends. We find that markets react
positively (negatively) to dividend increases (decreases). This primary result supports the
idea that markets seem to update expectations about bank performance from dividends
news. However, the market reactions following dividend change announcements by banks
is substantially lower than those documented in extant literature for industrial firms,
suggesting that the role of dividends in resolving information asymmetry between banks
and investors seems attenuated by regulations. While our study fails to rule out competing
explanations for the positive market reactions to announcements of dividend increases, it
establishes a link between market reactions to announcements of dividend increases and
changes in bank efficiency, our measure of bank agency problem obtained from a frontier
analysis of bank input-output combinations.
We provide evidence of a negative relation between bank earnings quality, measured
as an aggregate of four accounting based earnings quality attributes, and the cost of
180
equity. Further extension of the study uncovers strong evidence of a positive relation
between market valuation of bank stocks and earnings quality. Consistent with these
two findings, we also find stronger positive price-earnings multiples for banks with high
earnings quality relative to banks with low earnings quality. Overall, our results suggest
that markets seem to pay a premium not only for the level of earnings but also for
the quality of these earnings. These results support the argument often presented by
regulatory authorities, various accounting standards boards, and the Basle Committee
on banking regulation that better accounting that results in greater disclosure level and
greater quality of financial reporting is associated with significant reduction in the cost of
equity. Thus, while better accounting may be associated with unintended operating costs
that affect the bottom line, the higher earnings quality resulting from better accounting
also reduces bank cost of equity.
However, our results also point to the fact that the relation between cost of equity
and individual attributes of bank earnings is not unidirectional as individual elements
of our aggregate measure exhibit significant but incorrectly signed and, in some cases,
insignificant relation with bank cost of equity and bank valuation. This evidence suggests
that while earnings quality is an important factor in bank cost of equity, the dimension of
earnings matters. The result also supports the claim by some practitioners that greater
information results in more price volatility and higher cost of equity. Notwithstanding
this finding, the balance of evidence presented in this thesis supports a positive role for
earnings quality, as it permits better monitoring that reduces information asymmetry and
information risk. In all, these results speak directly to the efforts by regulatory authorities
to incorporate market discipline in bank regulation: markets can differentiate between
“good” and “bad” earnings and will reward banks with high earnings quality. In addition,
it also has important implications for the estimation of bank cost of equity.
The implication of bank earnings quality is not limited to the reduction in the cost of
equity or the associated positive pricing of bank stocks. In a related study that draws
evidence from 34 countries around the world, we find that banks in countries with high
earnings quality, measured as a composite of loss avoidance, earnings smoothing, and
magnitude of accruals, pay a higher proportion of their earnings, revenue, equity, cash
flows, and assets in dividends. Banks in these countries also engage in less dividend
smoothing and have stronger dividend-earnings relation, consistent with the idea that
bank earnings in these countries are more sustainable. These results along with those
discussed above give support to the idea that better bank earnings quality is a valuable
corporate governance tool that permits better monitoring of banks and give support to
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the argument that dividends are credible certification of earnings quality (e.g. Breeden,
2003).
In line with the results presented in this thesis, we advocate that an additional “E”
element be included in the bank rating system. Specifically, we advocate a CAMEELS
rating system, the second E being earnings quality. While the level of earnings is im-
portant, in view of the fact that these earnings are subject to manipulation by bank
management, our results advise that regulatory and supervisory authorities should design
and institutionalise measures aimed at assessing the quality of bank earnings. Perhaps, a
mandatory payment of dividends often advocated as a certification of earnings is an idea
worth revisiting.
5.2 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
Our study provides opportunities for further studies on the market and non-market con-
sequences and determinants of bank earnings quality. Our index of country-specific bank
earnings quality provides opportunities to investigate such issues as the role of bank
regulations on bank earnings quality. While studies have attempted to link variation
in regulations across countries to bank valuation, we are not aware of any study that
examines whether such variations affect bank earnings quality. It will be interesting to
know whether the index of earnings quality constructed in this thesis is able to predict
the performance of banks in different countries during or after the crisis.
However, our study is not without its limitations. First, while we take the best possible
approach to mitigate measurement errors, we cannot completely rule out this problem.
For a fact, we constructed our measures of earnings quality from limited time series data
when compared to that available for similar studies on industrial firms. Even though the
validation of our aggregate earnings quality measure suggests that the measure correl-
ates in the expected direction with some country-specific measures of transparency and
opacity, we believe that the data limitation in many of the countries that we study is
an important issue that may tweak our findings. In addition, we only consider limited
dimensions of earnings quality in this thesis. For example, none of our studies considers
the implications of market-based earnings quality measures on the outcomes examined
in this thesis. Given the multi-dimensional nature of earnings quality and the established
evidence that different earnings quality attributes exhibit different outcomes, it would be
interesting to uncover what role, if any, other earnings attributes play in bank equity.
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